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This study investigates Anglo-Saudi cultural relations from 1950 to 2010, with the 
aim of greater understanding the nature of those relations, analysing the factors 
affecting them and examining their role in enhancing cultural relations between the 
two countries. Furthermore, the thesis is grounded within the area of public 
diplomacy, using cultural exchange as a means of developing ties between the UK 
and Saudi Arabia, and evaluating the power of Saudi-British cultural diplomacy to 
improve bilateral relations.  
This thesis has been undertaken using an analysis methodology in order to 
examine the factors and events effecting Anglo-Saudi cultural relations by providing a 
study of political, economic, security and educational factors and their impact on such 
relations. It questions how and why certain events occurred, how these impacted on 
cultural ties, and then examines the ensuing consequences.  
The research is made up of seven chapters. The first chapter provides an 
explanation of the conceptual and theoretical development of culture, cultural 
relations and cultural diplomacy. In the second chapter the thesis deals with the 
historical background of Anglo-Saudi relations and its current development, and then 
examines the factors that have impacted on Saudi-British bilateral relations, 
specifically the Buraimi and the Suez crises during the 1950s and 1960s in chapter 3, 
booming oil prices in the 1970s in chapter 4, the higher education links between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain during the 1980s and 1990s in chapter 5, the relationship in the 
light of the events of 11 September 2001 in chapter 6, and finally the growth of 
educational co-operation and the role of the British Council in the Kingdom of Saudi 




In its examination of cultural, political and educational factors, the study has 
drawn on primary data from various archives in both Britain and Saudi Arabia, in 
addition to reports from the British Council, the Saudi Embassy, the Cultural Bureau 
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In today’s cosmopolitan world, cultural relations are part of a normal lifestyle. 
Furthermore, globalization has meant that there has been a steady increase in 
economic, educational, and political dealings taking place between people from 
different cultural backgrounds, and in order to achieve success in these dealings 
cultural factors need to be taken into account.
1
 Indeed, it is an era when political and 
cultural affairs go hand in hand on a national level.  
Since the beginning of the new century relations between the government of 
Saudi Arabia and the West have become much more complex for a variety of reasons, 
such as the events of 11 September 2001. This has made it even more important to 
avoid cultural misunderstanding and to create a better climate for communication 
between the people of Saudi Arabia and other governments, particularly those in 
Western countries.  
For this thesis, the United Kingdom has been chosen as a case study of Anglo-
Saudi cultural relations with the intention of examining and analysing the evolution of 
Anglo-Saudi cultural relations. The thesis is grounded within the area of public 
diplomacy, using cultural and educational exchanges as a means of developing ties 
between the UK and Saudi Arabia. In particular, it will look at education as a vehicle 
for cultural engagement.  
More specifically, this research asks three primary questions:  
 To what extent have the cultural relations of both countries developed and 
engaged since the 1950s? 
 To what extent have political factors affected bilateral cultural relations? 
                                                 
 
1
 Jeanne M. Brett, 2000. “Culture and Negotiation”, International Journal of Psychology, (Wiley-




 To what extent has education evolved as the key cultural asset in the bilateral 
relationship between the two countries? 
It will also be demonstrated through this research that Anglo-Saudi cultural relations 
cannot be viewed solely on one aspect, or determined by one factor, but rather exist as 
a function of a complex relationship between both sides, and are also affected by 
external factors coming specifically from the United States and the relationship 
between Muslims around the world and the West.  
When discussing Saudi-European relations, the policy of both sides (European 
and Saudi) towards one another is essentially based on political and economic 
advantage. Gerd Nonneman, in his article about Saudi relations with Europe, 
indicated that there have “been issues where deep conviction (whether religious or 
political), matters of pride or questions of intercultural communication have come 
very much to the fore.” Examples quoted by Nonneman include: 
“the decision by King Faisal in 1973 to impose an oil 
boycott in response to Western support for Israel; on a 
much smaller scale, the upset over the Death of a Princess 
episode in 1980, which demonstrated a mutual lack of 
comprehension; or the debate in the late 1990s over policy 
towards Iraq. Yet such issues usually become especially 
important when they link in with the key considerations [...] 
for instance, when they are seen to impact on the legitimacy 
of the Saudi regime, or on the security of mutual economic 
interests. On their own, and away from those linkages, they 
tend not to reorientate policy very significantly or for very 
long.”2 
 
Nonneman asserts that much of the present Saudi-European relationship was borne 
out of long-standing Saudi-British relations, and the history of both countries confirm 
this. In December 1915, Abdul Aziz met with Sir Percy Cox, the British Resident in 
                                                 
 
2 Gerd Nonneman, 2001. “Saudi-European Relations 1902-2001: A Pragmatic Quest for Relative 





charge of Gulf Affairs, to sign the first treaty that would build closer ties between the 
House of Saud and the UK. In 1916, Abdul Aziz was invited to Kuwait, as a guest of 
honour at a meeting for all Britain’s regional allies.3 
In 1917, towards the end of World War I, the first formal British mission was 
established in Riyadh.
4
 The delegation was headed by Harry St. John Philby, who in 
1924 left British government service and became a trader, took up residence in 
Jeddah, converted to Islam and changed his name to Abdullah.
5
  
In 1932, following the announcement by Abdul Aziz of the unification of Najd 
and the Hijaz and all the territories of his kingdom into a single sovereign state that 
would be known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with its capital in Riyadh, the new 
King sent a diplomatic mission to London. By 1934, the Saudi Embassy was well 
established and the Anglo-Saudi relationship had developed.
6
  
In February 1945, following the Yalta Conference, Sir Winston Churchill met 
King Abdul Aziz on the Suez Canal.
7
 Educational and cultural links between the two 
Kingdoms began soon after this meeting, when some of the younger sons, grandsons 
and daughters of King Abdul Aziz were sent to Britain for their education. Other 
Saudis of means became frequent visitors to the UK for study and training, while 
British adventurers such as Rosita Forbes, Bertram Thomas, Wilfred Thesiger and 
                                                 
 
3 Gary Troeller, 1976. The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa’ud (Frank 
Cass: London); Richard Bayly Winder, 1965. Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century (Macmillan: 
London). 
4 Joseph Kostiner, 1996. The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical 
State (Oxford University Press: Oxford). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Clive Leatherdale, 1983. Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939: The Imperial Oasis (Frank Cass: 
London). 




Harry St. John Philby explored the desert of Arabia and wrote accounts of their 
extraordinary experiences for the audiences back in Britain.
8
 
During the 1960s, George Thompson, Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs in Harold Wilson’s government, visited Saudi Arabia on 
numerous occasions
9
 and conveyed to the Saudi authorities that the United Kingdom 
considered its relationship with the Saudi government as the most important 
relationship it had with any Arab country. 
With increasing numbers of British people working in the Kingdom, the first 
British school was opened in Jeddah in 1967. The same year, with the aim of 
promoting bilateral cultural and educational relations, the British Council opened its 
first office in Riyadh. Today there are three British Council offices in the Kingdom, 
running a range of English courses and English language programmes, as well as 
teacher training and education counselling. 
By the early 1970s, thousands of Saudi students had been accepted for 
undergraduate and postgraduate studies, as well as courses in the English language, in 
different part of the United Kingdom. From the beginning of 1975, as Saudi Arabia 
emerged as a strong force for modernization, the British Council and British 
                                                 
 
8 Harry St. John Philby was “in charge of British Political Mission to Central Arabia, 1917-18; crossed 
Arabian Peninsular [sic] from Uqair to Jidda; carried out exploration in South Central Arabia; in 
political charge of Central Arabian Mission to England, 1919; Adviser to Ministry of Interior, 
Mesopotamia, 1920-21; Chief British Representative, Transjordan, 1921-24; retired from ICS, 1925; 
elected to Council of Royal Geographical Society, 1925; awarded Sir Richard Burton memorial medal 
by Royal Asiatic Society, 1925; Resident Director in Arabia of Sharqieh Ltd, 1926-46; further 
exploration of Arabian Peninsular [sic] 1930-55; Director, Mitchell Cotts (Sharqieh) Ltd., Jedda, 1946-
55.” PHILBY, Reference code: GB165-0229. Title: Harry St John Philby Collection. Name of creator: 
Philby, Harry St John Bridger (1885-1960) Explorer and Orientalist Dates of creation of material: 
c1902-1957. Level of description: Fonds. Extent: 89 boxes.” St. Antony’s College, Middle East Centre. 
Accessed 14 January 2015. http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/mec/MEChandlists/Philby-Collection.pdf. Philby 
wrote many books and articles about his journeys of exploration, such as “Across Arabia: From the 
Persian Gulf to the Red Sea”, 1920. The Geographical Journal, (Royal Geographical Society: 
London); Arabia 1930 (Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York); “Rub’Al Khali: An Account of 
Exploration in the Great South Desert of Arabia”, 1933. The Geographical Journal, (Royal 
Geographical Society: London); A Pilgrim in Arabia 1946. (R. Hale Ltd.: London); Arabian Jubilee 
1952 (R. Hale Ltd.: London); Forty Years in the Wilderness 1957, (R. Hale Ltd.: London).  
9




companies played a significant role in strengthening the special relationship, which 
resulted in accelerating and expanding English language learning centres in the main 
cities in Saudi Arabia, in addition to the opening of hundreds of British businesses. 
In March 1981, Margaret Thatcher became the first British prime minister to 
visit Saudi Arabia.
10
 It was during her time as a prime minister that the British public 
first recognised the enormous international influence of Saudi Arabia, not only as the 
main producers of crude oil but as a regional superpower, the centre of Islamic values 
and Islamic culture, and a leader of the wider Islamic family of Arab and non-Arab 
nations.  
During the First Gulf War, which resulted from Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990, the strength of political ties between the two countries was illustrated 
once again as Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom fought side by side to expel the 
Iraqi forces and free Kuwait.
11
 
The firm friendship survived the backlash from the terrible events of 11 
September 2001 and the Second Gulf War of 2003, and there are currently not only 
many thousands of British expatriates living in Saudi Arabia, but thousands more 
Saudis living in the UK, creating in the process a vast range of ties between the two 
Kingdoms. Currently more than 30,000 British Muslims, out of approximately two 
million Muslims in Britain, travel to Saudi Arabia every year to perform Hajj, the 
annual Muslim pilgrimage. The growing bilateral relations over recent years have 
revived the bicultural fusion that started in the early 1970s, when thousands of Saudi 
                                                 
 
10 William Quandt, 1981. Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil (The Brookings 
Institution: Washington, DC, USA). 




students were offered the opportunity to study at higher educational institutes in the 
UK. 
 
Studies on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Problems with Cultural 
Relations and Resources 
Political studies on Saudi Arabia exist in various forms. British government policy in 
the Middle East is well documented, particularly in the early part of the twentieth 
century when there was a significant amount of literature dedicated to Anglo-Saudi 
political relations. For example, the Arab Bulletin was a periodical produced in Cairo 
by the Arab Bureau, a section of the Intelligence department of the British forces in 
the Near East; established in 1915 to monitor German-Turkish Policy during the First 
World War.  
However, while British policy with regards to Saudi Arabia is also well 
documented after the Second World War, to date no comprehensive study has been 
undertaken on Anglo-Saudi cultural relations in more recent times, particularly during 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, no academic study has, up until now, used 
Saudi’s cultural policy towards Britain, or Britain’s cultural policy towards Saudi 
Arabia, as a case study for the examination of Saudi and British bilateral relations.
12
 
“[…] little work has been done to fill in the contours. All too 
often, new writing consists of a rehash of stories already 
told, often relying on the same secondary sources, or of 
superficial country surveys prompted by the region’s high 
profile over the last decade or two. Scholarly attention to 
the Peninsula is the product largely of no more than the last 
quarter-century. It is relatively sparse, and variable in its 
quality. With few exceptions, historical scholarship has yet 
to move beyond the comfortable horizons of country 
                                                 
 
12
 J.E. Peterson, 1991. “The Arabian Peninsula in Modern Times: A Historiographical 
Survey”, American Historical Review, (American Historical Association: Bloomington, IN., USA), vol. 




studies and political analysis. One feature of Saudi Arabia's 
socioeconomic development and the emphasis placed on 
higher education has been the creation of a body of 
scholarly work, generally in the form of unpublished 
doctoral dissertations, by Saudi students, many of whom 
later rose to high positions in the government. One 
wonders to what degree these students were able to 
translate their ideas into practice upon their return home 
to government service.”13 
 
In some cases, political events and even military crises between the countries have 
had an impact on bilateral relations on all levels. Most of the research chronicling 
tensions between the two countries have shown the negative impact on political and 
economic ties, but none have explored extensively the impact on cultural and 
educational relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia.  14  
“Earlier writing on the Peninsula dealt mostly with rulers and 
tribes. More recent writing, whether scholarly or otherwise, has 
concentrated heavily on country case studies. Much of this is 
political history (“names and dates”) but the country emphasis 
also holds true generally for what little economic and social 
history exists. As such, state formation provides a convenient 
and useful prism through which to view the historiography of 
Arabia. At first glance, the literature on Arabia seems 
misleadingly substantial. Its bulk is descriptive or narrative.”15 
 
The collection and analysis of information regarding bilateral cultural relations 
between Saudi Arabia and the West is often problematical. For an effective analysis to 
take place, access to a variety of sources, such as the Saudi Archive in general and 
media Archives in particular, is often difficult. There has also been little or no access 
to the Saudi Information Ministry library since it was set up, and even after it was 
changed to the Cultural and Information Ministry it is difficult even to meet the 
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officials responsible for the international cultural relations department, or the external 
Media department. 
Most Saudi students know how difficult it can be to do their research and how 
poor the facilities are in order to conduct research. That not only includes a lack of 
public and private libraries, but also limited facilities for researchers to access 
information, especially from government institutes such as ministry libraries. 
Furthermore, the author of this thesis is of the opinion that the idea of doing research 
“by Saudi researchers” in Saudi is not welcoming for obtaining in depth information 
about any private institution either internally or externally as much as any government 
one. Also, it is noticeable that the only easy way for a Saudi researcher to get 
information is to know an official in the department or institute that one wants to 
examine. Strangely, Western researchers can often do that more easily than Saudis.  
For example, the author of this research attempted several times to meet some 
highly placed officials in government and private institutes in Saudi Arabia and 
London to get information about cultural matters related to their institutes work. 
However, as often as not, requests were ignored “or refused” and in the best cases 
they responded with superficial or propaganda statements. 
For example, one of the institutions approached was the Saudi MBI Al Jaber 
Foundation in London. The aims of this institute include a role to close the gap 
between Arab and the West by education or, as its website states to “create an 
environment which brings people together, promoting good governance and cultural 
dialogue.” However, when the author attempted to examine it closely, there was little 
welcome even from the public relations department. 
This was just one case but a similar reaction or result, with different excuses 




as the Saudi-British Society, the Saudi Cultural Bureau, the British Council in Saudi, 
the Saudi Embassy, Education and Higher Education Ministries, and the Ministry of 
Culture and Information etc. Such responses to requests for information are not small 
obstacles, and other researchers in the region have observed similar difficulties. For 
example Nonneman
16
 observed that Saudi Cultural aspects are not used to engaging in 
this kind of study. Hence, at appropriate places the thesis will address a number of 
challenges posed by undertaking this study, and will discuss the degree to which these 
challenges relate to the lack of directly available information which has impacted on 
the research process. However, in some cases organisations were very helpful, such as 
the UNESCO, the Saudi delegation in Paris and the Saudi Foreign Ministry, which 
will be shown in this thesis. 
This thesis analyses the 60 year-long cultural relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain from 1950-2010, following the establishment of the Kingdom after 
the unification of the Saudi state, and the construction of the state infrastructure and 
the launch of real foreign relations. Due prominence is given to the historical and 
continuing cultural relationship between Saudi Arabia and Britain, as it seems 
peculiar that nothing substantial has been written about it, or even between Saudi and 
other Western countries, beyond snapshots of the current period in this relationship. 
As has been established, doing research upon Saudi Arabia is beset with 
problems and challenges and gathering data from Saudi Arabia is extremely difficult. 
Even the British Council in Riyadh and London were not very helpful with regard to 
collecting reports from the 1980s onwards. In addition, the reports and data of the 
                                                 
 





British Council in Saudi Arabia can only be found in the British Archives in London 
for the 1970s. 
However, when this information was requested from the Council in London, 
the reply by email was that, “we do not have it”, and from Riyadh the response was, 
“it has been destroyed”. It may be concluded that any matter related to Saudi Arabia is 
still considered confidential, even if the information required is only the number of 
Saudi students enrolled in the British Council in Saudi Arabia during the period 
between 1980 and 2001.  
Nevertheless, this discrete approach to providing researchers information was 
not limited to the British Council; the Saudi Embassy and the Saudi Cultural Bureau 
in London were also unhelpful in this regard. In addition, it took a long time to 
receive a response from many of them, and any response that was received was 
mostly a little information if anything, and in the best cases some brief general 
statements on the subject without any documentation.  
Perhaps this reluctance is due to the fact that no serious and responsible 
“scientific attention” has been shown in Saudi cultural relations with the world, and 
that there are no scholars who specialise in the Saudi cultural relations strategy and 
the role of culture from an international perspective. This was in fact raised by Dr 
Abdel Aziz bin Slemh the minister responsible for external media in the Ministry of 
Culture and Information in Saudi Arabia. Bin Slemh, who the author had a chance to 
meet briefly in 2010 at the “GCC Days” Conference in London, was asking: “is there 
any clear vision for the nature of the work of the culture sector in the Ministry of 
Culture and Information? To make it clear, does the ministry have a particular 
strategy about the cultural field? Does the ministry have international cultural 




and the main thing is the correct implementation of these strategies and their outcome. 
More importantly, the officials who work in such departments have to be fully aware 
of the cultural importance of their work and its advantages. Bin Slemh has stimulated 
the creation of a platform of policies which can be inspired by work philosophy and a 
way of thinking about cultural activities.
17
 He added that the existence of cultural 
policies are an important key in any country, the absence of such policies, or if they 
are unclear for the officials who work in this field, was described by him as like 
pushing a kart in the dark and not knowing its direction.
18
 “An exercise of this kind 
can be fruitful only if more generally grounded in an understanding of the trends in 
Saudi foreign policy.”19 
Therefore, this thesis attempts to fill this lacuna by providing a detailed 
historical account of Anglo-Saudi cultural policy since 1950, and by offering a 
perspective on Anglo-Saudi cultural policy in recent years. At the same time, a 
rigorous examination of the available historical evidence and documents aims to 
highlight the complexities of Anglo-Saudi cultural policies, challenging simplistic 
explanations of Saudi's pro-British stance and vice-versa. 
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Saudis Studying in Britain and Cultural Institutes 
There are many ties of history and friendship between Britain and the Saudi kingdom, 
including well-developed cultural, educational and sporting exchanges.
20
 For 
example, since 1980 “there is a large and successful sports co-operation programme 
involving now over 75 training exchanges annually.”21 
The objectives of the Saudi government are to fulfil the educational and 
cultural objectives of the Kingdom, which reflect the true nature of Islam and 
contemporary Saudi society and prevent conflicts between nations by promoting 
religious dialogue. Such a strategy may well have a profound political impact in the 
Middle East, easing tensions between nations. Now and after 9/11 the Saudi 
government, at its highest levels, has been keen to adopt educational and cultural 
policies designed to engage Saudi citizens with other cultures.  
Historically, in the 1970s, the number of Saudi Arabian students studying 
abroad was relatively low, and the distribution among European countries was also 
low. However, even then Britain was more likely to host Saudi Arabian students than 
the rest of Europe.  
The Anglo-Saudi Cultural Agreement of 1967, stipulated that dealings should 
be reciprocal, although the reality was that there were no student exchanges or 
exchanges of scholars on the Saudi side. Rather, the UK provided professors and 
scientists to Saudi Arabia and no students went to Saudi Arabia from Britain. 
Subsequently, in the mid-1970s, when Saudi Arabia's external policy had 
evolved towards an international opening of its economy, a new development policy 
scheme by King Faisal resulted in a flow of students going abroad. . 
                                                 
 
20 Hanley, Saudi Arabia. 




The fact cannot be overlooked that Saudi students in recent times can be found 
in almost all towns and cities in Britain. Furthermore, big cities, such as London, 
Manchester, Nottingham, Birmingham and Edinburgh have large numbers of Saudis 
studying at postgraduate level. London alone hosted almost half of the 6,000 Saudi 
students that were studying in the UK in 2010. Even smaller cities like Bournemouth 
and Brighton have large numbers of English language students. At the same time, 
however, there are potential gains related to student exchanges for both countries; 
strengthening of cultural relations for example, enhanced commercial ties, transfer of 
technology, awareness of the other culture and promoting peace. 
In the face of the escalating numbers of Saudi students in Britain, the 
Government of the Kingdom established an Education Office in the mid-1960s and 
the British Council opened in Saudi in 1967. As this thesis will show, it is incorrect to 
equate the roles of the Saudi Cultural Bureau in London and the British Council in 
Saudi Arabia, since the activities of both are quite different.  
The cultural patterns above are reflected in some historical and current issues 
in Saudi-British relations, and have implications for the future as well. The thesis will 
highlight some of them in order to better understand the foreign policy of the Saudi 











Methodology - An Overall Picture 
The relationship between both countries, such as political, security and economic 
issues, has been examined in some depth, so it will be enough here merely to 
highlight it in relation to cultural relations. In this thesis, “Saudi Arabia is 
undoubtedly the ‘heavyweight’ on the GCC side. In some ways, indeed, GCC policy 
towards Europe can be seen as an extension of Saudi policy (e.g. on 
petrochemicals).”22 
This thesis has been undertaken using an analysis methodology in order to 
examine the factors and events effecting Anglo-Saudi cultural relations. In order to do 
that the thesis has built on analytical frameworks and approaches. The analytical 
frameworks include both the conceptual frameworks, and the impact factors approach. 
Conceptual frameworks have been applied to the term cultural diplomacy, according 
to the methodology applied by Yin. “The definition and key features of the concept 
have been explored in detail, with emphasis on the role of government and its 
purposes. To avoid conceptual confusion, the relations between cultural diplomacy, 
public diplomacy and soft power are also examined. Cultural diplomacy highlights the 
role of culture in the external diplomacy of a country and also the role of government 
in facilitating the cultural diplomacy overseas.”23 
The methodology adopted in this thesis to pursue its aims depend on the 
concept of public diplomacy, which uses two inseparable tracks in role and function 
which concludes by cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. Yin, in his Master’s 
thesis Britain’s Cultural Diplomacy in China, covered this point well by saying: 
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“Richard Arndt distinguished between cultural relations 
and cultural diplomacy, stating that the former grows 
“naturally and organically, without government 
intervention” and includes cross-cultural encounters such 
as trade transactions and tourism, flows of students, 
communications, book circulations, immigration, access to 
media, etc. Cultural diplomacy, according to Arndt, mainly 
concerns formal diplomatic relations with diplomats in the 
service of national governments employing these 
exchanges for the purposes of national interests thus 
emphasizing the role of governments and its goals it hopes 
to obtain. This thesis also argues that cultural diplomacy, 
often conducted towards one country, is often one-sided 
while cultural relations emphasizes the mutual or bilateral 
relationships between the two sides. The practice of 
cultural diplomacy has been known as international 
cultural relations in the UK.Thus for the convenience of 
discussion, these two terms are often used 
interchangeably.”24 
 
Therefore, the thesis will concentrate on concept and practice. The research is based 
on an analysis of the mutual cultural relations between Saudi and Britain, where 
cultural aspects in their relations seems have been given little consideration from both 
sides until now. Cultural aspects in their relations have been examined to find 
evidence of the extent of improvement over the six decades being studied, besides the 
other more obvious relations, factors and appearances, and in which way both 
countries use cultural diplomacy between them. 
Furthermore, “the introduction to [Anglo-Saudi] cultural diplomacy has been 
examined under this conceptual framework, with focuses on [throughout the thesis] 
the [KSA-UK] governmental level (emphasising the role of government) and at the 
operational level (namely to examine how British Council, [Saudi Cultural Bureau] 
and other [state and] non-state actors are involved).”25 







The selected case is based on the United Kingdom because it is the second 
major international player after the US, and its increasing presence in KSA in security 
and investment activities, and culturally via the British Council, is very obvious. Also, 
Britain has had strong historical relationship with Saudi Arabia since 1902, indeed 
longer than any other Western country as mentioned earlier. On the other side, the 
continued increase in Saudi students and tourists in Britain is very visible. This 
aspect, alongside the educational link in particular, will be discussed throughout the 
thesis. Therefore, it is valuable to select Britain as a case study of Western countries 
in an examination of the cultural relations with Saudi Arabia, which would be key in 
understanding the cross-cultural dimension with Saudi and this kind of relationship. 
Therefore, conclusions may already be drawn that Saudi should build connections and 
trust with Britain and should take progressive steps in this kind of relationship with 
Britain for all the reasons indicated above and others. 
Another important consideration for this choice is that as Britain has a 
completely different culture than Saudi, for example the religion and the language, it 
could argued that making strong cultural links and communications with such people 
would be very difficult and a challenge to both countries. So in this thesis it attempts 
to find ways and evidence, using a variety of factors and platforms, in how these two 
opposing countries could link culturally together.  
Data and Materials Collection 
This thesis combines historical and analytical approaches to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the impact of fluctuating events (the Buraimi Oasis and Suez Crises, and 
then in the final chapter the terror attacks of 9/11) on bilateral relations. The study has 
intentionally chosen not to examine all the important events that have defined the 




during the 1960s, the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, the oil embargo that followed the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and the 2003 Iraq war. These 
receive passing mention but are not the focus of this thesis. 
This study starts by explaining the concepts of culture in general, and then 
clarifying the distinction of the concepts of cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. 
“Even if there is a clear difference in cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange, the 
two concepts are not entirely separable.” In their paper of Correlation between 
Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange, Bin, Cho and others see “cultural 
exchanges as a subordinate category of cultural diplomacy, perceiving it as a way to 
enhance the positive linkage between nations.”26 
 Anthropological research states that international cultural relations include 
any acceptable kind of social link. Social activities in today’s world are, at most, 
effective in designing and shaping international cultural relations. This practice has 
become a major part of the diplomatic means to achieve a government’s objectives. 27 
Sensitivity to other cultures and learning to communicate effectively, is the 




Despite the practical difficulties of this research, material was located in the 
British Archives. The study has performed a rigorous examination of the available 
historical evidence and documents, with an aim to highlight the complexities of 
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Anglo-Saudi cultural policies, challenging simplistic explanations of Saudi’s pro-
British stance and vice-versa.  
“Scholars, who conduct research involving international dimensions, note the 
importance of primary sources as a viable option for data collection.”29 The primary 
sources obtained from the official archives of Britain were documents of the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Colonial Office and Cabinet papers, which 
were examined at the Public Records Office at Kew. Other primary sources included 
the published collections of declassified documents, private papers and memoirs.  
Secondary sources were obtained from a variety of private and institutional 
libraries, such as books, theses, periodicals and newspapers, and also private 
dialogues. Sources were obtained from both sides; from the Saudi side: The Cultural 
Bureau and Embassy of Saudi Arabia in London, the Department of Statistics, the 
Monetary Agency, the Ministry of Higher Education, King Faisal Foundation Library, 
and Al-Darh King Abdul Aziz Library, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
On the British side, the following institutions provided valuable information: 
The British Council in Riyadh, The British Library and King's College Library, 
London. In addition, for limitations in sources on this topic, British media could be 
channelled towards alternative sources, for which it proved not merely possible to 
obtain the views in how British people see Saudi Arabia but also in forming their 
views toward the country and to show their interest in it.Therefore, the purview of this 
study will encompass analysis of the media and some news throughout the thesis 
which could take into account cultural differences. References from newspapers and 
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newspaper archives for the Guardian, BBC News, the Times, the Arab News, Saudi 
Gazette, and the New York Times were particularly valuable. 
It should be noted here, given an awareness of the pragmatic limitations of 
sources, that this study has not explored the public views (or the views of a certain 
group) of cultural relations on each side, nor the views of Saudis studying in Britain. 
Rather, as stated earlier, analysis of the impact of some events and factors on Anglo-
Saudi cultural relations through, mostly, qualitative methods and some quantitative 
methods, such as data collected from the original sources such as the Saudi Monetary 
Agency (SAMA), Saudi Airlines, the Saudi Cultural Bureau, the Foreign Ministry and 
finally the Saudi Higher Education Ministry. These sources of data have links to the 
majority of qualitative data available which is related to the factors that could impact 
on those numbers, such as the amount of investment and trade, the number of Saudis 
studying abroad and travellers from/to London, which were all analysed to show to 
what extent they impact upon each other. 
Therefore, figures from the Saudi Statistics Body from 1962 to 2010 have 
been chosen, including the numbers of Saudi students studying in Britain, Saudi 
people travelling to Britain from 1970 to 2010, and vice versa which demonstrate how 
“the impact of Britain’s cultural influence can be witnessed by the growing number of 
[Saudi] students studying in UK [and the travellers]. The popularity of British culture 
in [Saudi] can also serve as evidence of the positive results of its cultural 
diplomacy.”30 
Also, statistics from SAMA for the investment and trade between both 
countries, as well as some statistics from Saudi Higher Education annual reports, can 
give an indication of what has been achieved. 
                                                 
 




Statistics of the number of travellers between both countries, and the numbers 
of Saudi students in the UK, which was very extensive from 1962 up to 2006, came 
from the Saudi archives and from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), which was used extensively throughout the thesis. In fact, the 
movement of travellers between the two countries preceded diplomatic relations. 
Trade and investment data between both countries also came from a variety of 
sources, especially from SAMA and the OECD. 
The author also managed to undertake informal interviews with Mr Daniel 
Kawczynski, Member of Parliament for Shrewsbury & Atcham, who is Chairman of 
the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Saudi Arabia, and also with some members of 
the British Council in Riyadh and Jeddah. In the same context, the author also had a 
discussion on the matter of Anglo-Saudi cultural ties with HRH Prince Turki Al-
Faisal, the former Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom from 2002-2005, in his 
office at Georgetown University. In addition, the author had a conversation with the 
Under-Secretary of the Saudi Foreign Ministry for Economic and Cultural Relations 
in Riyadh, HE Dr Yusuf Al-Saadoun, and with one of the cultural officials at the 
Saudi Arabia Embassy in London. Finally, an interview was held with the longest 
serving member of the Saudi Cultural Bureau in London, Mustafa Mursi. 
The research also includes observations from the author herself within this 
thesis. These are included for two reasons; firstly she is a Saudi national and has lived 
her whole life in the kingdom until 2005. Secondly, from the beginning of 2006 the 
author transferred to Britain to study (English, Master's, and PhD) until the 
completion of this thesis at the end of 2014. 
So she has spent around 8 years immersed in the British culture, under what is 




student”, and is ideally placed to comment on the current state of Anglo-Saudi 
relations at a cultural level.  
The author was fascinated by living in the UK, which is completely different 
from her native Saudi culture. On the one hand, she noticed early after her arrival to 
study in the UK that some British people she met at her school were also interested to 
learn about Saudi culture, but on the other hand she noticed how difficult it was to 
contact with Britons outside her academy. In particular, there was no encouragement 
for them to communicate with the author without a formal reason for a chat, or unless 
there was a place that collected them together, such as a school, academy or 
university. Therefore, the author came to the conclusion that if Saudis want to have a 
greater contact with British people, being in educational institutes were the best places 
to start. Also, she noticed how the British needed a reason to connect with foreign 
people, in general, both inside and outside Britain. In this regard, it is worth 
mentioning that Saudis must look for new ways (reasons) and initiatives to encourage 
people to communicate with them, beside the links have already existed between both 
countries like investment and trade. 
However, the physical appearance of Saudis studying in Britain is a great 
opportunity to take the advantage in this respect:  
“In an educational setting social capital is defined ‘as the 
networks, together with norms, values, and understandings 
that facilitate cooperation with or among groups.’ […] In a 
study of Australian universities, Burnheim (2003) noted 
that it is important to understand: 1.) the particular role of 
social capital in the networks and networking within the 
universities, which themselves constitute capital; and 2.) 
the universities’ roles in the creation of the norms, values, 
and understandings which enable networks to operate. 
Similarly, in a mixed method study regarding international 
students in Australia, Neri and Ville (2006) noted that poor 




institutions have an adverse impact on the wellbeing and 
academic performance of the students.”31 
 
Being a Saudi living with an English host-family is an opportunity that must not be 
missed. To live within the relevant culture is a great advantage over living in a 
different culture. The education institute and a close host-family gives a Saudi student 
living among them the best way to identify English culture, aside from just speaking 
the English language. Students who possess a direct knowledge of British culture 
have an advantage when working to improve the image of both sides, and might gain 
improvement in some essential aspects of their personality. Any approach and study 
of cultural relations can produce reliable results, regardless of the homesickness or 
difficulties that these students might face. 
Thesis Structure  
 This thesis is divided into seven chapters, including this introduction and 
conclusion. Chapter 1 provides the conceptual and theoretical development of culture, 
cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. Discussing the importance of the term 
culture for the thesis, and notions of public diplomacy and the role of culture within it, 
the chapter locates the importance of culture within the umbrella of public diplomacy. 
It also examines the first Cultural Agreement made between Saudi Arabia and the 
UK, following negotiations which started in 1967 to the eventual signing of the 
agreement in 1975. 
Chapter 2 provides a background of the bilateral relations of both countries, 
and an overall picture of cultural relations since 1945, and the discussion of cultural 
relations is continued in chapter 3, which covers the period of the 1950s and 1960s, 
examining in the process, the animosity between the Saudi government and Britain 
                                                 
 




over the Buraimi Oasis dispute and the Suez crisis that took place in these decades. 
This chapter will show not only the importance of significant security interests in 
establishing cultural relations but also the centrality of security issues in preventing 
evolving cultural ties.  
Chapter 4 discusses the huge investments of the United Kingdom in Saudi 
Arabia after the oil boom of the 1970s, and traces the shift in relations in favour of the 
cultural relations between both countries. Chapter 5 discusses the impact of Saudi 
educational development in Saudi Arabia and its links to bilateral ties with the UK 
during 1980s and 1990s.  
Chapter 6 traces the impact of 9/11 on bilateral ties and how this has 
influenced cultural relations. In particular, events since 9/11 have renewed scholarly 
interest in the role of culture in international security as they increasingly view 
“challenges like [...] the war on terror through the lens of national identity and 
culture”.32 
Finally, chapter 7 focuses on the higher education exchanges that have taken 
place in recent times and examines the role of cultural institutes – the British Council 
in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Cultural Bureau in London – in the bilateral 
relationship. For example, Chou et al. discussed how scholarship opportunities for 
international students are one of the most promising factors in higher education at the 
present time.
33
 This opportunity to study in Britain became reality for Saudi students 
through the King Abdullah Programme and through the facilities made available by 
the British government and international student’s mobility systems in the UK. 
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Cultural misconception is all too often a cause of many conflicts; big and 
small, violent and non-violent. Acknowledging cultural diversity requires clear and 
strong cultural relations. In particular, it impacts on bilateral “imaginings” of the 
Other and influences directly the cultural imagination of both.
34
  
As such, building a solid cultural relationship is an end in itself, but it is also a 
prerequisite to moving beyond cultural sensitivity and to addressing fundamental 
issues such as the consumption of oil, commercial exchange, security issues, and 
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THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 “In today’s world, international friendships that cross 
cultural and political boundaries are essential to the 
development of better understanding and to the realization 
of our shared goal of a peaceful and fruitful co-existence in 
a secure world.”  
 






This thesis offers the first in-depth study of Anglo-Saudi cultural relations. The first 
chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical development of culture, cultural 
relations and cultural diplomacy. The chapter will discuss the importance of the term 
‘culture’ in relation to the thesis and notions of public diplomacy and the role of 
culture within it, locating the importance of culture within the umbrella of the public 
diplomacy.  
The thesis is grounded within the area of public diplomacy, using cultural 
exchange as a way of developing ties between the UK and Saudi Arabia. The thesis 
explores cultural relations and this chapter provides a definition of culture in order to 
proceed with such analysis from the start.  
The idea of public diplomacy is also defined and discussed, including cultural 
relations and public diplomacy and the origins of formalised cultural relations with 
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the UK and Europe in the form of the 1967 Cultural Agreement with the UK and the 
Euro-Arab Dialogue. Some reasons will be given for the initiation of the Dialogue and 
also the success of the initiatives, or otherwise, will be considered. This idea suggests 
that public diplomacy has transcended traditional forms of diplomacy, moving beyond 
engagement with leader/regimes, to engagement with people. This appears to support 
the importance of cultural exchange/education and will also be explored in greater 
detail in subsequent chapters.  
Furthermore, the question may be raised as to how the impact of public 
diplomacy is measured? The thesis will be concerned in how this idea of public 
diplomacy fits into more conventional diplomatic relations between the two states and 
the impact that it might have on bilateral relations between the two nations. 
The thesis assumes that education will facilitate cultural exchange but until 
now no evidence has been offered to support this view. Because the way in which this 
must be measured needs a different methodological approach, this thesis will discuss 
the validity of the argument for the bilateral cultural relations between Saudi Arabia 
and the UK. 
Hence this chapter is a conceptual  unpacking of culture, public diplomacy and 
the role of education. It will also provide an analysis of the first and only “Cultural 
Agreement” between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1967.  
 
1. Definition of Culture  
To commence it is necessary to first define what is meant by the word “Culture”. 
However, without going too deeply into the complexities of the many different 




Varenne in his writing, “The Culture of Culture”.36 Instead this term will be confined 
to a brief definition by a cultural body - the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). 
The term – which corresponds to “Thaqafa” in Arabic – is often used to refer 
to the heritage, community of beliefs, customs, traditions, ideas, values, precepts, and 
ideals “acquired by [a human] as a member of society.” The concept of culture also 
includes the attitudes and material values that frame the way people live. Moreover, it 
includes knowledge that is transferred from generation to generation, including 
literature in all its forms, music, folk art, visual art, sculpture, dance and films.
37
  
In addition, culture has been defined in several conferences held by UNESCO, 
as well as in the writings of scholars of UNESCO. Therefore, it can be summarised 
as: 
 A particular society at a particular time and place;  
 The tastes in art and manners that are favoured by a social group;  
 Acculturation: all the knowledge and values shared by a society; 
 The attitudes and behaviours that are characteristic of a particular 
social group or organization.
38
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Based on these definitions, there are a large number of tools that could be used to 
highlight community culture, and the features that distinguish one culture from 
another. Consequently, this can be used to find common values in wider areas of 
cultural relations common to all nations. 
1.1 A Definition of Cultural Relations 
“No two people define ‘cultural’ in precisely the same way” as George Vaillant 
asserts, “since culture means highly intellectual pursuits to some, quality clothing, 
type of food, and to yet another group the somewhat formidable field of all those 
human traits, possessions, and activities not biologically transmissible from one 
generation to another.” Cultural relations work “toward direct understanding between 
peoples as opposed to more formal contacts through their embassies, business 
organizations, and those other types of collective frame-work, which so often obscure 
the human aspects of a nation's life.”39  
Furthermore, another more detailed definition of cultural relations is given by 
Herbert Myron. His definition, based on the UNESCO model, clarifies cultural 
relations as “neither a decoration, frill and ornament, nor government connections. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Adopted in by the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development, (UNESCO: 
Sweden). From the United Nations see, Diana Ayton-Shenker, 1995. Background Note: The Challenge 
of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, (United Nations Department of Public Information 
DPI/1627/HR). Accessed on 16 February 2015 http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm. Also, Karl-Erik 
Norrman, “Definitions, Ideas, Visions and Challenge for Cultural Diplomacy”, (E-International 
Relations, 3 January 2013). Accessed on 16 February 2015 http://www.e-
ir.info/2013/01/03/definitions-ideas-visions-and-challenges-for-cultural-diplomacy; 
Aliaksandr Birukou et al.,  2009. A Formal Deflation of Culture. (University of Trento: Italy). 
Accessed on 16 February 2015 http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/1604/1/021.pdf; Jalal Ali Belshek, “The 
Influence of Culture on the Negotiation Styles of British Students”, ARECLS e-journal, (University of 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England). Accessed on 16 February 2015  
http://research.ncl.ac.uk/ARECLS/volume_3/jalalali.pdf 
39
 George C. Vaillant, 1945. “Shadow and Substance in Cultural Relations”, The Scientific Monthly, 





Rather, cultural relations are preserved as the mutual understanding between different 
people, groups based on other’s character, qualities and beliefs.”40 
In addition, the author of this thesis suggests that the learning of a modern 
language abroad, particularly in multicultural classes and institutions, could 
encourage cultural understanding. The classroom engagement between students of 
different backgrounds and ethnicity could lead to freeing themselves “from prejudice 
and provincialism.”41 
In his study of building networks through cultural relations, former Chief 
Executive of the British Council, Martin Davidson, stated in 2007 that cultural 
relations, “with its emphasis on developing long-term, mutually beneficial 
relationships, can contribute to the development of solutions by […] connecting 
people, emphasising a willingness to listen, and focusing on mutual benefit.”42 
Davidson also argues that “cultural relations do much more than develop better 
mutual understanding, but can also provide the platform on which collective action on 
issues such as climate change can be based. The ability to construct networks through 
cultural relations will be a key component of the conduct and future development of 
public diplomacy.”43 For these and other reasons, cultural relations between the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Kingdom (UK) are deeply rooted in 
common values, as will be highlighted throughout this thesis. 
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1.2 Cultural Relations and Public Diplomacy 
Public diplomacy is no longer limited to broadcast messages and publicity campaigns, 
or to the government communications of foreign officials working in the field of 
foreign policy. It has become about building relationships with actors within civil 
society in other countries and facilitating the establishment of networks between non-
government parties at home and aboard. The researcher and expert Dr Abdul-Wahab 
Al-Kayali in his Diplomacy Encyclopaedia says that diplomcy is one of the main 
instruments to achieve foreign policy aims. The definition of influence states that in 
order to induce support in various ways, some of the influence is convincing, some is 
moral and some may be immoral.
44
 
Beside the transfer of information and negotiation on behalf of governments, 
diplomats seek to strengthen relations between countries and develop them in 
different areas. Al-Kayali thinks that leaders (prime ministers, presidents, etc.) will 
use more private diplomatic channels to explain their views. 
Jean Melissen, in the first part of his book The New Public Diplomacy: Soft 
Power in International Relations
45
  and Brian Hocking
46
 seek to clarify the concept of 
public diplomacy and evaluate the diplomatic significance in the current international 
environment. They conclude that the new public diplomacy for both is a part of the 
global policy systems. Melissen offers an understanding of the new public diplomacy 
in terms of current developments. He recognises that traditionally there has been a 
connection between the practice of cultural relations and diplomacy but currently 
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there is considerable overlap as governments place great emphasis on connecting with 
“the public”. For example, in their discussions with the “Islamic World” the British 
government no longer confines its relations to the diplomats of other countries but,  
“talks through Middle Eastern Policy with moderate 
domestic Muslim organizations . Both public diplomacy and 
public affairs are directly affected by the forces of 
globalization and the recent revolution in communication 
with the public has become an increasingly complex 
challenge for foreign ministries.”47 
 
During a British Council conference, a senior diplomat raised the issue that citizens 
are no longer prepared to listen to their governments, or the governments of other 
countries, instead they want governments to listen to them. This is the face of a new 
public diplomacy that is developing, particularly in the light of the information 
revolution, where a single ‘Tweet’ or a post on a social media website can have far-
reaching effects, and the promotion of ideas can be propagated and catch on quickly. 
However, in turn the communication in this new public diplomacy becomes 
increasingly one way, for: 
 “The crux becomes clear in Jay Black’s description of 
propaganda: Where as creative communication accepts 
pluralism and displays expectations that its receivers 
should conduct further investigations of its observations, 
allegations and conclusions, propaganda does not appear to 
do so.”48                                                                 
 
Hocking builds on the multi-threaded avenues that make up public diplomacy in his 
discussion of “soft power”, when he suggests that reliance on strength and military 
“hard power” have lost their effect in a globalised world where “factors such as 
culture, ideas and values” are of greater importance “which […] encourages others to 
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want what you want.” Hocking concludes that such cultural diplomacy began after the 
end of the Second World War, where; 
 “[T]he power of […] economic attraction, becomes 
addictive and hard to escape from over time, both Britain 
and the US have been able to deploy this variant of power 
play. After 1945 the US built its sticky power on the pillars 
of free trade and the Bretton Woods institutions, together 
with the reality that the economic well-being of other 
countries was linked to that of the US.”49 
 
The link between the end of the Second World War and the dawn of ‘soft’ power is a 
compelling one. After the end of the War, the world was in disarray, Europe was 
shattered, as was the Far East, and the impact of the War spread far and wide. Yet 
America remained unscathed, it was not subjected to the heavy bombing that Europe 
and Japan suffered and its infrastructure remained intact. Culturally it bounced back 
very quickly, and there was a feeling of envy around the world. After years of 
remaining insular, America felt its way around the world. Foreign nations wanted 
what America had, but at the same time they did not want to be America, or as 
Hocking explains, nations might want to “adopt aspects of American culture while 
resisting global policies emanating from Washington.” 
“This phenomenon, suggests Ferguson, is rooted in 
historical precedent: “[…] it was precisely from the most 
Anglicized parts of the British Empire that nationalist 
movement sprang.”50  
 
At the same time the use of “hard” power, especially when being used by the 
US, has had the result of alienating parts of the globe against the US. This can be seen 
as a problem for the United States. There is a link between the successful deployment 
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of hard or coercive power and soft power [for example] among American business 
leaders that anti-US sentiment following events in Iraq is threatening their interest.
51
                                                  
 
Despite the emergence of soft power as an avenue of policy making and 
cultural diplomacy, Cynthia P. Schneider believes that cultural diplomacy is an 
excellent example of soft power, but is too often marginalised as being excessively 
soft and far from policy issues,
52
 while Wally Olins, in his discussion of the reputation 
of state administration stresses the idea that states are always trying to create and 
improve their reputations to enhance their loyalty internally and to extend their 
influence externally. He also distinguishes a number of areas where nations complete 
with each other directly, as the administration of a state’s reputation is very necessary. 
But he points out that any such gains should be measured in the long term and cannot 
be measured as short term gains.
53
 
Finally, Shaun Riordan considers public diplomacy is part of an emerging 
model of recent diplomacy and it requires a co-operative approach based on dialogue. 
Such an argument is compelling when one considers the building of nations and the 




From this evolving field, it is evident that public diplomacy, concerning ideas 
and values to large extent, and the involvement of non-government parties is 
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considered one of the best ways to develop cultural relations.
55
 In addition, there are 
some common denominators between cultural relations and the reputation 
management of the state, including the aims of public diplomacy revolving around the 
broadcast of information and ideas to other nations to change or enhance their 
attitudes toward the state. Both look to communicate with foreign audiences in the 
context of bilateral or multilateral relations resulting in the creation of cultural 
diplomacy. 
Therefore, the task of cultural diplomacy task for state reputation management 
requires great effort and coordination between the culture of the state and public 
diplomacy. It should be executed and carried out at the beginning by initiatives from 
specialist practitioners in public diplomacy, then all state forces can be employed to  
participate in and be involved showing the culture of the country in order to promote 
its good image. For this reason, the researcher of this thesis believes that culture and 
diplomacy are twins, and that one promotes interest in the other to foreign ministries, 
where culture puts public diplomatic effort into force and are allowed to take effect in 
the international environment through what may be called “cultural diplomacy.” 
From the perspective that public diplomacy is the executive tool of foreign 




 The political dimension of cooperation between the parties of international 
community; 
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 The economic dimension, when the relationship has developed between 
nations to become interdependence on living needs as a form of 
international system; 
 The cultural dimension, when the sense of people and the ruling elites is 
expressed that their culture and innovations are the achievements of human 
civilization and part of the added power of state that contributes to the 
strengthening of its foreign policy and the achievement of international 
status. 
This description is different from the concept of cultural relations, which forego 
cultural diplomacy in terms of the implementation of cultural exchange processes by 
mechanic movement and retail associated with certain exclusive sectors, whereas, 
cultural diplomacy is associated in a comprehensive and systematic plan by foreign 
policy makers for the state.  
Niama illustrates that the first cultural diplomacy institutions within 
governmental framework and structure emerged in France in the mid-nineteenth 
century, followed by Germany then Britain, which founded the British Council in 
1934, and the United States which set up its official cultural programme in 1938. 
Then followed many other countries around the world. This became the foundation of 
cultural relations in the formation of foreign ministries and the selection, through 
media and art, of scholars as ambassadors for their countries. This was traditionally 
commonplace, such as the Saudi ambassadors Ghazi Al-Gosaibi to Britain and Ziad 
Drees in UNESCO, which was established by the United Nations in 1945 and until 
now coordinates international cultural activity.  
Culture formed an important element of the foreign policy of states, which 




common objective of elements such as language, religion, history and customs, which 
have a clear potential impact in the general behaviour of the state in the drafting of 
resolutions that organise its relations with other countries. In turn these interact with 
each other, and have the outcome of overlapping interests. Following the information, 
media and communication revolution that has changed spatial and temporal concepts 
around the world, this has had the result of bypassing the traditional concepts of 
sovereignty and has made the state less able to control the flow of ideas and money 
into and out of it.
57
 
In this context, a cultural programmed penetration and breakthrough became a 
part of foreign policy objectives, which was adopted by some states to support their 
political and economic goals, and cultural diplomacy institutions have the 
responsibility of implementing and coordinating activities on the ground. Countries 
should seek cultural and diplomatic links for the advancement of a target to be 
culturally inclusive due to political and national aspects. The co-existent approach 
does not mean that the conflict in the social movement can be cancelled, but it does 
mean that violent methods should be replaced with peaceful methods, respectful 
dialogue and public opinion. 
Through the analysis of cultural diplomacy patterns regards aims, according to 
the vision presented here, it does find that countries are divided into two types:  
 The state that tries to protect its cultural heritage and prevent it from 
extinction; 
 The state that tries to export its culture and social, political and economic 
values. 






The two aims could meet in one policy, linked to foreign policy goals in which the 
state seeks to achieve its aims with the extent of the power factor at their disposal, 
taking them out of the theoretical realm into the practical reality.  
Therefore, the development of cultural diplomacy institutions in all its patterns 
and forms, to express the policy countries through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or 
through the National Council for culture, includes all the cultural institutions which 
the country considers may be the indispensable, and a factor of strength underlying 
the state, which should take advantage, especially in the absence or weakness of other 
forces and states, or military and economic weakness, as is the case in Iraq. 
 It should benefit from the support of the international community to develop 
and activate this aspect, which according to scientific methodology takes into account 
the selection of appropriate methods and cadres, which would reflect the prestigious 
position occupied by the national culture among global cultures. 
Many countries – such as Saudi Arabia recently – seek to promote global 
understanding in many ways, including cultural diplomacy. There are countries with a 
history in this area and it continues in its job, under the description that culture is a 
real bridge between peoples, like the Saudi relationship with Britain. It is easy to find 
a lot of cultural centres that deal and specialise with teaching languages and cultural 
affairs spread around the world, including the French Cultural Centre and the Spanish 
Cervantes Institute, the German Goethe Institute and the British Council, and others, 
The last only has three branches in Saudi Arabia for each sex. UNESCO also plays a 




Some authors have a different opinion. For example, Ali Al-Omari sees the 
absence of any Arab cultural diplomacy,
58,  when he asks: “What about Arab 
countries?” Do they put culture in the list of their priorities and include the meaning 
as a bridge for cultural exchange and understanding between peoples? Al-Omari 
thinks that many Arab countries claim cultural diplomacy, but that it does not happen 
on the ground in many cases. And this is not through a lack of experience, the policies 
and visions of Arab countries show the importance of cultural diplomacy, but these 
are still limited for the most part. On the other hand, he believes many Arab countries 
see culture as being on the margin in the relationship between people and takes some 
cultural activities as ”decorations” on the sidelines of diplomacy. 
While some countries consider that cultural communication is one of its 
strategies and it works on the cultural presence through literature, theatre, cinema, 
music, arts and intellectual events, such as the UK, other countries, including Arab 
countries consider cultural communication incomplete and ineffective, with the 
exception of individual initiatives here or there, such as the United Arab Emirates, but 
in general there is no Arabic strategy toward it. 
“Other countries have also matched their commitment to 
cultural diplomacy with significant funding. In a recent 
survey of cultural diplomacy in nine countries, the United 
States ranked last in per capita spending, lagging behind 
not only France and the United Kingdom but also Sweden 
and Singapore. France leads in spending on cultural 
diplomacy, with an annual budget of over one billion 
dollars.”59 
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As Schneider argues, “Understanding the environment, a pre-requisite for effective 
diplomatic work, is as important for culture as for politics.”60 It is possible to also 
argue that public diplomacy is the non-official practice of the diplomatic mission, or 
the exercise of organisation and development of relations between nations by informal 
means.
61
 The concept of public diplomacy in the current era is an activity a country 
undertakes to improve public opinion, outside of official channels, such as the work 
of embassies. Public diplomacy involves using other resources, relations, and contacts 
such as global unions, professional and student unions, youth and women’s 
organisations, parliaments and parties, sports teams and popular arts, and other 
indigenous non-governmental organisations that have friendly relations with parallel 
organisations around the world.
62
 
From the perspective of Alaly al-Sadeq, in his book, International Cultural 
Relations, public diplomacy can work in an integrated manner with official diplomacy 
to minimise conflict, disputes and political rivalries in order to create harmonious 
links between states and peoples.
63
 He concludes, not surprisingly, that the developing 
world is most interested in popular diplomacy, because of the economic, media, 
political and cultural dominance of the developed world.
64
 
Cultural Diplomacy is defined as the “exchange of ideas, information, art, and 
other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual 
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understanding.”65 However, this notion is insufficient to address its broader 
implications and multi-dimensional aspects. Due to the growing importance of 
cultural dimensions in analysing the ever-increasing complexity of international 
affairs, cultural diplomacy emphasises the influence that transnational flows have on 
shaping national identities and foreign perceptions. It covers cultural relations, 
cultural co-operation, public diplomacy, and even propaganda.  
International cultural relations can be seen as the executive tool of current 
public diplomacy and this research looks at the concept of cultural relations from the 
perspective of the concept of ‘cultural diplomacy’. As Schneider puts it, “Effective 
cultural diplomacy initiatives can be created out of whole cloth, or they can build on 
extant programs, exhibitions, or performances. Most important, though, is that they 
resonate with the local population. Sometimes a positive impact is predictable, other 
times not.”66 
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1.2.1 The 1967 Cultural Co-Operation Agreement 
The Convention of Cultural Relations was born out of public diplomacy. On 23 
November 1975 in Riyadh, officials from the UK and the KSA signed the first 
Agreement on Cultural and Technical Co-operation.
 68
 Although the agreement was 
signed in 1975, the title stated “1967”, based on the date that negotiations started. 
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This Agreement, which is still in effect, was intended to strengthen friendly relations 
and to increase cultural and technical co-operation between the two countries. 
The Agreement includes 13 articles, the first of which introduces and defines 
the terms “territory” and “country” in relation to the KSA and the UK, and the 
expression “nationals” in relation to the two governments. The second article deals 
with the role of both governments in encouraging “technical and cultural co-operation 
between the two countries through visits by university professors, instructors and 
persons engaged in scientific and technical research”, and through shared “training 
programmes and courses of vocational training in the other country”. 
Furthermore, this article promotes the “expansion” of studies of the language 
and literature of the other nation in universities and educational institutions in both 
countries. Finally, it encourages the establishment of projects to ensure the protection 
of the heritage and civilization of the two countries. 
The most relevant articles for this thesis are articles III, IV, V and VI, which 
oblige the two parties to stimulate their nations to “a better understanding of the 
civilization and culture of the other country” as stated in article III. This article 
suggests five methods to achieve that goal with the proviso that efforts should not be 
limited to these methods. In summary, they cover the following: the interchange of 
scientific, technical, educational and cultural publications, materials and equipment; 
the arrangement of exhibitions; the interchange of media programmes, and “cultural, 
educational and scientific recordings and films”; visits by scientific experts between 
the two countries; and “translation and publication of the scientific, cultural and 
artistic works of the other country”. 
In Article IV, the Agreement called on the two governments to encourage, by 




within their own territories to continue carrying out their study or research. In 
addition, “to make available all reasonable facilities in the various fields to the 
nationals of the other country wishing to engage in archaeological exploration within 
the regulations laid down or, where suitably qualified, to complete their education or 
training in the universities, scientific institutions, factories, laboratories and institutes 
for applied arts and science within its territories.” 
Article V states that the “Contracting Governments” agree to support “close 
co-operation between the professional organizations and the educational, scientific 
and cultural institutions within their respective territories.” Meanwhile article VI, 
requires the two countries to make a commitment to “facilitate visits by scientists, 
research scholars and students from the other country to the museums, libraries and 
educational, scientific and cultural organizations or institutions within its territory.” 
With regard to the implementation of the terms of the agreement, article VII 
dictated that each country should “designate appropriate persons or organizations to 
ensure the fulfilment of the provisions of this Agreement and to meet once annually, 
alternately in the KSA and in the UK” to discuss the progress in meeting these goals. 
Article VIII gives details of advantages to be gained by the KSA, a developing 
country, from the UK, a developed country. For instance, at the request of the KSA, 
the UK should employ their best efforts to “assist the Government of the KSA in 
securing places in their institutions and organisations for the training of suitably 
qualified Saudi citizens”, and provide “scholarships, fellowships and training courses 
in the UK.” This would subsequently prove to be a key basis of the bilateral cultural 
relationship, as would another aspect of the clause that called on Britain to carry out 
“technical assistance projects in Saudi” and provide “advisers and experts, subject to 




Article IX states that British experts, consultants, and “representatives of the 
British Council and the members of its staff who will be appointed by the UK and will 
come to the KSA under the terms of this Agreement privileges similar to those 
enjoyed by United Nations (UN).” In addition, “All Saudi officials who are charged 
with the implementation of this Agreement and who come to Britain under the terms 
of this Agreement” should enjoy the same privileges. 
Article X stated that each government had agreed to facilitate within the limits 
of its legislation the importation into its territory of equipment necessary for the 
purposes of this Agreement. Article XI stated that the two governments would 
“conclude separate Agreements to define the details of the programmes of co-
operation in the various cultural, scientific and educational fields which are prepared 
by persons or specialist organisations.” 
The last two articles, XII and XIII, dictated that this agreement should not 
“affect the obligations of the nationals of either country to comply with the laws and 
regulations in force in the territory of either Contracting Government.” Finally this 
Agreement would be valid on the date of its signature, would remain valid for four 
years, and would continue to be enforced unless one of the parties were to withdraw 
in the last six months of the Treaty. 
This agreement can be viewed as a major business transaction, with both 
governments spending a huge amount of time and effort in delivering a document that 
was capable of addressing the complexity of the issues that encompassed the bilateral 
cultural relationship. Moreover, the fact that it took eight years to complete shows that 
the differences between the two nations that needed to be bridged in this sphere were 
both complex and varied. For example issues like the language barrier, and different 




On one level these complex differences meant that the agreement ultimately 
failed to live up to the expectations of both sides. The deterioration and decline of the 
political situation on various occasions before the 1970s, as addressed subsequently, 
led to this agreement being completed late in the bilateral relationship, thus resulting 
in many opportunities for the development of cultural relations and business 
opportunities being missed. Included here were the development of special family 
relations between the two royal families, ties linked to the Hajj and Umrah seasons, 
and trade and investments to provide for the necessary and appropriate solutions to 
enhance the relation between the two cultures.  
1.2.2 The Euro-Arab Dialogue  
Ahmad Dajjani argues that the initiative to launch a Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was 
suggested by the Arabs themselves.
69
 Although the 1973 oil embargo on the US and 
Holland was met with public outcry, the Arabs, far from willing to inflict serious 
damage to the European economy on which they largely depended, instead wanted the 
international community to show urgency in solving the protracted Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which was diverting their attention from more pressing needs, exhausting 
their financial resources, and hindering their development.
70
  
The Arab initiative was released during the Arab Summit in Algeria in 
November 1973, and was meant to reach out to Europe in a sign of good will.
71
 The 
Algiers summit mandated four Arab ministers to make the offer of “dialogue” to the 
European Summit which was planned to take place in Copenhagen in December 
1973. The Arab objective was to ensure European support for a just solution of the 
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According to John Sakkas the Arab initiative came as a surprise to the 
Europeans, who as a result agreed to proceed with establishing Euro-Arab Dialogue.
73
 
According to Rory Miller, in June 1974 the nine member strong European Economic 
Community designed an aide-memoire to the member states of the Arab League 
requesting their partnership in a new co-operation plan for Euro-Arab Dialogue 
(EAD)
74
. France took the credit for initiating the concept of that dialogue in February 
of that year. Then the Community Foreign Ministers of Europe approved the plan set 
out by the French government, and the plan was finally endorsed by the Nine on 31 
July 1974 in Paris.
75
 
Many academics and researchers have noted that a coordinating group was 
established from senior official from member’s states of the Arab League and EEC 
charged with the aim of moving the programme forward.
76
 Moreover, the Arab-Israeli 
dispute and its ramifications on the peace settlement process, pan-Arabism, and inter-
Arab discord cannot be viewed as separate factors since they interact with and 
mutually reinforce one another.
77
  
Another element was added by the view expressed by Lakhdar Brahimi in 
which he asserted the oil embargo following the 1973 War triggered the French 
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 To take a case in point, Rory Miller states the sky-rocketing oil price that 
followed the War subsided immediately in March 1974.
79
 He illustrates a rather 
profound case when oil was used as a weapon in late 1973 that resulted in domestic 
political upheaval and severe economic recession in the whole of Europe and North 
America.
80
 It goes without saying that the path the European Commission took was to 
push the EAD programme to give an overwhelmingly positive picture to the public 
that dialogue would encourage the Arabs to take a more moderate view of Europe.
81
  
Salah al-Hejailan argues that Euro-Arab Dialogue should also communicate 
culturally on the level of shared values. There were also obstacles that needed to be 
overcome, such as understanding each culture and better commination to eliminate 
prejudices against each other’s heritage and values.82 Moreover, when the West was 
faced with an oil embargo they were very eager to engage with the Middle East for 
dialogue, including cultural and scientific cooperation but this enthusiastic approach 
receded after the 1977 agreement.
83
 Undoubtedly, the Western media were largely 
responsible for giving negative coverage to the public by accentuating some 
unsubstantiated issues in Arab societies.
84
 
The FCO literature on the issue of the Euro-Arab Dialogue illustrates the 
opportunity both sides missed to create formidable north-south relations. The reason 
why the UK, the country that would have benefitted the most from this initiative, took 
such a low-key role is unclear and incomprehensible. The price paid by both Saudi 
citizens and their British counterparts to live with that policy is prominent more 
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evident. There is a real feeling that the UK, which had a considerable history with 
countries in the Middle East, gave up its role to other European states such as 
Belgium, Holland and the Republic of Ireland. Most Saudi academics and researchers 
agree that there was a wide divergence of factors which may explain why the two 
Kingdoms, which had on numerous occasions emphasised cultural exchange as the 
only way forward for real change in society, decided to abandon the project from the 
start. There could be some reasons which are not mutually exclusive, but collectively 
they dragged on the issue of cultural exchange for 40 years. 
This section examines Britain’s relationship with the Arab world, in general, 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in particular, during the 1970s and 1980s in the 
fields of scientific research, technical cooperation, and technical and vocational 
training. An attempt is made to identify the reasons behind the lack of interest of both 
countries to utilise their potential, willingness and capabilities to take forward the 




The wide and deep implications of nine European countries (the UK, 
Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Italy, Denmark and the Republic of 
Ireland, which will be referred to as the Nine) to begin dialogue and negotiations with 
the Arab League was significant. The Arab countries, who came out of 1973 with 
little dignity after the defeat in the Arab-Israeli war, were trying to build bridges with 
the West by initiating the dialogue.
86
 The Nine created the Middle East Experts to 
provide technical assistance to Arab countries, who held their first meeting on 4 
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 Shortly after, on 10 September, another meeting was held where 
the representatives of the Nine agreed to send an emissary to the Middle East to 
facilitate this huge task and provide technical assistance.  
From the outset, the UK did not take this opportunity of technical co-operation 
very seriously. While the British welcomed the French role in sending a fact-finding 
mission to meet with the Arab League Secretariat in Cairo, despite the reservations of 
both Belgium and the Danish, the view expressed about that mission according to an 
FCO memo was rather pessimistic; “it was designed to keep the pot boiling with the 
Arabs rather than to be a serious practical undertaking.”88 
As Middle East and North African countries are major suppliers of the world’s 
energy, and have a unique geographical position for the transit of goods and oil 
throughout the world, their core interests can be defined and articulated only in social 
development through education and training.
89
 Given these realities, and the 
geopolitical imperatives the Arab League, it is not surprising to see dialogue pursued 
after 1973 in a policy of co-operation with the Nine based on mutual respect and 
understanding of each other’s needs.  
After several meetings, both the Arab League and the Nine realised it was 
essential that the areas of assistance should include scientific research and 
development, technological assistance and vocational and technical training. In this 
context, Euro-Arab relations also included opportunities for developing nuclear 
energy for peaceful applications. It did so by considering three main themes: First and 
foremost, establishing a foundation for programmes of economic cooperation in 
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which there was an effective flow of advanced European technology into the Arab 
countries enhances the level of engagement between European and Arabic people, 
secondly cultural exchange, and thirdly labour and social programmes.
90
  
Experts from both sides agreed on the need to design an integrated rural 
development policy through education and training. The proposed measures took 
practical and straightforward actions within a reasonable timespan. There was a sound 
readiness within the Arab League secretariat and its instruments for such co-
operation, but one of the problems facing the European Experts in the field of cultural 




Although both sides agreed on the basic principles of investing in enhancing people’s 
lives through education and technical training, they were sceptical of diverting the 
available financial resources to the cultural and technical schemes proposed by the 
hand-picked experts from both sides. The Arab side tried cautiously to avoid 
discussions that turned collective projects into bilateral efforts under the Arab League 
framework. Therefore, the chances of European governments producing a tangible 
accomplishment of the objectives stated in the joint memorandum were diminished.  
From 1975 onwards, the Arab League was aware of the difficulties ahead when the 
signs of a new relationship between Israel and Egypt was beginning to emerge, which 
had a profound impact on developments in the Dialogue, especially with the leaders 
of Arab-nationalist countries such as Saddam of Iraq, Gadhafi of Libya and Assad of 
Syria.  
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In one of those meetings, the British representative Rodric Braithwaite suggested that 
any department was free to put forward an expert to attend the next meeting with the 
Arabs if he was ready to defend the interests of his department.
92
 More to the point, 
scepticism was common, which was apparent in a meeting held in Dublin on 20 June 
1975, when Mr Braithwaite was exploring the possibility of discussing European 
tactics before the next meeting with the Arabs. The British were not forthcoming 
when the Arabs in general, and the Gulf States in particular, were ready for cultural 
and technical cooperation, despite those countries being suffused with religion, and 
the need for major political, social and education policies to receive religious 
ratification to win grass-roots support.  
This passive approach to the initiative was also clear from the start. The European 
side was also frustrated when the Arabs tried to postpone their scheduled meeting 
because the EEC had signed an agreement with Israel on 11 May 1975, although Arab 
moderates, including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United 
Arab Emirates, managed to influence some more radical countries to continue with 
the timetable of meetings.
93
 
As far as scientific and technical cooperation was concerned, the two sides 
agreed on the formation of an ad hoc group to take all necessary steps for this 
particular demand from the Arabs. For all Arab countries, moderates or radicals, the 
main priority was to make every effort to increase European education and training in 
all fields for Arab students and labour. The Arabs also requested access to a scientific 
data bank including cooperation in the energy sector and in nuclear energy for 
peaceful applications. Nevertheless, the Europeans were not keen to deliver the 













The Euro-Arab cooperation provided ample evidence that all cultures can exist 
simultaneously, and political differences between parts of the Arab world and Europe 
during the 1960s and 1970s should not hijack the development process. The ad hoc 
group created to deal with scientific cooperation offered a concrete programme for its 
way forward. Though many factors contributed to under education in the Arab world, 
the group realised that in order to transfer European technology, it must first train 
personnel at all levels to incorporate such technology.  
While levels of training in each of those countries varied dramatically, one objective 
remained constant: European assistance in advancing universities and other education 
institutions needed to be prioritized to lay the foundation for those institutions to be 
more open to accommodate advanced scientific research.
95
 The Nine also decided to 
establish new training centres in Arab countries for specialised training to advance 
their knowledge and expertise.
96
  
During the meetings, some Arab countries presented lists of fields which they 
considered vital for training, exchange of academic staff, and cultural and 
archaeological exchange. The Arabs also requested special training and assistance in 
the fields of archives and documentation, and supplying the libraries of Arab 
universities with reference books and publications. Furthermore, it was agreed to 
devote a great deal of research effort on particular areas, such as solar energy, 
geothermal energy, nuclear energy and radio-biology. According to diplomatic 
reports, the Arabs expressed a great interest in desalination technology to improve the 





 FCO Memo, Euro-Arab Dialogue, 04 August 1975. 
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drinking water capacity in some of those countries with a shortage of natural rainfall. 
This was set aside in favour of bilateral cooperation, in which European countries 
would offer the technology to those Arab countries to improve their water resources.
97
  
A strong determinant of the Nine-Arab cooperation was the cultural aspect. Seminars 
of experts on cultural relations between both civilisations and their role in the 
contemporary world were suggested. The implementation of those projects were once 
again left for adequate preparation by top experts on both sides. It is worth noting that 
alongside this there was the synchronised publication of a collection of books, 
cooperation and coordination in the fields of journalism, archaeology, youth 
exchanges and Euro-Arab sports activities. Another thread of cooperation involved 
supporting translations of Arab books into different European languages, and vice 
versa, and promoting cultural values through the presence of European experts and 
lecturers in the Arab world as well as Arab students in Europe.
98
  
What added an extra stimulus to cultural cooperation was the idea of 
establishing associations between the universities of both sides, including joint 
meetings of the conference of European Rectors and Arab Rectors. This went further 
with the desire to establish institutions for Arab culture and the Arabic language at 
different European universities. The implication was clear; the exchanges of expert 
visitors to study and teach in respective educational institutions, so Arab universities 
would be able to carry out taskforce-led education programmes to combat illiteracy.
99
  
The cultural co-operation in particular envisaged a far bigger role for Arabs, with a 
more boundless expeditionary force in arts, sciences, education and tourism. The 
Arabs expressed in those meetings that they considered cultural and educational 
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exchanges as an indispensable part of the work of the group to have a “civilizational 
dialogue.”100  
The European side suggested practical measures to enhance primary school 
education, because students spend most of their educational years in this particular 
stage. They identified and analysed what they saw as being wrong in the Arab 
primary education system and schools. Since such deficiencies were also cited by the 
Arab experts, the criticisms were quickly accepted and absorbed without question and 
the Arab counterparts showed a great respect for raising those points. In a rare display 
of objectivity, a member of Arab delegates suggested the idea of teaching European 
languages in general, and the English language in particular, in primary schools. 
Further, the Arabs argued that European and Arab universities and educational centres 
should recognise each other’s degrees. For their part the Europeans did not receive 
this suggestion with great enthusiasm, since it was not easy to adopt by European 
universities, and the Arabs quickly dropped it.
101
 
According to an FCO memo of 04 August 1975,
102 the Arabs were very 
talented individuals who were “well informed, highly intelligent and consistent in 
their argument deliberation.” The ad hoc group set aside a few subjects for further 
consultation, such as training, exchange of university staff, access to data bank, 
collaboration in energy research and power production, including nuclear power for 
peaceful purposes, radio-biology and desalination of water. The scale of optimism on 
agreed issues outweighed those topics left for the next Euro-Arab meeting.
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In spite of this Agreement, some official government efforts to develop KSA-
UK cultural relations failed during the 1970s, principally due to the lack of 
organisational structures capable of dealing with such a complex and delicate task, the 
lack of co-ordination between various government departments, a lack of a strategic 
approach for implementation, representation and a flexible evaluation process. 
All this meant that essential factors were missing in different stages of the 
process. Furthermore, these efforts failed due to the lack of necessary financial 
resources and legal means. Regretfully, there was disregard in this Agreement for the 
changes occurring within Saudi society in general and in the role of civil society 
institutions, as well as popular participation, in particular, over the period it covered. 
Most importantly, these efforts failed because of the absence of a 
comprehensive long-term mutual perception of the best way to develop cultural 
relations. This prevented the development of an integrated long-term strategy in the 
cultural sphere.  
Other important explanations for the limits of this Agreement include the 
obvious inconsistency between the interests and needs of both countries in both the 
political and cultural spheres, and lack of “similarity” in many areas – such as school 
student exchanges, artistic endeavour, and science – that made it difficult to develop 
“companion” bonds, a key factor in the long-term development of strong cultural 
relations and effective cultural diplomacy.  
The purpose of this description and analysis of the Agreement is to set out the 
official principles and fundamentals, as well as challenges upon which the cultural 
relationship of the two countries under study were built. However, it should be noted 
that the final version of this Agreement was preceded by a number of official 




potential models and to produce an agreement designed to ensure the success of the 
treaty, and therefore, the success of the cultural relations between the two countries in 
the longer term. As such, it is vital to examine how the Anglo-Saudi relationship 
evolved up to 1967, the year negotiations on this Agreement commenced. 
 
1.3 A Brief Summary of the Beginnings of British-Saudi Cultural 
and Scientific Exchanges 
“Despite its prominent position on the world stage in recent 
years, Saudi Arabia remains a closed and largely unknown 
country. The bare outlines of its history have been 
recounted a number of times, […] Still, the process by which 
a minor family of the central Najd gained dominion over 
much of Arabia, lost it twice, and then gained it again, plus a 
prominent position on the international stage, has not been 
examined adequately. Details of the early period are scarce 
and often contradictory. [...] Neither Western accounts 
[…],or modern Saudi renditions […] are conclusive, because 
of the lack of written evidence.”104 
 
“Seldom can Britain have exercised full diplomatic relations with a king and country 
about which she knew so little.”105 Clive Leatherdale’s point above is well made. In 
1915, Najd, the core territory of what later became Saudi Arabia, had become a 
British associate and received a monthly British subsidy of £5,000 GPB (withdrawn 
in 1924). Hejaz at that time, ruled by King Sharif, had a similar arrangement and 
received a monthly subsidy of £200,000 GPB. Leatherdale notes that, although Saudi 
Arabia was an independent state, Britain had no diplomatic relations with the country 
until three years after its recognition in the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927.
106
 Thereafter, in 
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1932, Ibn Saud conquered Hejaz, in order to constitute one kingdom; Britain 
suggested that this new state should be named Saudi Arabia.
107
 
At this time, communications inside Saudi Arabia were slow and difficult. 
Moreover, the British delegation and any non-Muslims were generally not permitted 
to travel outside of Jeddah, one of the more hospitable and open-minded cities in 
Saudi Arabia.  
 In 1932, telegraph messages from Jeddah to Riyadh, where the King resided, 
were sent via Bahrain, and replies could not be expected in less than three weeks. This 
problem aggravated the people of Saudi Arabia who wanted to communicate via the 
British legation in Jeddah, instead of through its own representative in London.  
Consequently, the British Representative in Jeddah gained new responsibilities 
as a policy maker, rather than as a diplomat executing policy.
108
 In 1939, at the 
outbreak of World War II, Britain, through a mandate from the League of Nations, 
had the right to deal with the foreign affairs of associate states wherein there were 
British agents or advisors. The Arab countries covered by this included Yemen, 
Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, and Bahrain. However, British control was not 
exercised in the KSA.
109
 
Britain's interest in the Middle East was more extensive in comparison to that 
of the other Great Powers.
110
 Towards the end of World War II it became clear that 
Britain would attempt to exercise a predominant role in the region. According to 
Tareq Ismael,  
“A major element of its strategy […] could be seen in its 
attempts to foster a British-influenced league of Arab 
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states; such an Arab league did in fact emerge during the 
war, consisting of; Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.”111 
 
Its colonial history meant that Britain at that time had a bad reputation in the eyes of 
Arabs in general. For their part, the Saudis certainly perceived Britain in a negative 
light. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood – “Ikhwan” – movement in Saudi Arabia 
during the 1940s posed several problems inside the KSA. They were not only hostile 
to Ibn Saud, but were essentially hostile to any foreign presence in the KSA, to the 
embarrassment of the Saudi government.
112
 Although the government managed to 
defeat the group in the late 1940s with British help
113
 their resistance towards any 
non-Muslim Western presence or influence has remained an important part of Saudi 
society – especially in the older population.  
It can be argued that in these terms one significant long-term consequence of 
the historical diplomatic and political relationship up to the present day, is that Saudi 
Arabia has been less keen to understand British culture than the British have been to 
understand the Saudis. However, it is also true that from 1945 some gradual reform 
measures began to be introduced in Saudi Arabia, encouraging foreign travel on a 
small-scale. The Saudi government also actively sought to educate people and make 
them aware of the importance of western science and technology. For example, in 
June 1945 King Abdul-Aziz officially asked the British government to develop and 
train flight crews. Britain acknowledged that it could meet the initial requirements by 
sending a training mission of civilians equipped by (Avro-Anson) for passengers and 
with two aircraft (Tiger Moths) equipped to carry out training tasks – according to a 
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commercial contract implemented by Air Work – under the supervision of the British 
government. The Saudi government agreed, and the aviation training and maintenance 
team arrived Jeddah in 1947. This first British training mission, had approximately 10 
members and was headed by the retired Colonel Hugh Black.
114
 
Aviation training was thus provided for a number of Saudi students selected 
on merit from the School of the Preparation Mission in Makkah. In a microcosm of 
the bigger generational differences in the country, many parents of students 
nominated for flight school submitted petitions to the authorities to exempt their 
children from studying aviation. Such applications were denied and the success 
achieved by the first batch of trainees made many young people want to join in the 
future rounds of training.
115
 
As these students spoke poor English, the language barrier became an obstacle 
to this early attempt at exchange and co-operation in the civilian sphere. However, 
this problem was overcome, and in August 1949, 10 student pilots completed their 
initial aviation training in Jeddah and with fluent English were now able to undertake 
advanced aviation training in the UK. They went to the Training University Air 
Service, near Southampton, where they trained on Proctor and Tiger Moth aircraft, 
progressing to twin-engine aircraft, such as, the Avro Anson and Airspeed Oxford. 
This marked the first time that a group of students was sent by Saudi Arabia to the 
UK. Subsequently, nine trainees from a second group were enrolled in the Academy 
of Aviation in Perth in Scotland where Prince Mansour bin Abdul-Aziz, Minister of 
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These small groups of Saudi students managed to overcome all the barriers 
they faced, such as a lack of English language skills, significant cultural differences 
and the miscommunication and misunderstanding that comes with them. One 
explanation for this success was the role of the team of British trainers sent to Saudi 
Arabia, in closing the gap and enhancing ties. Thereafter, this experiment impacted on 
the whole country, even in the most conservative regions, and played a small but 
powerful role in the evolving bilateral cultural relationship and in bringing about 
changes at the public level in KSA, especially in Jeddah. 
After these pioneering students, hundreds of young Saudis were sent to study 
in the UK, which changed the perception of the West to the extent that conservative 
Saudi families were pleased to send their young daughters to pursue English language 
courses and even they allowed their sons to live with British families in different part 
of the United Kingdom. Today, Saudi citizens in large cities and small towns all over 
the KSA experience cultural diversity with the millions of expatriates from over 110 
countries who live in the Kingdom, without losing their identity or sovereignty as a 
result of accommodating alien cultures with the indigenous Arabic-Islamic culture. 
However, a small section of Saudi society are still wary of foreign cultures, despite 
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Before reviewing the historical background of the two countries’ relationship, 
including the main events that led to the development of that relationship, the concept 
of cultural relations was discussed, with a focus on the concept of cultural diplomacy 
as a tool for cultural relations. Furthermore, the use of cultural relations in public 
diplomacy as a facility for achieving a country’s foreign policy, international 
objectives, and to deliver their message to the world was also considered. This chapter 
defined the concept of culture, and of cultural relations inspired by the principle of 
diplomatic culture and the importance of building relations between peoples.  
Given this, and regardless of its value, the 1967 Agreement did not provide a 
unified strategy of planning and administration to set up realistic cultural relations in 
subsequent decades because by the time the Agreement was signed, nearly 10 years 
after the negotiations were started, local political events in the Middle East had 
influenced the cultural relationship. Additionally, the disregard for the financial and 
economic aspects of these cultural projects also led to a lack of progress, thus 
delaying the opportunity for developing stronger cultural ties in key areas.  
The cultural agreement stressed the importance of information exchange 
between the two countries and its dissemination through the media (radio, television 
and the press). It also spoke of the expansion of educational cooperation through 
various means, including linkages between universities and other educational 
institutions, providing better facilities for students to learn both Arabic and English, 
exchange of academic visits and participation in conferences of scientific nature.  
In addition, it stressed that cultural cooperation should be based on a broad basis of 
educational cooperation between the two countries, and doing an active activities in 




cooperation, particularly in the long-term projects that benefit both countries. 
Exchange of scientific information and visits is also important. Moreover, the 
document highlighted the need to coordinate plans that safeguard technological and 
scientific progress.  
The agreement spoke of the need to strengthen humanitarian relations, such as 
communication between the peoples of both countries and permitting travel for 
professional reasons and through proper diplomatic means. However, the document 
did not speak of promoting tourism and youth meetings. Moreover, information about 
the implementation of the document’s provisions in the 1070s, 80s and 90s is lacking. 
 
According to Siddiqui, the Euro-Arab Dialogue was re-launched as a way to 
promote European engagement in the Middle East. But the reality was that the 
European Community had little motivation to engage with the Middle East when its 
interests were not jeopardised.
117
 Some researchers have argued that the EAD was not 
functioning even before the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement of 1979.
118
 They go 
further to say that the EAD was seriously affected and its impact on cultural exchange 
was inadequate.
119
 Rory Miller argues that the failure of the EAD stems from three 
angles; inability to prevent the politicisation of the framework of the dialogue by 
concentrating only on economic issues of European countries; the lack of vision to 
avoid deep internal divisions among EU members on the objectives; and the mandate 
of the EAD.
120
 Furthermore, the US influence on EU members and its hostility to the 
EAD since its inception was also an influencing factor.
121
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From the EU point of view, the EAD was sought to develop dialogue through 
bilateral or multilateral economic and cultural relations, but the vast majority of the 
effort was focused mainly on economic development after the oil embargo imposed 
on European countries after the war of 1973.
122
 From the content of Arab elite 
discourse, and from the academic debate on the costs and benefits of the EAD, 
observers would likely conclude that the main rationale for formulating the 
framework of the EAD was an economic one.
123
  
The transfer of cultural values and practices, such as learning the English language, 
was a key aspect of the British policy in colonised and non-colonised countries 
around the world. It is easy to underestimate how far, and to what extent, the Arab 
intention to create cultural relations with other countries has been lost in translation. If 
that intention from the Arabs was truly reciprocated by the Nine, we would have seen 
more than ever before synchronised relations between the Arabs and Europe.  
In the late 1960s and 1970s, it was not unreasonable to describe the Arab community 
in both moderate (Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC, Morocco, Tunisia) 
and semi-moderate Arab countries (Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Mauritania) as asking 
for change by more integration with western countries, and the Nine missed a chance 
of making a comprehensive cultural change, especially the UK through the British 
Council, which was operating in each and every Arab state. Furthermore, despite 
decades of peace and stability, polices adopted by the GCC countries took a collective 
stand against radicalism of all kinds, and there is little evidence to support the 
assumption that the British government in particular was ready to transfer skills, 
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technologies and education assistance, associated with and based on English language 
learning, as an effective channel for transmission of cultural exchange.  
The poor outcome of the Nine and Arab dialogue shows that even when the process of 
educational and scientific reform was accepted, the political will from Europe to 
ensure its effective implementation was not there. While the agenda of the Nine might 
have suited the United Kingdom more than other members for the long-term 
integration with young Arabs who were eager to learn English, the British Council 
had, and has, less to offer for such a major shift in Arab-British relations, and 
arguably pursued a policy of dragging its feet on fundamental issues of mutual 
interests.  
With the passing of the fortieth anniversary of the Nine-Arab dialogue, from 
September 1974, it is clear that the good intentions of the Arab political elites were in 
vain. Their substantial enthusiasm, as noted from FCO memos, meant that intelligent 
and consistent Arab expertise supplicated to the Nine, believing that if cultural and 
scientific co-operation could be prioritised and taken seriously then the UK would 
have been the greatest beneficiary. The reward that Britain had to gain was as much a 
political one as it was financial, in the sense of maintaining a credible British cultural 
presence in major cities in the Arab world. It meant that for the foreseeable future all 
diplomats and political leaders would have graduated from British education 
institutions, taking a pivotal role in the wider context of UK-Arab relations.  
Today, most scholars and policy makers in the UK and Saudi Arabia who are 
pushing the cause of cultural co-operation are encouraged by the current public 
support, which was often restricted in the past by religious or language barriers.
124
 
Fortunately, for those who advocate well intended programmes of cultural relations 
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with the UK, the case of doing just that is more clear than ever before because a 
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ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS AFTER THE PRE-1945 ERA: 
EXPLORATION, EXCHANGES AND VISITS, TRADE AND ECONOMY, 
AND EDUCATION AND CULTURE 
 
INTRODUCTION  
This Second chapter provides a review of the events affecting the cultural relations 
between Britain and Saudi Arabia after Saudi unification in order to better understand 
the nature of the bilateral relations and the basis for cultural relations between the two 
countries. It will also examine how the Anglo-Saudi relationship evolved between 
1945 and the signing of the important bilateral cultural agreement in 1975. 
The history of cultural relations after unification could easily be described as 
“drought cultural relations” that is, almost non-existent. It was not until the early 
1960s that the Saudi government started to build and develop the infrastructure of the 
country, and it was only in the early 1970s when Saudi Arabia began to care about her 
international position and foreign affairs. 
In this chapter, a brief account of the main events which impacted on the 
relationship from that time on will also be given, although at this time we will not 
explore the reasons for these developments as they will be examined in the coming 
chapters. 
Subsequently, there will be a focus on the main common factors between the 
two nations, based upon the strengths of their relationship, which could be used to 




2. A brief Overview of the Relations between Saudi Arabia and 
the United Kingdom 
 
“Britain was thus never a stand-alone state, even in 1940, 
and of course, the process of worldwide political, economic, 
and cultural interpenetration – a process profoundly 
affecting Britain – has accelerated markedly in recent 
decades.”126 
 
2.1 Official Visits 
Diplomatic relations between the two Kingdoms were established in 1927. Since that 
time, political relations and continued dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Britain 
have been maintained at the highest levels, through mutual visits between government 
officials for the purposes of further co-ordination and research, and the deepening of 
bilateral co-operation intended to strengthen relations in all areas and the various 
fields. 
The first visit by a member of the British Royal Family took place just five 
years after the unification of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 23 September 1932. On 
25 February 1938, HRH Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone, and her husband, the 
Earl of Athlone, travelled to Saudi Arabia. For three weeks they travelled across 
Arabia from west to east, meeting tribal chieftains and camping out in the desert. The 
princess wrapped herself in a long black gown when in the company of Arab men, 




In her memoirs, which have been reproduced on websites such as “Sotheby’s”, 
“American Exchange”, and “Art Daily”, Princess Alice wrote: 
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“Our visit to Saudi Arabia in the winter of 1938 came about 
through a chance meeting with the Crown Prince Saud in 
1936, when he took me in to luncheon at Ascot [...] Out of 
politeness I said how sorry I was that I had never visited 
Arabia, though I had been as far as Petra. He at once asked, 
‘Why not come to Arabia?’”128 
 
This visit was significant for several reasons, for although many members of the 
Saudi royal family had visited Britain, this was the first occasion on which a 
delegation from the British royal family had visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It 
was also the only occasion that any member of the British royal family met the 
founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud. The primary 
objective of this visit was not just to discuss political affairs but also to strengthen 
mutual ties and communications.
129
  
As this thesis will demonstrate, from 1945 the KSA has remained one of the 
most important countries in terms of UK foreign policy, arguably more than any other 
country in the Middle East.
130
 His Majesty King Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz was the first 
Saudi Monarch to pay an official visit to Britain in 1967.
131
 In the same year, His 
Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud (Minister of Defence and 
Aviation and Inspector General) visited Britain. There then followed three visits to 
Britain by Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz, later the King of Saudi Arabia, in 
1975, 1977, and 1981. Also in 1981, King Khalid bin Abdul-Aziz paid an official visit 
to Britain which resulted in the strengthening and development of relations in many 
areas. Prince Sultan (Crown Prince, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence 
and Aviation and Inspector General) then visited Britain in 1986 followed by King 
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Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz in 1987. During two subsequent visits, in 1988 and 1996, Prince 
Sultan met Queen Elizabeth II at Buckingham Palace, the British Prime Minister 
[John Major], and a number of British officials. Prince Sultan’s discussions with 
British officials dealt with bilateral relations and common interests between the two 
countries and issues of common concern.
132
 
In this context, the last visit to the United Kingdom by the monarch of Saudi 
Arabia, King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, was in 2007 when he met with Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and the Prince of Wales, His Royal Highness Prince 




On the British side, Queen Elizabeth II visited Saudi Arabia in 1979, and the 
Prince of Wales has made numerous visits to the Kingdom – in 1986, 1988, 1990, 
1993, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2006.
134
 Interestingly, no British prime 
minister visited Saudi Arabia until 1981, when Margaret Thatcher became the first 
serving prime minister to visit the kingdom,
135
 and then again in 1985. Following her 
visit, a number of other British prime ministers have visited the Saudi Arabia 




2.2 Trade and Economic Relations 
In terms of trade, the mutual visits between Saudi and UK officials referred to above 
played a significant role in supporting and strengthening relations between the two 
countries, and over the past two decades, a strong and increasingly expanding trade 
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 As Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business 
Innovation and Skills affirmed: “The relationship between our two Kingdoms is 
important to both of us and we will work to improve it.”138 Currently, Saudi Arabia is 
considered to be the UK’s largest foreign trading and investment partner in the 
Middle East, with more than 150 Saudi-British joint-ventures active in the Kingdom, 
worth around £6.5 billion GPB in 2009. This makes Saudi Arabia the UK’s 23rd 
largest export market. According to unofficial Saudi Chamber of Commerce sources, 
the majority of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Saudi Arabia originates from the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Lebanon.
139
 
  The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) listed the 
top companies from the UK investing in KSA in 2008. These are:
140
  
 SABB (The Saudi British Bank, an associated company of the HSBC Group) 
 United Sugar Co. 
 Middle East Propulsion Co. Ltd. 
 National Factory for Can Ends Ltd. (NAFCEL) 
 GSK Saudi Arabia Co. Ltd. 
 Synthomer Middle East Co. (formerly Dhahran Harco) 
 Saudi Masterbaker Ltd. 
 Saudi MBT Building Materials Co. Ltd. 
 International Paint Saudi Arabia Company 
 MK Cable Management (Saudi Arabia) Ltd. 
 Bupa Arabia 
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At the OECD, both kingdoms jointly manage a working group focused on 
economic diversification designed to enhance conditions for investment in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Furthermore, the number of Saudis visiting the UK has 
increased rapidly over recent years. In 2007, approximately 31,000 visas were issued 
to Saudi citizens, an increase of 55 per cent over 2004.
141
 Most of the visas issued 
were for tourism; however the number of Saudis who are studying in the UK has also 
increased from 3,000 in 2007 to over 14,000 in 2010.
142
  
Similarly, the number of British citizens who live and work in Saudi Arabia 
increased to around 20,000 by 2010. More than 25,000 people a year make an annual 
Hajj pilgrimage, while up to 100,000 visitors from Britain do the lesser pilgrimage of 
Umrah.
143
 During his visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2006, the Hon. Jack Straw, MP, 
former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, declared that 
Britain “was the first mainly Christian country to send an annual, official 
Government-backed delegation to the holy places [to assist] British pilgrims 
undertaking Hajj.”144 
Accordingly, the main factors in the economic relationship between the KSA 
and the UK can be summarised as follows:  
 Over 150 active Saudi-British joint ventures exist with a total investment 
worth around £6.5 billion GPB in 2009. 
 The UK is the second largest foreign investor in Saudi Arabia after the 
US. 
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 The numbers of British citizens who live and work in KSA is around 
20,000. 
 The UK is one of the most popular European countries visited by Saudis. 
 There are over 14,000 Saudis studying at British universities. 
 Saudi Arabia has the largest construction market in the Middle East and 
is one of the fastest growing in the world. 
Economic relations between the two countries are a benchmark in terms of the 
strength and durability of bilateral co-operation. From the unification of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia until the present day, economic and trade co-operation between the 
two countries has developed significantly at all levels, particularly in the area of trade 
and investment, as indicated by the statistical report on the official website of the 
Saudi embassy in London.
145
 Finally, there is no doubt that positive and developing 
bilateral trade, whether company-to-company or government-to-government, affirms 
the strong relationships and promotes cultural understanding. 
2.3 Cultural and Educational Relations 
 Cultural exchange 
Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom are two extremely different countries in terms 
of their religion, culture, traditions and language. Nevertheless, both kingdoms have 
recently worked to narrow their differences in promoting closer friendship and 
understanding between their peoples. Published in 2008, The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and The United Kingdom; a History of Friendship sets out the early 
relationship between the two Kingdoms. The book describes the adventures of the 
earliest British explorers who dreamed of crossing the Rub’ al Khali desert (the 
“Empty Quarter”), capturing its heart and understanding its history. For instance, 
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Lady Anne Blunt, who visited Arabia in the nineteenth century, was enchanted by 
battlemented towns, commenting:  
“It was nearly sunset when we first saw Jubbah, below us at 
the edge of the Sabkhah (salt flat or dried-up lake bed) with 
dark green palms cutting the pale blue of the dry lake and 
beyond that a group of red rocks rising out of the pink 
Nafud. Jubbah is one of the most curious places in the world 
and to my mind one of the most beautiful.”146 
 
Bertram Thomas, in the 1930s, was amazed by the manners of desert dwellers, 
declaring: “It was their code after a thirsty day's march that when we arrived at a 
water hole no drop should pass the lips of the advanced party until those in the rear 
had come up.”147 
“Until the last several decades, most authors have been 
either travellers, both casual and ‘professional,’ or 
government officials (principally British) stationed in the 
region [Saudi Arabia]. It should not be surprising that the 
travel literature has been of mixed quality. Nevertheless, 
the accounts of intrepid travellers such as Carsten Niebuhr, 
George Sadleir, J.R. Wellsted, Charles Doughty, the Bents, 
and Richard Burton, quite often constitute the few 
surviving records of much of modern historical interest. 
That tradition has been continued by such twentieth-
century travellers, explorers, missionaries, and journalists 
as Bertram Thomas, St. John Philby, Paul Harrison, Claudie 
Fayein, Daniel van der Meulen, Wilfrid Thesiger, and David 
Holden. At the same time, diplomats and expatriate 
administrators have made seminal contributions to the 
history of Arabia, not unlike the way in which they collected 
specimens of geology or flora and fauna for analysis in 
museums back in Europe. Many of these works, among 
them Samuel Miles, Snouk Hurgronje, and Sir Arnold 
Wilson, provide the basic foundations upon which later 
writers, both Western and indigenous, have been able to 
build. As a source on subjects as diverse as political 
narratives, economy, slavery, telegraphs, and tribal 
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gazetteers, J.G. Lorimer’s compilation is without 
comparison.”148 
 
Many British residents in the Kingdom today have continued to explore the desert, 
archaeological sites, and landscape. This was advocated by The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and The United Kingdom, which cited Margaret Thatcher’s opinion: 
“I am not known as an incurable romantic, but the desert, 
the mountains, the teeming commerce of the ports – 
perhaps the contrasts and combination above all – an effect 
on me which it has had on so many English men and 
women. I came away not just fascinated but captivated by 
the land, the culture and the people.”149  
 
Similarly, the United Kingdom has attracted thousands of visitors from Saudi Arabia, 
mostly because of its rich culture and history, museums, the English language, the 
cold and rainy weather, and the brick and stone architecture. However, during the 
period of UK influence over Eastern Saudi Arabia, it did not establish any British 
schools, unlike in Egypt and other countries. The first office of the British Council in 
Riyadh, opened in 1967, was established in order to help in “promoting bilateral 
cultural relations between the two countries.”150  
Nonetheless, the most formal move towards friendship and cultural 
understanding came from the establishment of the Saudi-British Society in 1986 by 
the Saudi Embassy in London. The Society is a “social, cultural, non-political and 
non-commercial organisation” that “aims to bring together British citizens who have 
[...] professional, commercial, cultural or otherwise” interests in Saudi Arabia, as well 
as Saudi Arabian citizens who are interested in the UK,
151
 and its main activities have 
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included receptions for important visitors, dinners, exhibitions, lectures and book 
launches.
152
 Examples of its activities include a lecture arranged by Professor Bruce 
Ingham on the Tribes of Arabia with a particular focus on the tribes of Saudi Arabia, 
in addition to two tours of Saudi Arabia. More importantly, the society has issued a 
number of publications including Inside The Kingdom, Saudi Women Speak, Arab 
Storm: Politics and Diplomacy Behind the Gulf War, Beyond The Dunes: An 
Anthology of Modern Saudi Literature, and Travellers In Arabia: British Explorers in 
Saudi Arabia. Some of these early publications reflect the insight of the British into 
Saudi culture, literature, politics, traditions and geography in an attempt to illustrate 
the early contacts between Saudi Arabia and Britain.
153
 
Moreover, a vast number of art exhibitions have been held in both Kingdoms 
as part of this developing exchange. Perhaps the most significant of these were the 
joint “Painting and Patronage” exhibition held in 2000 and 2001, displaying paintings 
by the HRH the Prince of Wales and Prince Khalid Al Faisal,
154
 and the exhibition of 
photographs about Saudi Arabia and Islam by British Muslim Peter Sanders, held at 
the Houses of Parliament in London in 2004.
155
  
In 2006, the British Council sponsored a photographic exhibition in Riyadh 
called “Common Ground”. This exhibition included “images of [the] contemporary 
Islamic experience in the UK” and was opened jointly by the foreign ministers of both 
countries.
156
 In the same year, the British Museum displayed “paintings by three 
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Saudi artists in its ‘Word into Art’ exhibition”157 and British Airways selected the 
Saudi artist, Shadiyah Alem, to work with other international artists in decorating the 
tailplanes of their aircraft. Furthermore, an exhibition of historic photographs, 
recording a century of special friendship between the two countries, was displayed at 
the Victoria and Albert Museum in London in 2007. 
This cultural alignment between the two Kingdoms was also seen in the 
festivals held by Saudi Arabia in London and Manchester in 2004 and 2005, 
appropriately titled “Saudi Arabia Days”. These festivals brought craftsmen, 
traditional performers and music from Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom.
158
 In 
2006 this cultural programme was further developed through exhibitions and activities 
in London, Wales and Scotland where Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf, then 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, sponsored an exhibition of Islamic Art at the 
Royal Museum, Edinburgh.
159
 These exhibitions assisted in cementing the 
relationship between the two countries. As Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf contended: 
“Through culture and sport we begin to understand one another. Today, more than 
ever, we need to demonstrate what draws us together.”160 
In recent years regular conferences have been held between the Saudi Arabia 
and the UK to improve understanding between their different cultures, to combat 
extremism and terrorism and to find peaceful solutions to current conflicts in the 
Middle East. Most recently, in April 2009, at the Fourth Saudi-British forum “Two 
Kingdoms’ Dialogue” held in Riyadh, the then Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud 
Al-Faisal, emphasised the bilateral cultural and educational relations that have 













become critical to the relationship.
161
 The Two Kingdoms’ Dialogue focused on ways 
of strengthening political, economic and educational co-operation between the two 
countries, expanding co-operation between Saudi and British universities, as well as 




Al-Faisal claimed that the number of Saudis studying at British universities 
and colleges in 2009 had increased by more than 700 per cent since the year 2000 to 
about 15,000. In the context of bilateral co-operation, the two countries have sought to 
ensure a better future for the young through programmes offered by the business and 
the professional sector. As Al-Faisal stated: “I also trust that its inauguration will lead 
to effective measures to put this programme into practical application.”163 
David Miliband, the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs who headed the British delegation, expressed British pride in the fact that 
more than 14,000 Saudi students were enrolled within the UK educational 
community, and also noted the existing co-operation between Saudi universities and 
their British counterparts, including the universities of Leeds and Sheffield, who had 
signed agreements with King Saud University for co-operation in the increasingly 
important and cutting-edge area of nanotechnology. He also looked forward to further 
scientific and academic co-operation between the two countries.
164
 
The Two Kingdoms’ Dialogue, which began in London in 2007, has focused 
on ways of strengthening political, economic and educational co-operation between 
the two countries. Each year the participants discussed the challenges facing young 
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men and women in both countries and have emphasised the need for inculcating 
moderate ideas and tolerant concepts in their minds. The dialogue has also focused on 
expanding co-operation between Saudi and British universities and, as noted above, 
prospects for setting up Saudi-British technical training institutes in the Kingdom. 
During the king’s visit to the UK in 2007, the two countries signed a 
memorandum of understanding on technical education and vocational training, and 
the governor of the Saudi General Organization for Technical Education and 
Vocational Training (GOTEVOT), Nasser Al-Ghafees, expressed the hope that the 
annual forum would also discuss the possibility of training trainers of the 
organisation’s colleges and institutes.165 
 Educational Exchange 
Taking an educational perspective, the motivations behind creating cultural links 
between the two nations are varied. From the British point of view, its investment in 
people is for the purpose of delivering both cultural values and technology to Saudi 
Arabia. In contrast, the Saudis see it as an opportunity to cement the gap in education 
and skills within the country and improve the quality of life of its people. Historically, 
the Egyptian educational system had been influenced by the British,
166
 and in turn the 
Saudi educational system had been influenced greatly by Egyptians. Hence, 
indirectly, there has always been an informal British influence on the Saudi education 
system. For example, the Egyptian influence in delivering vocational education to 
empower and further improve the skills of the Saudi work force is a system widely 
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used in Britain, and is an aspect that has paved the way for another connection 
between the two nations.
167
  
In the same context, the General Organization for Technical, Educational and 
Vocational Training (GOTEVOT) project was set up by the British in Saudi Arabia in 
2005 to provide international accreditation to the vocational training system. Prince 
Andrew, The Duke of York, and the then British Ambassador, Sir Sherard Cowper-
Coles, were present at the signing ceremony. As Dr Saleh Al-Amr (Deputy Governor 
for Development) told the Arab News: “The partnership program [sic] brokered by the 
British Council in conjunction with the British Embassy will develop mutually 
beneficial relationships between the two countries in the field of education and 
vocational training”.168 For its part, the British Council was “very pleased to have 
been able to assist GOTEVOT in its pursuit of gaining international accreditation for 
the vocational education and training system in Saudi Arabia,” Marcus Gilbert, 
deputy director of the British Council, told the media. He also said that the agreement 
added value to the awards gained by students and also led to recognition for 
GOTEVOT as the primary awarding body within the region to accredit qualifications 
within the Gulf States.169 
Proper educational links with the United Kingdom began when some of the 
younger sons, grandsons and daughter of King Abdul-Aziz were sent to further their 
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education in Britain in the 1950s. By 2008, over 14,000 Saudi students were enrolled 




The first British school in Saudi Arabia was opened in Jeddah in 1967, with 
the aim of creating bilateral cultural and educational relations. Currently each main 
city in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has approximately two British schools, including 
the British International Schools in Riyadh, Jeddah, Al-Khobar, Damam, Dhahran, 
and Tabuk.
171
 Besides these schools there are many British academic and language 
centres across Saudi Arabia. Today there are also three British Council offices located 
throughout the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which deliver English courses and language 
programmes as well as teacher training and educational counselling.
172
 
Correspondingly, in 1985 the first Saudi school, The King Fahd Academy, 
was opened in London, and Saudi Arabia has endowed a number of academic posts at 
some of Britain’s top universities, such as the King Fahd Chair at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, and the Khalid bin Abdullah Al Saud 
professorship for the study of the contemporary Arab World at Oxford University. 
Additionally, Crown Prince Sultan donated approximately £2 million GBP towards 




Meanwhile, Saudis frequently visit the UK both to study English and to join 
sports and educational courses and joint programmes with British students. This was 
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confirmed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and The United Kingdom, which in 2008 
stated that a programme held to link 32 Saudi Arabian and UK schools, in addition to 
groups from different Kingdoms, congregated together to explore different continents 
together as members of “Connecting Cultures”.174  
Another significant educational link between the two countries was the launch 
and implementation of a web application, Explore Saudi Arabia in the form of an 
educational website. The aim of this project was to disseminate information about the 
Kingdom, its history, culture, geography and religion in British schools. The potential 
for exploiting the tremendous opportunities available through modern 
communications facilities, such as the Internet, is beyond the scope of this research. 
However, the provision of online facilities with up to date information has certainly 
had a positive impact on the bilateral cultural relations.  
 
2.4 Factors and Starting Points for Cultural Relations  
2.4.1 Religion 
Religion is an important and essential factor in relations between individuals and 
communities. There is no doubting the influence of religion on the lives of people’s 
customs, traditions, and behaviours. Saudi Arabia is predominantly an Islamic 
country, and highly religious, whereas Britain, though historically Christian, is today 
largely secular.  
Islam is not just a religious practice, but is a behaviour, thought, a way of life, 
a political system, art, and literature. Thus, the Islamic religion enjoys an 











The conceptual framework of Islam was built on the idea of the oneness of 
God, and the Sharia laws founded by the two pillars of Qur’an, and Hadith. But as the 
Islamic societies become more familiar with Western technology and capitalist values, 
they face increasing pressure when trying to keep their traditional culture; “The Saudis 
have been receiving the material components first (technology, capitalism) and then 
these material components began to pose a challenge to the cultural and behavioural 
attitudes of the Saudis.”176 
“In response to this challenge, the Saudis were split into 
three groups. First, there were those who admired the West 
and wanted to imitate it. Second, there were those who 
knew the tremendous influence that Western mode of 
development could have on Saudi culture and wanted to 
slow down the importation of technology and maintain 
their own traditional culture. Third, there were the 
moderates who wanted both the material comforts 
provided by Western technology, as well as the spiritual 
stability offered by accentuating traditional values.”177 
 
On the British side the concept of religion is different. As the report The Struggle for 
Secularism in Europe suggests, “Britain is constitutionally a Christian state and also 
one of the least religious countries in the world.” However, the report considers that a 
paradox because although religion in Britain;  
“drives many aspects of social policy and foreign policy, [it 
is] for entirely expedient political reasons. Faith has little to 
do with much day-to-day life yet recognition of what have 
become known as ‘faith-based communities’ is central to 
political decisions on a range of issues. Freedom of speech, 
education and counter-terrorism strategies are all 
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influenced by a range of assumptions around the benefits of 
a religion-based policy.”178 
 
On the other hand, religion is crucial to Saudi Arabia’s politics and society, and it 
plays a key role in any relationship that Saudi Arabia has with other countries. This 
reality impacts on relations with Britain due to the fact that no common religious 
culture exists between them, and because Saudi Arabia’s religious conservatism 
certainly plays a role in perceptions of the country in Britain. This religious challenge 
has made public diplomacy even more important in the bilateral relationship.  
On occasion, as a result of this lack of common ground between Islamic and 
Western nations, “the efforts of Middle Eastern governments to come to terms with 
the West have sometimes meant that the governments then lose power.”179 Indeed the 
situation is complicated, for when the Saudi government tried publicly to establish 
links with the West in the 1970s and later, on some occasions, as will be shown 
through this thesis, it was rejected by a large segment of society.  
Thus, the government kept their social and cultural contact with the West at a 
distance from the public in order to achieve their foreign policy initiative without 
facing any objections. That, in my view, led the Saudi government to explain this 
issue to the West only in diplomatic terms, aside from showing much good will. This 
may be the reason why Saudi Arabia still uses this same diplomatic and political 
attitude, which is mistakenly perceived as a veil of secrecy by the Western public, 
who have never seen Saudi culture in its true light.  
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In turn, from the British side, because they have absorbed this concept about 
Saudi society through trade and politics, they exercise caution in their interactions 
with Saudis, and do not deal socially and culturally with Saudi society. Moreover, the 
concept of the Saudi government “losing power” has possibly “produced hesitation in 
the West [including Britain], for why come to terms with Middle Eastern 
governments”.180 
It is inconceivable that religious fanatics in the early 1980s tried very hard to 
stop the progress made by many scholars and educators from both countries.
181
 The 
notion that Saudi culture, and for that matter Arab culture, is monolithic and cannot 
exist with other cultures had been falsely propagated by the enemies of all cultures on 
both sides of the fence:  
“Yet a more problematic aspect of the question confronts 
Saudi society, and the regime in particular. As a result of the 
international politico economic and technological 
pressures/opportunities […] there exists an ineluctable 
imperative to adapt to a globalizing world. How this can be 
reconciled with the perceived need to protect ‘Saudi’ 
culture remains a question fraught with tension. Questions 
of the application of Shari’a law, especially if it concerns 
Europeans in the kingdom, will remain sensitive.”182 
 
The challenge of combating the perception of Saudi Arabia as a source of radicalism, 
and its negative impact internationally, is one of the most serious that the nation faces. 
Recruits for this extremist ideology against western culture offend Saudis both 
internally and externally, and distorts the image of Saudi Arabia internationally more 
than any other Islamic country. Therefore, the Prince Mohammed bin Naif 
Counselling and Care Centre and the King Abdul Aziz Centre for National Dialogue 
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play not just an internal role for their own security interests but also act on an 
international scale with co-operation world-wide to prevent terrorism and to correct 
the image of Islam and in turn Saudi culture. 183,184  
The Dossier Women Living Under Muslim Laws considers that “confronting 
anything that has to do with Islam and its most conservative interpretations is 
extremely problematic in ‘the West’, and that women confronting Christian or Jewish 
fundamentalism, for instance, do not suffer the same limitations as we do.”185 This 
point of view for research in Britain is a dilemma which could limit of desire to 
identify Muslims and thus prevent cultural exchanges between SaudiArabia and 
Britain. Because of Western fears of Islamic culture: “In this area, Saudi and 
European policy-makers have been careful to appear sensitive to each other's 
concerns.”186 Therefore, and as Nonneman asserted in Muslim Communities in the 
New Europe, research is lacking in this area and there is a need to explore this issue 
further.
187
 Hence that the entire Muslim world, and especially Saudi Arabia, should 
deal with it transparently and diplomatically is not only to correct the vision of Islam 
in the West, but also to correct the imbalance that exists in the minds of Westerners 
about Islam. 
The royal family continually needs to play the role of buffer 
and balancer, between traditionalist and globalizing 
sentiment, and between the pressures to open up and the 
need to maintain ‘local’ tradition – both supplying different 
building blocks for legitimacy and security. In this, it is, 
again, continuing the century old pattern established by 
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Abdul-Aziz. The regime’s Islamic credentials have been 
buttressed also by the support of Islamic institutions across 
the world, including in western Europe [and the UK], where 
Islam has acquired a major presence.188 
The religious, or Islamic, factor is not only important enough to be mentioned here in 
this section, but will also be raised in sections in chapters throughout the whole thesis. 
2.4.2 Historical and Political Ties 
Arab relations with the United Kingdom stretch back to the colonial era. The most 
prominent events in the history between the Arab countries and Britain occurred 
during the era of the Ottoman Empire, when the Ottomans ruled most of the Islamic 
world, including the Arabian Peninsula. This long history between the Arab countries 
and the United Kingdom, with all the benefits and consequences it has brought, has 
served as an anchor and a springboard for the privileged relationship between the 
Arab world and Britain.  
The end of the Ottoman Empire led to the formation of the political map of the 
modern Arab world. However, it is difficult to find any long-term historical ties 
between Britain and Saudi Arabia, particularly because the country of Saudi Arabia 
itself is relatively new. In addition, Saudi territory was not colonised by Britain, as 
were other Arab countries such as Egypt, Palestine and Yemen. However, some minor 
parts of Saudi Arabia were under British protection, including the Western Region, as 




Early in this chapter and in the introduction some features were discussed of 
the historical relations between both countries, and here we will take a moment to 
review some of these points and refer to other ones.  
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Diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United 
Kingdom began with common interests from 1902, when Abdul Aziz was the 
undisputed ruler of a substantial central area in Saudi Arabia called Najd. However, it 
was not until 1911 that Abdul Aziz invited the British Political Officer in Kuwait, 
Captain William Shakespear, to visit him. Shakespear accepted the invitation, and met 
the Saudi leader in Taif the same year. The discovery of oil was announced in 1913, 
and since then the British Government has played a pivotal role in developing 
relations with the House of Saud. 
In December 1915, Abdul Aziz met with Sir Percy Cox, the British Resident 
in charge of Gulf Affairs, to sign the first treaty that would build closer ties between 
the House of Saud and the UK. In 1916, Abdul Aziz was invited, as a guest of honour, 
to Kuwait to a meeting for all of Britain’s regional allies,190 and in 1917 the first 
formal British mission was established in Riyadh. The delegation was headed by 
Harry St. John Philby.
191
 
After the establishment of the mission, and formalisation of the relationship 
between the UK and Saudi Arabia, the main preoccupation for the entire region was 
to create security and stability for the area, until the unification of the Kingdom in 
1932 in which Britain also played a prominent role, as previously stated. After 
unification, a further security threat to the rule of Abdul Aziz came from fanatical 
tribes that had supported him in his conquests to unify the land, forcing him to co-
operate militarily with Britain again to get rid of the opposition “Brotherhood” and 
this he managed by the end of the 1940s. Then surfaced many other problems in 
which the British were involved. To give one example, the Buraimi Oasis crisis was 
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one which involved Britain, and which took several years to resolve. Although, there 
were Anglo-Saudi disputes in the 1950s and 1960s, which severely affected their 
political relations as will be discussed in chapter 3, it could be argued that good 
political relations between the two countries, and the real establishment of cultural 
relations, began alongside the huge investments of the 1970s, which increasingly led 
to the modernization of Saudi and in turn required more dealings with foreign 
countries, including Britain. Such change was viewed as more active interference in 
social and economic matters from the West, with a view to speeding the pace of 
development, and aroused opposition and strengthened Islamist movements in Saudi 
Arabia, which were at odds with the aims of the Saudi government. 
Although cordial bilateral relations have faced challenges during the last 60 
years, such relations have remained steady, and in some periods were stronger. For 
example, in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, on the basis of economic and trade co-
operation, Saudi consultants and policy experts in the government stimulated the 
scholarship programme to the West, including Britain, to reduce the severity of the 
deficit in qualified labour in Saudi Arabia and at the same time to attract foreign 
experts from the West.
192
 Greater international investments in education, especially 
with Britain, resulted in an increase in the number and quality of academically 
qualified professionals in British hands. At the same time, this co-operation 
encouraged tourism, particularly from Saudi towards Britain. However, while these 
two aspects were the most influential in the cultural relationship between both 
nations, at the same time it was rare to see any other kind of cultural relations 
developing, such as arts exchange, exhibitions, lectures, seminars and so on.  
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The relationship faced a new challenge in the 1990s, following the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq, when Britain supported the region’s stance against Saddam Hussein: 
“We stood shoulder to shoulder with Saudi Arabia in the 
Gulf war in 1991, with the largest deployment of British 
armed forces since the Second World War, and we are 
ready to do the same again if necessary.”193 
 
In addition, the response to international social changes after 9/11 was backed by a 
broad international political consensus. One example of this pressure came from 
Britain, where the British media policy and public opinion put the King Fahd 
Academy in London under the microscope, forcing it to change its Saudi curriculum 
completely, so as to be in line with the British curriculum as much as possible in order 
to satisfy British public opinion. This later resulted in the overhaul of the education 
system in Saudi Arabia, including the tertiary education system, which could be 
attributed to the United Kingdom in particular, as will be examined broadly in 
chapter6. 
 
2.5 Prospective Factors for building Anglo-Saudi Cultural Ties  
2.5.1 Factor 1: Hajj and Umrah Seasons  
Reports published by The Independent newspaper in January and November 2011, 
noted that the number of Britons who had converted to Islam in the previous decade 
had doubled. The report found that thousands of Britons convert to Islam every year 
compared with other religious communities, despite the growing criticism and 
scrutiny faced by British Muslims and the negative image reflected by the media 
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about Islam, as will be explored in greater detail throughout this work. The Faith 
Matters Research Foundation report stated that 100,000 Britons converted to Islam 
during the decade between 2001 and 2011, compared with 60,699 in the decade up to 
2001. The report added that there had been 1,400 converts to Islam in London in 2010 
alone, which means that 5,200 British converted to Islam every year, when 
extrapolating this figure to other British cities.
194
 
Annually and throughout the year, thousands of British Muslims come to 
Saudi Arabia to perform Umrah and Hajj. These pilgrims are undoubtedly cultural 
symbols. Additionally, intellectuals engage in religious visits, to provide a British 
aspect to Saudi culture, through official cultural forums and private methods, such as 
literary clubs, universities, and cultural forums.
195
 However, one could argue that a 
lack of Saudi cultural forums, both in the form of literary clubs or other outlets, 
affects the participation of intellectuals and non-Saudis during cultural seasons. In 
order to combat this deficit, visits should be organised for intellectuals and Britons 
seeking pilgrimage as the Hajj and Umrah seasons provide a major opportunity for 
Muslims in general to come together and engage in dialogue, in order to achieve the 
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2.5.2 Factor 2: Productive Political Relations between the Two 
Countries 
Since the unification of the Saudi state, and despite some political crises between the 
two countries in the decades following the establishment of Saudi Arabia, which 
blocked the exchange of cultural ties between the two countries, Anglo-Saudi 
relations have been characterised by mutual respect, co-operation and consistency.  
For a variety of reasons, both countries drifted apart during two decades; the 
1950s and 1960s, which made them unable to translate the powerful resumption of 
relations in the early 1970s into a meaningful political co-operation. 
By ending those two decades of uncertain engagement, and unveiling a new 
framework for bilateral relations, Britain and Saudi Arabia harked back to a 
formulation that was made when King Fahd and Margaret Thatcher came to power in 
the 1980s. The two leaders met three times during their rule, and proclaimed that the 
prosperity and security of the Arabian Peninsula and Britain is indivisible and could 
be promoted through co-operation between London and Riyadh.  
Preserving the security of both countries remains even more imperative in this 
current era of radical extremism, and such events have severely altered the 
international context of the new millennium. 
From the 1980s onwards, Saudi Arabia became one of the key political, 
financial and military backers for Afghanistan, assisting British and American 
governments during the Soviet-Afghan war. Relations have improved since the 1990s, 
largely due to a convergence of economic interests which has led to unlimited co-
operation with regards to security. As Britain discovered following Saddam Hussein's 




numbers of British nationals in Saudi, and Britain conducted strategic operations with 
the Saudi government to achieve her goal. 
The international activities of the Saudi government and improvement of its 
foreign policy has been increasingly visible since the tragic events of September 
2001. It also traces its influences on Anglo-Saudi bilateral relations and the increasing 
pressures imposed on the cultural aspects of both countries. “[While] recent events 
have renewed scholarly interest in the role of culture in international security [, 
politicians] scholars and practitioners have begun to interpret challenges like [...] the 
war on terror through the lens of national identity and culture.”197 
In January 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on information 
sharing was signed, reflecting some common interests in counterterrorism, and the 
Saudi government also expressed an interest in joint training co-operation with the 
British government in different fields, such as the agreement with Vocational 
education that was established 2010. The Saudi government clearly recognises that a 
productive political relationship with Britain could act as a counterweight to events in 
the Islamic world. The Saudi government has always taken a more even-handed 
approach to any conflict, urging that it be settled peacefully. 
At a time when religious extremism and international terrorism are threatening 
to undermine regional stability and security, the UK and Saudi Arabia are trying to 
translate the old convictions into practical policies. Developing a closer continuous 
political relationship, and co-operation in combating terrorism towards increased 
regional and global stability, both governments have made agreements, such as the 
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one with the Prince Naif Care Rehabilitation Centre, which acts against radicalisation 
in curtailing the activities of terrorists.  
Diplomatic work over the last decade has allowed both sides to reassure each 
other of their political will in promoting a new partnership. Several agreements have 
been signed in security, trade, investment, and higher education, such as the 
agreement between King Saud University and Leeds, Edinburgh and Sheffield 
universities, and the international university in KSA “KAUST” which educates many 
British scholars. 
Since 2001, Saudi Arabia has stepped up its diplomatic activities with the UK 
government and have held an annual summit, agreeing on several new initiatives. 
They have established forums for dialogue between senior civil servants, such as the 
Two Kingdoms’ Dialogue, investment forums, economic and financial forums, etc., 
and aim to bring the heads of government departments in Saudi andBritain together 
once a year. Their co-operation on practical matters became a feature of their 
relationship. 
This period has seen great advances in the Anglo-Saudi relationship, and many 
instances where the two countries have worked together on issues of mutual interest. 
British troops currently serve alongside Saudis in maintaining the security of the 
Arabian Gulf and other areas. They work together in multilateral organisations, such 
as the United Nations (UN), where they co-operate on such initiatives as combating 
hunger in the developing world and mass disarmament. Since the Trade Exchange 
Agreement reached in 2002, the British and Saudi governments and have worked 





In an informal conversation with Daniel Kawczynski MP, the Chairman of the 
All-Party Parliamentary Group for Saudi Arabia, we discussed and analysed his 
opinions on the political relations between both countries. From his point of view, he 
considers that the UK and Saudi Arabia have a good relationship in terms of defence 
and counter terrorism: 
“…if you remember, I think it was plane coming from 
Yemen where the guy wanted to blow it up with an ink 
cartridge. Saudi intelligence that ensured that the bomber 
was found and the plane didn’t explode.  I wrote at the time 
to the king of Saudi Arabia to thank the Saudi security 
forces for doing that. I think they are very few people in this 
country will understand the extraordinary support the built 
country get in terms of security working together to deal 
with terrorism.” 
He also considers that trade and business relationships are very good between 
the two nations, particularly regarding the defence contracts that the UK operates with 
Saudi Arabia: 
“I think the defence contract is quite good, providing British 
fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. Saudi is a very strong country 
militarily, which is of profound importance for global peace 
and security. I can’t over emphasise this. A weak Saudi 
Arabia, who can’t defend herself, will have a global impact 
on peace and security and could potentially cause one of 
the worst recessions in the world because of the 
importance of the oil supply from Saudi Arabia. So that is 
extremely important; that’s why our Prime Minister 
recently visited Saudi Arabia just few weeks ago wanting to 
sell the Saudi some fighter jets. Because is extremely 
important for Iran not to see any weakness in Saudi Arabia, 
if they did see any weakness they will use it in the most 
profound, destabilising way and it may have massive 
ramifications.” 
 
He also recognised that the UK relies on Saudi Arabian to keep the straits of 
the Arabian Gulf open and secure, “and more precisely the Arabian gulf not the 
Persian gulf:” 
“We rely on Saudi Arabia to ensure that [ships] sailing 




not then the ramifications of that will be on the global price 
of oil. That is good, that is positive.” 
 
Hence, since the events of 2001 the two countries have overcome many 
obstacles. In recent years, especially following the visit of King Abdullah bin Abdul-
Aziz to Britain in 2008, Saudi-British relations have gained significant momentum. 
As a result of those discussions, King Abdullah and the British prime minister, 
Gordon Brown, agreed to expand and develop relations in various fields, including 
politics, security, and economics.
198
 
 The promotion of cultural relations has thus gained support from Saudi and 
British leaders, which is essential for the activation and subsequent enrichment of 
relations in this area. To build on this cultural institution, both countries must invest in 
this further and build on political support for the promotion of cultural relations 





















                                                 
 
198





This chapter has provided an overview of the history of Saudi-British cultural 
relations before and after the unification of Saudi Arabia. It noted the ongoing 
inadequacies in bilateral cultural ties, in particular the limits placed on cultural 
relations. It seems that limits are restricted mostly to cultural exchanges being limited 
to one side, which may be described as “non-mutual” or “low-level” exchanges, and 
insufficient communication between the two nations due to differences, 
misunderstandings and political obstacles. The chapter also noted some structural 
obstacles, such as the limited representation that Saudi Arabia has externally, 
compared to the UK, in terms of both formal and non-formal organizations promoting 
cultural relations. Such structural obstacles will be elaborated further in later chapters.  
It was also observed that the political and economic processes between both 
countries have accelerated markedly, although overall cultural engagement was 
apathetic, and attention was drawn to the fact that there were no historic mutual 
government visits at a high level from the period after the unification of Saudi Arabia 
until the late 1960s. From this point attention was drawn to the acceleration of events 
such as those that occurred in 1967, and including the following: 
• The first Saudi visit to Britain by King Faisal, 
• A pre-agreement in cultural relations between the two countries 
• Opening of the first British school in Jeddah 
• Opening of the British Council in Riyadh 
The potential for a better understanding between Saudi Arabia and the UK could be 
brought about through shared cultural experiences. For example, characteristics 
distinct of the two nations’ cultures, such as the seasons of Hajj in Saudi Arabia and 




relations and economic and commercial interests that exist between the two nations. 
All of these factors should be taken into consideration as a foundation for future 
projects in establishing improved cultural relations between the two countries. 
The terrible events of 11 September 2001 and the Second Gulf War of 2003, 
which was supposedly about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), led to the myths 
about Saudi Arabia taking a very nasty and vicious turn. Tales of the noble Bedouin 
and historical legends of Muslim scholars of the past disappeared almost overnight, to 
be replaced with stories of terrorism and radical extremists: 
“What upsets me? That the extremists monopolise the 
attention of the state and of the media. Nobody listens to 
Muslims that do not create any problem, who practice their 
religion in the private sphere.”199 
Aicha, 34, social worker, interview. 
 
Some “anti-racists”, including the British Labour politician Bernie Grant, 
argued that if someone wanted to write or criticise another society then that individual 
should live in that society. For example, Salman Rushdie should live in Saudi Arabia 
“if he wanted to criticise Islam”.200 
“The ‘War on Terror’ has resulted in the deliberate pursuit 
of domestic policies by the British state aimed at 
accommodating religious identity within public 
institutions[…], the state’s aim ostensibly has been to 
contain Islamist terrorism on British soil and to construct a 
moderate British Islam.”201 
 
Today, more than ever before, the British public recognise the international influence 
of Saudi Arabia, not only as the main producers of crude oil, but as a regional 
superpower, as a centre of Islamic values and Islamic culture, as well as a leader of 
                                                 
 






the wider Islamic family of Arabs and non-Arab nations. Currently, more than 30,000 
British Muslims from approximately two million Muslims in Britain, travel to Saudi 
Arabia every year to perform Hajj, the annual Muslim pilgrimage. 
However, the potential for better understanding has always existed parallel to 
this reality and continues to exist on both sides. This has made the consolidation of 
existing cultural relations between the two countries – from educational missions, 
seminars and conferences, to scholarships, exchanges, and exhibitions – an important 
part of overall bilateral relations. Cultural bridges between the two countries are not a 
liability, or a sign of weakness of the national culture, but rather evidence of the deep 
historical facts and the openness of Islam.  
Therefore, this work aims to be a foundation for further British-Saudi research 
to examine the role of this special link between both countries, in order to establish 
common ground and enable them to build cultural bridges and improve cultural and 



















THE EVOLVING CULTURAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED 





Culture is linked to all aspects of human civilisation. It is not possible to consider 
cultural relations between countries without mentioning the important events that 
have had a clear impact on those relations. Therefore, to discuss cultural relations 
means touching upon aspects of the community’s culture – whether it be economic, 
commercial, social, or behavioural in nature – as well as the main events that have 
impacted on cultural relations between the countries in question. 
This chapter focuses on the problems that have negatively impacted on 
political relations between the UK and the KSA during the 1950s and 1960s. The goal 
is not to explore who was responsible for the damage to the relationship between the 
two countries, but to examine the influence of the conflicts on cultural relations 
between both countries, as well as the impact of cultural understanding on each side, 
of the issues raised.  
Resources for Saudi-British cultural relations are in short supply for this 
particular period. This raises the question of whether volatile political relations at the 
time explain this lack of cultural engagement. As such, this chapter will also analyse 
whether educational programmes established in the 1950s and the 1960s had a direct 
effect on the building of relations between the UK and the KSA, and examines the 




combination of moral, socio-political, and economic factors that have affected Anglo-
Saudi relations in the period under examination. 
The negative political relations between the UK and KSA in the period of the 
1950s and 1960s led to a delay in any official cultural exchange between the two 
countries. It is probable that the political situation and the adverse events that 
occurred during this period, such as the Buraimi problem and the Suez Canal crisis, 
exacerbated the cultural gap between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, and thus led to 
the lack of official cultural exchange between the two countries. One example of this, 
as mentioned earlier, is the delay in opening the British Council in Saudi Arabia until 
1967.  
Moreover, it is difficult to study this issue through available sources, as they 
do not address the very important non-official exchanges. Therefore, this chapter 
focuses on the official exchanges such as educational programmes, while considering 
the importance non-official cultural exchanges where possible. 
Due to problems of documentation and the absence of archival records within 
Saudi Arabia, this thesis has primarily relied on British documents as well as on other 
sources, such as memoirs. According to Leatherdale, the British government’s 
concerns covered political, strategic and oil factors, which required some rather 
extreme shifts in policy over the period under discussion, as the political environment 
changed dramatically.
202
 Peterson argues that Britain was making private 
arrangements to secure her oil interests in Qatar, at the same time as Ibn Saud, for his 
part, was trying to entice the British government towards further compromise.  
At the same time, so confident were the British government and oil companies 
of the supply of Saudi oil that there was little need to protest against American oil 
                                                 
 




activities. On the issue of social interactions between the two countries, he described 
this relationship as “embarrassing”, and interestingly, he refers to the “traditional 
isolation and historical writing” present in Saudi culture, as “Arabic language sources 
are not comprehensive.”203  
The long history of Saudi-British confrontation still exercises an influence on 
relations between both states. In spite of this long history between the KSA and the 
UK, both peoples have either omitted or avoided a systematic study of each other’s 
cultural influences. In addition, a significant number of citizens in both the UK and 
the KSA are ignorant of many of the historical events or details of the history shared 
by the two nations. Both sides have painted a picture of the other party via transmitted 
opinions or omitted information, especially through the media.  
Such an example of where this occurred was in 1973, in relation to the Saudi 
media’s solidarity with Egypt in its war against Israel. This was interpreted 
completely differently by Westerners than as it was in Saudi Arabia, especially as 
most people did have not TV and did not read newspapers. 
This chapter sheds light on how certain aspects of Saudi thought have been 
interpreted in incorrect or erroneous ways, in particular by the UK. For the Saudis 
who came to the UK in the 1950s and 1960s, it was difficult to be exposed to the 
British education system, based as it was on eighteenth century European thought and 
classical ways of thinking, all of which was very different to what occurred in the 
Middle East in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. All of this complicated and 
was made more challenging by parallel political tensions in the bilateral relationship 
investigated below. 
                                                 
 





3. Anglo-Saudi Disputes  
3.1 The Buraimi Oasis 
It is widely believed the Buraimi Oasis problem arose in 1954, when ARAMCO, a 
jointly-owned Saudi-American oil company, proposed exploring for commercial 
quantities of oil which existed near the Buraimi Oasis.
204
 However, boundary 
problems between Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Gulf countries in 1954 were at the 
centre of Anglo-Saudi relations even before recognition of the state.
205
  
For example, in 1922 the extension of Saudi territory towards the north of the 
future state, by means of traditional raids, was halted by a series of treaties drawn up 
by British agents involving the creation of neutral territories.
206
 At the same time 
Britain co-operated with the Saudis in the country’s expansion southward, with the 
result that in 1930 Saudi Arabia completely absorbed Asir, a British associate like 
Hejaz. 
In the early-mid 1950s, British officials had profound concerns over the future 
territorial ambitions of the Kingdom. According to the British Ambassador to Saudi 
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With regards to Buraimi the tensions between the two Kingdoms were based 
on grievances over border demarcation. The dispute reached its peak in 1955 when 
the United Kingdom seized the oasis of Buraimi by force. Relations worsened 
following the British government’s decision to set aside the arbitration agreement and 
move against the Buraimi Oasis and other disputed territories situated in the southeast 
of the Kingdom. The Saudi Government of King Saud attempted to peacefully resolve 
this problem, but all efforts were to no avail. Leatherdale argues that there were a 
number of different, very straightforward explanations regarding the crisis, but more 
than one of these combined together seem satisfactory to ignite the situation. There 
are two main interpretations; firstly, the problem was only exacerbated after the 
exploration for oil resumed in the eastern and south eastern region and brought in 
major revenues to the country. During that time, the Saudi Arabian government faced 
a huge loss of revenues due to a reduction in pilgrimage rates during the recession. 
The second interpretation is that the Saudi Government understood that the British 
Protectorates were carefully orchestrating a plan to weaken the Kingdom and thus 
refused to compromise on the issue.
208
  
The report of the British Ambassador KSA further complicates this argument; 
his 1955 report on Saudi Arabia indicates that the Buraimi problem had existed for a 
long time. The Ambassador writes, “The main cause of the serious deterioration in 
Anglo-Saudi relations was the Buraimi dispute, which became more acute in 1955 
than at any time in its twenty year history.”209  
On the other hand, Shafi Aldamer argues that the British government had 
fundamental reasons for opposing arbitration of this issue, and that Britain created the 
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Buraimi disunity, and fuelled other conflicts between tribes in British Protectorates 
and Saudi Arabia. These quarrels, taken in their entirety, led to the erosion of Anglo-
Saudi relations, which consequently led to the replacement of the British relationship 




Despite tensions over disputed territory, the Saudi government was pushing 
for wider cultural relations at this time. The British Mission in Jeddah managed to 
convince the FCO of the merits of opening a technical school in Jeddah. A report 
titled “Education in Saudi Arabia”, sent in May 1950 to the FCO in London, refers to 
several discussions in the past with regard to a Saudi request to have a technical 
college. The officer in charge believed that meeting the Saudi demand should be 
achieved in connection with the British government’s plan, already in place, to build a 
technical school in the Gulf area, presumably in Bahrain-
211
 British officials in Jeddah 
sent a letter to the FCO in London reporting a decision made by the Ministry of 
Education in Riyadh to introduce English language lessons in primary schools in 
Hasa, to teach the Qur’anic curriculum. The letter also indicates that the Ministry of 
Education would recruit foreign teachers from remote and rural areas of Egypt, Sudan 
and Palestine. The letter shows members of government missions were encouraged by 
the Saudi government to send their sons to private schools at public expense. It 
reflects the gratification of the British Mission in Jeddah for the announcement made 
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by the Viceroy of Hejaz in his Islamic Year speech of opening a Religious school and 
an Arabic school as well as many evening schools for teaching English.
212
  
From the Saudi Government’s perspective, opening English evening classes 
gave Saudi civil servants an opportunity to learn or improve their English language in 
their spare time. Nonetheless, some members of ultra-conservative groups were 
uncomfortable about this official move.
213
 
 To a certain extent, this affair underscores the Saudi government’s special 
efforts to encourage her citizens to learn a foreign language. The view of Saudi 
authorities at the highest level was reflected by the Viceroy of Hejaz about the 
importance of English schools as the route to reviving the country’s strength. Changes 
in the education system were particularly crucial to building a modern state that had 
been infused into the Islamic discourse. Caught in a high-risk balancing act, reformers 
had to counter the religious hardliners in order to be able to continue making changes. 
While disagreeing among themselves over different Islamic issues, hard-line scholars 
concurred that requisite national and Islamic integrity could only be preserved 
through rejection of Western culture. 
The saga began on 26 October 1956, with the Trucial Oman Scouts, a 
paramilitary force raised and trained by the British during the occupation of Buraimi 
Oasis. The Saudi Government expressed deep suspicions over British incursions and 
mobilised the Arab League and the media and accused Britain of violating the United 
Nations Charter.
214
 The Saudi Arabian minister of foreign affairs expressed his 
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government’s anger in a letter dated 27 October 1955, to the British Embassy in 
Jeddah. The letter included a profound protest against the British Government’s action 
and the motives behind occupying the Buraimi area, while it was being dealt with by 
the arbitration Tribunal.  
Regionally, the impact of British dispute over the Buraimi Oasis Saud “headed 
the Egyptian and Syrian coalition for neutrality, a policy taken to oppose the Iraqi call 
for a Western-sponsored defence system. Pacts were thus signed in 1955 between 
Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.”215 
By all accounts, there was growing outrage in Saudi Arabia over the British 
military adventure. It was more difficult for Saudis to comprehend the attack, while 
they had continued to believe that the dispute should be left for the arbitration tribunal 
to make its own impartial decision. The Foreign Ministry’s statement, issued in a 
verbal note on 27 October in Riyadh, warned: “The Saudi Arabian Government 
strongly protests against the British Government’s action in occupying the Buraimi 
area. The Saudi Government do not recognise the ruling given by the British 
Government concerning the frontiers between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, and they 
consider that the unilateral declaration of this ruling is valueless and inconsistent with 
international law and the United Nations Charter.”216  
                                                                                                                                            
 
Sultan of Muscat and Sheikh Abu Dhabi, but the difference between them and the British 
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In the face of such pressure, Saudi Arabia pursued a remarkably steady effort 
to convince the British government to go back to the negotiation table after Sir Reader 
Bullard withdrew from the arbitration tribunal, albeit while initially trying to ensure 
that “friendly” relations remained. Moreover, King Saud tried through a series of 
press interviews and remarks to convey his willingness to solve all disputed issues 
with the UK. However, Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, did not pick up 
at all on King Saud’s initiative. King Saud’s chief concern, rather, was that the British 
military intervention would represent an unprecedented act of aggression against the 
most important Islamic country in the region, which was viewed in much of the Arab 
world as evidence of British expansionism and imperialism.
217
  
Sefton Delmer, foreign editor of the Daily Express,
218
 visited Saudi Arabia in 
1956 and discussed with King Saud matters of public policy, in the Alhambra Palace 
in Riyadh. King Saud confirmed during this meeting that he did not wish to resume 
talks with the United Kingdom to reach an agreement in order to restore the Oasis of 
Buraimi to Saudi Arabia, instead, he was “keen on” the traditional friendship with 
Britain, and would like to see it flourish, as in the past. King Saud reminded the senior 
journalist of the fact that, when tension escalated between the Saudi government and 
the British government, he at once wrote a letter to Churchill, in September 1954, to 
express his anger and pain over the deterioration in relations between the two 
countries and reminding him that the issue of Buraimi was likely to drag Saudi Arabia 
to the brink of war in the foreseeable future.
219
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The King was certainly concerned about the polarisation manifested in the 
region after the military coup in Egypt, with its particularistic features such as Arab-
nationalism, political Islam, and communism. However, it would be wrong to treat 
Arab countries as unitary actors supporting Arab nationalist agendas, as this obscures 
the competition to influence strategy that took take place within each country. For 
example, Jordan was more inclined to support the British than Saudi Arabia. A 
confidential telegram sent from the British Embassy in Amman, Jordan to the Foreign 
Office in London, indicates that the Jordanians were apprehensive about the Saudis’ 
“pernicious activities”. The support of the Jordanian Government had a substantial 
impact on the mood of other countries, such as Iraq and Pakistan.
220
 Not surprisingly, 
Arab radicals took a more hard-line approach. Though British embassies in the region 
were well used to dealing with public protests, the polarisation was much wider in 
scope and received widespread support from citizens other than Saudis. It also 
represented considerable posturing by individual countries in the region, and different 
international actors who lined up behind the Saudi claim that the British military 
response to the crisis was driven by imperialistic interests.
221
  
King Saud stressed on several occasions that friendly relations could only be 
safeguarded if Britain withdrew its Trucial Oman Levies, and recognised Saudi 
sovereignty over his ancestors’ territory. Such unprecedented talk indicated the high 
level of importance Riyadh attached to making its sovereignty on Buraimi clear to 
London and reflected a degree of unease by King Saud over British military interest in 
the region. A major challenge facing the King, which had definite cultural overtones, 
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was how to explain to his citizens the hawkishness of some sections of the British 
government on a matter already under arbitration.
222
 
When King Saud talked to western media outlets he showed great frustration. 
He pointed out that British moves had clearly been prepared well in advance but noted 
that in the minds of normal Saudi citizens and tribal leaders there was little desire for 
military conflict breaking out between the two countries. King Saud also emphasised 
the role of leaders on both sides to calm down the situation, as he was very committed 
to continuing “the traditional friendship.”223  
At this time, British policy towards Saudi Arabia was clearly based on the 
strategic/economic significance of the KSA and the extent to which its rulers were 
able to continue to serve as a strategic ally to the UK’s interests. The British 
government was also concerned about the internal tribal and political situation within 
Saudi Arabia, in addition to British protectorates in the Gulf area.  
All in all, the Buraimi crisis from beginning to end was an example of 
miscommunication and misunderstanding, complicated by the many emotional 
currents of that particular time. Britain was also concerned over Saudi natural 
resources and the ways in which the Saudi government was trying expand its 
territories at the expense of resources belonging to British Protectorates in the Gulf. 
According to the British Ambassador’s 1954 annual report, the national 
unification of Saudi Arabia was a deeply cherished dream by virtually all Saudis and 
was widely recognised by all Arabs in the Middle East.
224
 The following year, the 
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Saudi Ambassador in London, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, was recalled by his King, which 




3.2 The Suez Crisis 
The military occupation of Buraimi Oasis motivated harsh rhetoric against Britain 
from some sections of Saudi society and from Arab nationalists, particularly in Egypt 
who were eager to put the issue of the Buraimi occupation firmly at the top of the 
regional agenda. Muslim conservatives played a role, in part for political reasons, to 
match the euphoria of Arab nationalism, which had erupted throughout the whole 
Middle East after the 1952 revolution in Egypt.  
In part, these complicated internal Arab issues slowed down a resolution of the 
Buraimi problem, but the primary reason was the failure of the KSA and UK to 
resolve differences on numerous levels. One victim of this diplomatic stalemate was 
bilateral cultural relations. There was an inevitable slowdown in this area in the wake 
of the crisis – cultural exchanges, educational programmes and student exchanges 
dried up in recognition of the problematic, ambiguous and unstable political 
relationship.  
While Saudis were doing what they could to re-establish normal relations with 
Britain in the wake of the Buraimi crisis, an armed aggression against Egypt took 
place. The Egyptian government had nationalised the Suez Canal Company. Britain 
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and France entered into an alliance with Israel to end this nationalisation and to defeat 
the nationalist leadership of Jamal Abdul-Nasser in Egypt.  
In response, the Saudi government announced an end to diplomatic relations 
with Britain and France.
226
 The Anglo-French-Israeli triangular attack on Egypt led 
King Saud bin Abdul-Aziz to cut ties with Britain and to block British shipments and 
supplies from Saudi ports. In addition, King Saud asked the US owned ARAMCO to 
stop oil exports to Britain, and the King joined the first Arab oil embargo against the 
UK, in support of the Republic of Egypt.
227
 
A communiqué from the Saudi foreign ministry was handed to the British 
Mission in Jeddah, recalling the Saudi Ambassador in London. Breaking off 
diplomatic relations with Britain was a symbol of Arabism, and a condemnation of the 
aggression against “sisterly” Egypt. Amid such a political atmosphere, a special 
correspondent of the Times newspaper summed up feelings on November 2, 1956. 
“The Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Youssef Yassin, expressed his 
conviction that the British government gave Israel the green light to go ahead with its 
plan to occupy the Canal Zone. He reaffirmed the intention of the Saudi Arabian 
Government to honour its bilateral agreement to give Egypt any support she required 
but said that no military support had yet been asked for. […] The crisis also 
highlighted the Egyptian influence in Saudi Arabia and the popularity of Nasser, as 
well as the widespread bitterness felt towards Britain...
228
 
The Suez affair was significant because it was the first crisis with both 
regional and international implications. Interestingly enough, in spite of relations 
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between the Kingdom and Britain being tense during the Buraimi crisis, Suez did not 
reach a point of cessation of diplomatic relations, and telegrams sent from Jeddah on 
03 November 1956 to London said that staff in Jeddah had noticed no significant 
change in the local atmosphere. Nevertheless, employees of ARAMCO, and Saudi 
citizens in particular, were acting to ensure there was no direct contact with the 
British Mission in Jeddah, to show their solidarity with the Egyptians against British 
hostilities. A confidential note from the FCO on 08 November 1956 proposed asking 
the help of the Pakistani President, Iraqi officials and Washington to persuade the 
Saudis to accept some kind of arrangements for Consular relations to continue, even 
though diplomatic relations were almost non-existent.
229
 
There is no doubting the British desire at this time to improve relations with 
Saudi Arabia. In a record of the conversation between Britain’s Selwyn Lloyd and 
Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the U.N., in Geneva on 10 May 1959, it 
was clear that Lloyd’s government was keen to pursue any path at that “might help to 
get things going again between the Saudi and ourselves.”230  
Without question, the Buraimi incident and the Suez Crisis had an immediate 
impact on the bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and the UK. Both crises 
highlight the importance of cultural exchange at the time that there was a lack of a 
formal British cultural presence in Jeddah. Had the British Council been in existence 
before the Suez Crisis, the Saudi elite would have been better informed, especially as 
the British government played a crucial role in securing a ceasefire in Egypt.
231
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Although initial reactions to both may have been somewhat overblown due to 
miscommunication and misunderstanding, significant emotional currents and the 
interference of Nasser of Egypt subsequently both countries demonstrated renewed 
energy and a determination to achieve their objectives through diplomacy rather than 
a stand-off. This was the message of the newly elected Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan. His message to King Saud on 22 April 1959 was a bold act of 
statesmanship. He passionately emphasised the need for the full co-operation of the 
political leaders of both Kingdoms.
232
 
Although the Suez Crisis subsided quickly, it had a profound impact on the 
balance of power within the Middle East, and on the responsibilities assumed by the 
United States there. The war tarnished the British and French reputations among Arab 
countries, profoundly undermining the traditional authority of the two European 
powers in the region.  
The strong reactions across the Islamic world were championed by Saudi 
Arabia and this move increased Saudi status and standing in its home region and 
beyond, especially in the Muslim world.
233
  
The close friendship between Saudi Arabia and the United States also gained 
enormous momentum during the Suez Crisis. Officials in the Eisenhower 
administration believed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was of vital importance in the 
Middle East by virtue of its spiritual, geographical, and economic position. President 
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Eisenhower was intent on launching bolder and more aggressive diplomatic initiatives 
aimed at giving the Kingdom a higher profile on the international stage.
234
 Moreover, 
America strived to develop King Saud and enhance his stature in the Islamic world 




3.3 The 1967 War and its Impact on Political Relations 
In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Saudi Arabia was keenly aware of 
Nasser’s potential to ignite the whole Middle East in flames. The Egyptian media 
propagated a strong anti-British stance, to convince the Arab public that the UK 
government was supporting Israel. As a matter of fact, the UK had adopted a more 
neutral or pro-Arab stand, to protect its oil interests in the Middle East. Foreign 
Secretary George Brown gave a speech that openly denounced the Israeli action 
against Arabs and demanded Israel return territories won in the war.
236
  
In this regard, the British position was not too distant from that of the Saudis, 
which called for withdrawal of Israeli forces to their original pre-June 1967 positions. 
King Faisal told a British official in Jeddah that he hoped the war would pave the way 
for some kind of settlement to be agreed upon, though he categorically refused to 
support or endorse any direct talks between Arabs and Israel as he believed that 
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British government policy was quite acceptable.
237
 This was important as the British 
greatly recognised the importance of Saudi Arabia, and in particular the role of King 




In the midst of the political turmoil in the Middle East, King Faisal gave an 
interview to a West German television channel. During this interview, he rejected 
rumours that Saudi Arabia would lead an oil boycott against the West, and refuted 
claims in the Arabic media that his government was considering breaking diplomatic 
relations with the UK in response to the war as utter nonsense.
239
 To drive this point 
home the King’s principal adviser at court, Rashad Pharaon, assured senior British 
diplomats that the Saudi Government had no intention of breaking off diplomatic 
relations with the UK.
240
  
The rising fortunes for cultural and political relations, as seen above in the 
KSA-UK responses to the 1967 war, can be traced back, in the short-term at least, to 
1964, the year that Faisal was crowned king. From this point on, Saudi Arabia showed 
a relatively greater willingness to capitalise on the close relations that King Faisal had 
built during his time as a Crown Prince and Prime Minister.  
The King was very keen to build his country by rescuing the Kingdom’s 
financial reputation and introducing measured modernisation policies in health, 
education and infrastructure. He came to power when there were grave political 
divisions and rivalries between “reactionary” and “revolutionary” states in the region, 
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demanding some unrealistic and uncompromising solutions to some deep-rooted 
problems.  
Whatever the pressures exerted on him to break off diplomatic relations with 
the UK and the US, Saudi authorities sought measures and policies that in the final 
analysis, did not diminish unduly their sphere of influence within the Western 
countries. King Faisal adopted a different posture and began to reform education in 
general, in particular, women’s education. In the presence of an encouraging political 
atmosphere, the UK was encouraged to sign the first bilateral Cultural Agreement.  
 
3.4 Cultural Conditions and Change in Saudi Arabia and its 
Impact on Anglo-Saudi Cultural Relations in the 1950s-
1960s 
The Saudi-British Buraimi Oasis dispute, unlike Suez Crisis had, little or no impact 
on social change to the Saudis, whereas it had a much larger impact on the political 
relationship of both countries, creating tension and disturbing the stability of the 
bilateral relationship. However, that strained relationship did not includes cultural 
relations for one reason; basically cultural relations between Saudi Arabia and Britain 
during the Buraimi incident were in their infancy, and no real cultural relationship had 
emerged between the two countries by this time. 
However, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, “social change was a new 
reality in Saudi Arabia”, which one of the reasons for the Suez Crisis became a major 
incident. The intensive media campaign towards Saudi Arabia by Nasser of Egypt 




tendencies.”241 The result was the British behaviour throughout the Suez Crisis led to 
the deterioration of the image of Great Britain in many Saudis’ minds and helped the 
rise of Nasserism and nationalism within Saudi society. For intellectuals, change 
meant modernisation and reform, not nationalism. As Saudis began to feel that being 
a Muslim was a greater source of pride, a few “Saudis who were educated abroad, 
their call for modernization and reform was a result of their exposure to new 
experiences and a new way of life that they admired and valued” became a flame for 
all social and cultural change experienced by Saudi Arabia, and subsequently the 
route for any cultural relations with the West. King Faisal hired some of them as 
ambassadors, such as Gazi Alqusiby, and appointed others as ministers, like 
AbdulAziz Alkhoayter, the first PhD holder from the UK. 
 For example, despite the disturbing evolution of the Buraimi Oasis crisis 
events, it did not cause the severance of diplomatic relations between them. For 
example, in 1965 George Thomson said during a debate in the House of Commons:  
“During my recent visit to Saudi Arabia there was a frank 
exchange of views on the Buraimi question. I am afraid that 
differences of opinion persist, but I was glad to find that it 
was possible to discuss them in a spirit of mutual 
understanding and against a background of wider common 
interests.”242 
 
Also despite the international catastrophic impact of the Suez Crisis, and the 
interruption of diplomatic relations between the two countries because of it, trade and 
investment between the two countries was not influenced during the Buraimi crisis. 
The latter demonstrates how much relations between the two countries are based on 
common interests, despite the strain on cordial relations placed on both in certain 
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situations. However, it is possible to affect cultural relations between the two peoples 
because of these tensions. 
Media 
Since the 1980s, media and the rise of communication technology has changed the 
way people think about international connections. Television, radio, and newspapers 
make it easier to learn about other cultures and make cultural interchange possible. 
However, Saudi Arabia was still a new state during the 1950s and 1960s, and 
it had to build an infrastructure and set up governmental institutions and public 
services, such as, health and education from scratch. In the first few years after the 
establishment of the nation, Saudi Arabia made early strides in the communications 
sphere. These included: 
1. The establishment of the Saudi press. The first official newspaper ‘Um Al Qura’ was 




2. Saudi Radio began broadcasts on 01 October 1949, although these were limited to 
Jeddah. Riyadh Radio did not begin broadcasting until 03 January 1965.
244
 
3. The establishment of the first TV broadcasting station on 07 July 1965, which was 
limited to one channel only in Jeddah and Riyadh. Broadcasting stations covering the 
whole Kingdom were not available until 1971.
245
 
In addition, until 1955, the Saudi media was not in a position to cover the outside 
world. In part, this was due to the nature of Saudi society. When television was first 
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launched, religious scholars rejected it and fought to have it banned as part of their 
determination to resist western influence and culture.
246
   
Television was not the only minority pursuit. According to a UNESCO study 
at the time, more than 90 per cent of the Saudi population was illiterate.
247
 This meant 
that newspapers and other forms of written communication were also targeted to a 
minority of citizens. This reality had interesting consequences. A lack of engagement 
with the written word meant that there was almost no tradition of archives in the 
Saudi context, which made it difficult for the researcher of this period to find sources 
to gauge popular attitudes towards cultural relations with the UK or any other country. 
 
Educational Exchanges and Travel 
Until 1950 there were no Saudi students in Britain. In 1953 the first group of 19 Saudi 
aviation students sent by the Saudi government to study in the UK graduated from 
flight school. Thereafter, Saudi Arabia chose to send their aviation students to study 
in other countries, such as Italy and Egypt, instead of the UK, due to escalating 
political tensions over Buraimi and Suez.
248
 As noted in the previous chapter there 
were no official or unofficial cultural agreements until 1967.
249
 
Nevertheless, one can chart the increase in travel and exchange over this 
period. There is no doubt that the expeditions to Arabia carried out by a number of 
British travellers or explorers provided a strategic benefit that helped the British to 
understand the region’s affairs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Notable 
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travellers included W. G. Palgrave, Lady Anne Blunt, Captain Shakespear, Gertrude Bell, T. E. 
Lawrence, Harry St John Philby, Bertram Thomas, Sir George Rindal, Sir Wilfred Thesinger, and 
Charles Doughty, among others.
250
 This kind of exploration was an essential 
component of bilateral exchange. However, exploits across the Saudi desert halted at 
the end of King Abdul-Aziz’s era in 1952, again arguably due to the escalating 
bilateral disputes addressed above. 
In the period between the start of the Buraimi dispute and the start of the Suez 
Crisis, there were Saudi scholarship students in the UK, though they made up only a 
small number of the 192 Saudis studying abroad in Egypt, Italy and the US at that 
time. Again, this was partly to do with the political situation, but it was also linked to 
the high cost of living in the UK compared to other places of study.  
Although Saudi educational missions to the UK began in the early 1950s, it was only really in 
the wake of the Suez Crisis that this important form of bilateral cultural exchange gained momentum, 
and indeed it was only in 1962 that the Saudi Ministry of National Economy began to keep 
full records of student exchanges and scholarships. This means that neither precise 
nor sufficient data from the 1950s is available.  
Figure 2 shows that Saudi student numbers in the UK steadily increased 
during the 1960s.
251
 British-Saudi relations only fully recovered from the fallout of 
the Suez Crisis around 1962-63. In that year the number of Saudi students studying in 
Britain totalled a paltry 11. Within a year, as political relations improved, the number 
of students on Saudi scholarships rose to 27 students in the UK, and by the end of the 
decade there were over 100. 
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Figure 2: Saudi Students in the UK (1962-69) 
 
Comparing the numbers of students in major European countries (Table 1) France, 
like the UK, also experienced a reduction in Saudi students in the early 1960s due to 
antagonism over the Suez Crisis, n turn there was a parallel rise in these years of 


















Table 1: Saudi Students in the UK, France, Italy and Germany (1962- 69) 
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Years UK France Italy Germany 
1962 11 64 50 107 
1963 27 1 60 32 
1964 39 88 120 342 
1965 69 96 180 375 
1966 105 34 144 277 
1967 99 27 121 263 
1968 127 31 84 266 




According to the Saudi Statistics
253
 as shown above, Germany had significantly 
higher levels of Saudi students than the other three countries in each year from 1962 
to 1968, except in 1963 when Italy witnessed an increase to 60 Saudi students and 
German numbers fell from 107 to only 32. Britain and France continued to have the 
lowest numbers of Saudi students. For example, in 1965, there were 375 students in 
Germany, followed by Italy with 180, France with 96, and finally, Britain with only 
69 students.  
 
Figure 3: Saudi Students in the UK, France, Italy, and Germany (1962-68). 
 
In terms of the total numbers of Saudi students over the seven year period 
from 1962 to 1968, Britain ranked third behind West Germany and Italy and ahead of 
France (Table 2). On the other hand, it is also true that over this period, as the 
memories of Buraimi and Suez faded, that Britain was the only country where 





Table 2: Comparison of the total numbers of Saudi students in the UK with France, Italy and 
Germany (1962-68). 
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Countries UK France Italy Germany 











Figure 4: Total of Saudi students in the UK, France, Italy, and Germany by 1968. 
 
By the late 1960s, the number of British and Saudi travellers was on the increase.
254
 
According to Saudi Airlines data, passengers travelling from Saudi to London on 
Saudi Airlines began being recorded in 1967. The number of travellers during 1967, 
1968, and 1969 was relatively low at 1,207, 1,185, and 1,722 passengers per year, 
respectively. Additionally, a counting of passengers arriving in Saudi Arabia from 
London began in 1968, when 1,579 arrived. There was a slight increase the following 





Table 3: Statistics of Travelling and Arriving from/to Saudi/London by Saudi Airlines, 1967-
69.255 
 
It is clear from figures in graphs (5) and (6) below that those arriving in KSA from 
London numbered more than those travelling from the KSA to London in the last two 
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 1967 1968 1969 
Travelling 1,207 1,185 1,722 




years of the 1960s. This was because there were many more English people involved 
in working in Saudi than vice versa. 
















When these values are compared with other key European destinations – 











Table 4: Numbers of passengers travelling to/from Saudi Arabia to other major European 





Figure 7: Comparison of numbers of passengers travelling to/from London by Saudi Airlines 




There is clearly a vast difference between the number of Saudi departures and arrivals 
in Frankfurt and Geneva compared to London, where numbers were much higher. The 
number of Saudi departures to Geneva was no more than 628 for the three years 
combined, while the number of people departing from Frankfurt, in the years between 
1967 and 1969 was 971, compared to 1,722 travelling to Britain in 1969 alone.  
In the late 1940s, one of the first public reports issued by the Saudi Ministry of 
Education examined the challenges that young Saudis faced in the realm of education. 
At the time there was no university in Saudi Arabia, and the overall education system 
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 1967 1968 1969 Total 
Frankfurt 
Travelling 816 - 155 971 
Arriving - 16 260 276 
Geneva 
Travelling 477 27 124 628 




was rudimentary. As a group they had not previously studied chemistry, biology, or 
any foreign language.  
As a result of this report, in 1949 the Saudi government decided to create a 
school to prepare students for further studies abroad.
258
 Though the numbers of 
students that benefitted from this preparatory training cannot be confirmed because of 
the lack of data, it is known that a small number of young Saudis travelled to Britain 
for higher education and technical training in medicine, engineering, science, 
languages, and literature after completing their time at this school.
259
  
However, it is notable that this training did not prepare students for the 
cultural challenges that they would encounter in the UK. What is known is that some 
of those young Saudis who spent time studying in Britain did return to Saudi Arabia 
and held respectable positions in the civil service, while others engaged in continual 
efforts to inspire their fellow Saudis to travel abroad for education and recreation.
260
 
Despite this, the numbers were small, and Gerald de Gaury believes that the 
citizens of Saudi Arabia were greatly handicapped in terms of external engagement by 
their lack of education, and this reality ultimately expressed itself internally in future 
decades when an over reliance on foreign workers would create demographic and 
social problems for the country.
261
  
Although those graduates who returned to the KSA contributed to its 
development, it is not yet clear what the influence of direct learning and cultural 
interchange had on the individual students and on Saudi society more generally. There 
is no doubt that diversity can foster a climate of tolerance, flexibility, and 
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responsiveness and can overcome negative perceptions and stereotypes.
262
 On the 
other hand, experience of foreign culture and society can also complicate attitudes to 
one’s home society and generate frustration towards domestic educational, social and 
political systems. 




 tells the story of a Saudi 
student who enjoyed a full scholarship from the Saudi government to the United 
States during the 1960s. Though the novel was criticised by many Saudis as 
superficially portraying the situation of Saudi students overseas, it does address 
clearly the frustrations and indeed alienation that can be a consequence of engagement 
with and immersion in other cultures and societies. As is often the case in many 
spheres of life, the ideal and thus the difficulty is in finding some sort of middle path 
between the two ways of life, through which balance can be reached. In this context 
there is no doubt that challenges aside, foreign students have functioned as agents of 
that transition, because they transfer to their own country their understanding of 
outside reality, and vice versa. 
 
Cultural Understanding and Exchange 
Anglo-Saudi cultural understanding was weak and actual bilateral cultural activities 
were inadequate for the entire course of the 1950s and 1960s. This era saw no 
conferences or exhibitions, no opening of cultural organisations and few exchanges in the realm of the 
performing arts and museums. Nor was there much in the way of the dissemination of 
publications and literature, or training initiatives and scientific research. 
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Apart from the political obstacles in developing such a myriad of cultural ties, 
it was also true that in these decades, the KSA was not ready – in terms of 
infrastructure, priorities or outlook – for scientific, literary and artistic exchanges. 
Saudi society still needed to develop and domestic education needed to be improved. 
As the British Embassy in Saudi Arabia in Jeddah reported home in 1963, “Prince 
Faisal aims to speed Westernisation; [...] He is also intent on economic development 
and has a sound financial basis for it […] He needs speed in reform to avert 
revolution.”264  
Moreover, the most important exchanges between the two countries during the 
1950s and 1960s were related to military matters and trade, and these were hoped to 
indirectly develop friendly relations and consolidate ties at a government-to-
government level. But at times of crisis, notably during the Buraimi affair, there was 
little thought of ameliorating problems by strengthening cultural ties on either side. 
For example, there was no move by the British to open a British Council office, as it 
had done in other Arab countries, even as far back as 1939 in the case of Egypt. But 
again, even this decision was not totally a function of political factors. At the time the 
British government was cutting the British Council’s budget and thus there was real 
concern over the additional expense of opening a base in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it was 
only after eight years of discussion and in the context of the 1967 cultural agreement 
that a British Council office became a reality. Interestingly, in the course of those 
prolonged negotiations it was not political or social or even cultural matters that 
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delayed proceedings and final agreement, but wrangling over responsibility for the 
cost of the venture.
265
 
The first British school was opened in Jeddah, and the British Council 
formally set up its first office in Riyadh with the aim of promoting bilateral, cultural 
and educational relations. According to one anonymous British official this would 
result in: 
“A considerable long term political and commercial 
advantage from an Institute of this kind, to which would go 
Saudi of present and future importance who would thereby 
become to some extent oriented towards the UK, especially 
those who were attending the Institute as a preliminary to 
training in England. It would also provide the Embassy with 
a valuable link in the capital.”266 
 
Once the British Council did establish a base in Saudi Arabia it was a steep learning 
curve on both sides. For example, it soon became clear that it was not possible to 
provide English language support for local students independent of addressing the 
social, cultural and even political implications. One important factor does explain the 
expansion of British Council programmes in the late 1960s, and that was Saudi’s 
rising oil wealth, and with it external engagement in Saudi Arabia, that often 
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Cultural relations are intertwined with politics. The effect of politics on Anglo-Saudi 
cultural relations in the 1950s and 1960s was complex. The Buraimi and Suez crises 
were caused by political considerations, but cultural misunderstanding between the 
two countries also resulted in a worsening of the political disputes, which in turn led 
again to a widening cultural gap. In addition, these crises partly occurred because of 
the lack of cultural interaction and exchange, which in turn had an impact on way that 
political relationship played out. 
As a result of these two crises and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Anglo-Saudi 
diplomatic relations ground to a halt between 1956 and 1962. This also had an impact 
on formal cultural relations between the two countries; the establishment of a British 
Cultural Representation in KSA was delayed until 1965; the British school and the 
official British Council were opened only late in 1967; and it took another eight years 
from 1967 to set up the first Cultural Agreement between the UK and KSA. However, 
by the late 1960s the first official declaration on KSA-UK cultural relations had been 
set out and plans to implement it had been launched.  
Even then, KSA-UK cultural relations suffered from the reluctance of both 
Saudi and British elites to participate. This can be attributed to the worsening political 
situation between the two countries, but also by the priorities of state. Cultural ties 
were still of secondary importance as trade, borders, treaties and diplomacy led the 
way.  
However it was also in the 1950s and 1960s that both governments began to 
gradually comprehend that economic relations and political co-operation could not be 
properly established without a credible cultural component. Even though during the 




not influence the political relationship to any notable extent, this reality was becoming 
clear. As this chapter has shown, education led the way in this regard. In contrast to 
economic relations, cultural exchanges call for boundless co-operation, for new 
models of modernisation and reform in the educational sector, based on adaptation 
rather than submission to foreign culture. For example, in the early 1960s, the 
education model that King Faisal brought to Saudi Arabia was an advanced one, 
which was designed to take the best from modern technology without sacrificing the 
core values of Saudi society.  
 
In the next chapter we will see “the strategy adopted to accelerate 
development manifested in the five-year plans proved to have significant political 
implications for stability during the 1970s, especially because the royal family had 
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THE OIL BOOM OF THE 1970S: CULTURAL RELATIONS IN A TIME 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
INTRODUCTION  
Since the 1970s, as a pivotal country in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic 
influence has increased substantially, along with her growing economic importance as 
one of the world’s leading oil exporters. By 1977 there was widespread consensus, in 
the words of Flora Lewis in The New York Times, that Saudi Arabia had “become a 
World power”.268  
As noted previously, during the 1950s and 1960s Anglo-Saudi cultural 
exchanges and institutional relationships were practically non-existent. Not 
surprisingly, the new economic boom at the dawn of the 1970s led to the UK 
engaging fiercely with Saudi Arabia for its own economic and political purposes. 
British diplomacy successfully managed to transform the low-profile Anglo-Saudi 
relations of the 1940s and 1950s into an institutionalised relationship, all the time 
carefully laying the groundwork for sound economic co-operation.  
Unfortunately, to date very little attention has been paid to the subject of 
cultural exchanges between Britain and Saudi Arabia after the oil boom of the 1970s. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of this turning point in 
the international energy market and the growing wealth of Saudi Arabia, and discuss 
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how the viability of the Saudi Arabian development plan impacted on its policies of 
cultural relations since the 1970s. 
This chapter will first examine the initiatives made by King Faisal to promote 
the abolition of illiteracy in Saudi Arabia and introduce basic education for both 
genders. It is remarkable to look at the outcome of King Faisal’s early policies of 
educational development and how these helped to achieve a positive effect in 
fostering a strategy for establishing human resource development with the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  
Secondly, this chapter sheds light on the trade links between Saudi Arabia and 
the UK, the second largest foreign investor in the Kingdom after the United States. It 
also examines the early role of the British Council in the development of Saudi 
society. 
To better understand the success of Saudi Arabia’s development plans, one 
needs first to consider the period between 1964 and 1975. On coming to power King 
Faisal, considered a very popular king in Saudi Arabia, was able to unify the royal 
family, and acquire the backing of religious scholars and the public. With the support 
of many religious hardliners, this allowed him to introduce a huge programme of 
modernisation. After convincing scholars that Islamic principles would not be 
sacrificed in the process, he cautiously made a significant step by opening up 
education to women, and he also established a judicial system by inviting legal 
experts from different countries to provide their opinion on the form it should take. 
More importantly, for the first time ever, he created ministerial portfolios, government 
organs and welfare programmes. Despite weak revenues from oil exports, King Faisal 




his enthusiasm was an important factor in creating agricultural and industrial 
subsidies.  
In the early 1970s, the so-called “nationalisation of national energy resources” 
erupted throughout the whole of the Middle East and beyond. In the energy sector, in 
contrast to decades before, Saudi Arabia, which held a quarter of global oil reserves, 
for the first time asserted control over both price and production. This process began 
at the beginning of the early 1970s, but was subsequently consolidated during and 
after the oil crisis of late 1973. The most obvious consequence of this concentration of 
wealth was that the energy firms became largely instruments of the state’s political 
power.  
Findings from several previous studies showed that due to its growing wealth 
Saudi Arabia emerged as an international power, forging ties with almost all states, 
rich or poor. In particular, these relations with the UK typically evolved around 
commercial trade and armaments. According to a report on Saudi Arabia, published 
by CWC Gulf International Ltd., relations between the UK and Saudi Arabia have 
expanded. The report stated: 
“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the UK’s 23rd largest 
export market, with exports worth £1.6bn. It is one of the 
UK’s largest trading partners in the Middle East and our 
largest export market in the region. The UK is Saudi 
Arabia’s joint 4th largest investor. Saudi Arabia owns about 
one quarter of the World’s oil reserves and has some 
US$800 billion invested in the USA. Saudi Arabia is now 
looking to diversify by investing into new areas and 
countries. There has never been a more timely opportunity 
for British and EU business.”269 
 
In an article titled “GCC’s investment in UK put at over $208 billion”, the online 
newspaper Emirates 24/7 news wrote about the “Gulf States Days in London” 
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conference, a three-day conference in London that told the story of the GCC-British 
relations and the power of Gulf investments in Britain. The paper reported on the 
considerable investment owned by members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 
nations, who held an estimate of more than $208 billion USD in Britain in both real 
estate and equity. Abdurrahman Alzamil, chairman of the Saudi industrial giant 
Alzamil, declared that “45%, amounting to around 60 billion pounds ($94.6 billion), 
was invested by Saudi Arabia,” a leading global exporter of oil, “while nearly 72 
billion pounds ($113.5 billion) in capital in the United Kingdom was controlled by the 
remaining members of the six-nation GCC”. According to the paper, Alzamil praised 
the skill the British market had demonstrated in attracting such huge foreign 
investment into its country, however he questioned the reason why fewer British 
investments – approximately $17 billion USD – were held in Saudi Arabia, adding, 
“the level is too low compared with the GCC’s investment in the UK’’, despite the 
strong and long-standing relationship between the two countries. Therefore, 
Abdurrahman Alzamil demanded more British investment in various industries within 
the GCC, including oil services, foodstuffs and other sectors.
270
 
In recognition of this, British companies sought to acquire and expand their 
foothold in the Saudi Arabian market, to export reputable British-made commodities 
in place of substandard regional ones. From a Saudi perspective Britain could be 
regarded as a precious source of support, as the Kingdom continued to pursue a 
course of cautious and selective cultural and educational development.  
This was seen in 1975, when the Kingdom signed up to a convention on 
cultural relations with the British government. As a result, the British government 
agreed to the request of the Kingdom to expand the British Council facilities in 
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several provinces. Over the years the British Council, Saudi officials and members of 
the business sector have deepened co-operation to boost English language training 
courses for their citizens. 
 
4. Saudi Arabian Development Policies 
The repercussions of improved international developments and “newly industrializing 
economies” called for widespread “joint initiatives and action” from all countries, 
especially the wealthy countries, prompting Saudi Arabia to rapidly contribute to 
drive the dynamics of international markets. Growing Saudi wealth not only enhanced 
the power of the Kingdom in the financial market, but also provided the country with 
golden opportunities to develop economic and social programmes for its citizens. 
Following the first five-year Developmental Plan of 1970, investment in education 
and public services continued to rise, even in the face of regular global financial crises 
and economic downturns. The level of expansion in basic education made the 
Kingdom the largest investor in education in the Arab world. These trends can be 
traced back to the establishment of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 




Growing wealth stimulated the use of accumulated funds in the tenth five-year 
Developmental Plan in 2005 in other areas of the economy, such as petrochemicals, 
construction and finance. The current level of development made the UK the second 
largest foreign investor in Saudi Arabia, after the United States. There are currently 
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around 200 UK-Saudi Arabian joint ventures with a total investment estimated at 
around £13 billion GBP. 
According to Al-Farhan, international industry has been widely dependent 
upon oil since the early twentieth century. Consequently it has had a powerful impact 
on the international economic system. For this reason, OPEC states have a potential 
influence in shifting the balance of power from the West, as it demonstrated in the 




“By setting economic development plans, the government 
of Saudi Arabia promoted policies such as economic 
growth, increase [in] foreign investment and expand [sic] 
employment opportunities. [...] In 1975, Saudi Arabia had 
about 470 industrial plants with overall investments 
estimated at $2.7 billion. By 2001, the total number of 
factories in Saudi Arabia exceeded 3,300 with a total 
investment of more than $90 billion.”273 
 
Like other OPEC members, Saudi Arabia had no national development plans prior to 
the formation of the organisation in 1960. In the 1970s, oil revenue increased 
hugely.
274
 Hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenues poured into Saudi Arabian 




According to the Frontline Educational Foundation, the Saudi population in 
1975 was estimated at four million, with only half a million literate males. With such 
a sudden influx of funds into the Saudi economy, it was difficult to handle the sudden 
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wealth, so the government began a massive programme of buying and building.
276
 To 
take on the sudden requirements to build a communications and transportation 
infrastructure foreign workers flooded in, and a generous system of welfare benefits 
for all citizens was established in record time.
277
 
Therefore, in addition to a massive restructuring programme, Saudi Arabia 
needed foreign expertise to confront such profound changes, including political, 
economic, social and cultural transformations. The existing inefficient education 
system needed to be re-structured to supply the labour market, in order to be able to 
participate in the international economy and “to cope with the requirements of new 
technologies”.278 
Khadejah Alkhathlan, in the Human Resources Development, 1998, stated, 
“Therefore, attention will be focused on a new stage of developmental strategies in 
Saudi Arabia. The main two problematic issues with development are the educational 
system and its position on the development strategies, and the lack of a national 
labour force.”279 
As such, Saudi Arabia began a long-term development policy aimed at 
improving conditions in Saudi society by creating, “a highly skilled and productive 
domestic workforce through an emphasis upon education, training and health 
provision”.280 The government established the first Five-year Development Plan in 
1973, initially targeting education and the economy. However, from the start it was 
forced to obtain skilled labour from outside the country.
281
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“[I]n the short to medium term allow the use of expatriate labour to overcome 
the skills shortage”282  
“The lack of a local labour force is the result of an imperfect 
educational system, which is the quintessence for 
responding to the needs of developments plans. The 
development in Saudi Arabia is based on the oil industry, so 
that the real need is to work on human development to 
replace the huge amount of foreign skilled labour.”283 
 
The commencement of Saudi Arabia’s rapid modernisation programme, which has 
been running since the early 1970s, is attributed to the efforts of King Faisal. 
Although Faisal was a deeply religious man, he had the foresight to realise that if the 
country did not modernise and industrialise itself in a rapidly changing and 
competitive world, it would be in danger of becoming a backward state that was 
internally vulnerable and had little external political and economic influence. 
Al-Farhan noted the two basic schools of thought within Saudi Arabia in 
response to this rapid change. The first school was led by those agitated by 
modernisation, fearing it would threaten societal tradition and stability. The second 
school, led by educated Saudi Arabians, supported modernisation and 
industrialisation. This group gained the support of King Faisal by ensuring that such 
modernisation and processes of development would comply with the nations unique 
and deeply entrenched religious beliefs. Such compromise satisfied those instinctively 
opposed to change and was vital to Saudi Arabia’s industrial development.284 
Accordingly, it could be argued that such change in Saudi Arabia was established 
within the Islamic context. 
“In a traditional and deeply religious state such as Saudi 
Arabia, any industrial development planning or modernity 
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planning that did not give credence to religious concerns or 
that could be perceived as a threat to the Kingdom’s 
traditions, would have been both politically dislocating and 
thereby doomed to failure.”285 
 
The sudden fortune, rapid foreign investment and openness to the world had 
significant social consequences for a very conservative society like Saudi Arabia. The 
community objection against what was not prevalent in Saudi Arabia at that time was 
the most difficult obstruction. Previously this traditionalism had prevented any 
cultural or social relationship with the West.
286
 During the modernisation process 
many conflicts bred within a religious establishment who assumed that innovation 
would bring threats to Islamic concepts and teachings. In encountering such conflict, 
King Faisal invited extremist Muslim scholars and professionals from Egypt and 
Syria to teach the youth, “his decision had far-reaching consequences”, that made 
youths more radical.
287
 It was, in the final account, partly because King Faisal was 




One of the most powerful examples of this kind of collision with conservative 
society happened in November 1979, when a group of Sunni extremists seized the 
Haram
289
 for 15 days, and killed more than 200 Muslims.  
“The antipathy of the Ikhwan and the ultra-conservative 
Wahhabis to the Al Sa‘ud never completely died away, as 
witnessed in the 1979 siege of the Great Mosque in Makkah. 
One factor in the disillusionment of the Ikhwan resulted 
from [King] ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s forbidding them from continuing 
their raids north into the British mandates of Iraq and 
Transjordan.”290 
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The Ikhwan had sought to declare of an Islamic caliphate and were against the 
modernity processes initiated by King Faisal, including the establishment of a 
television station.
291
 “The radicals called for a return to pure Islam, and a reversal of 
modernization. Juhayman [Al-Utaybi] also accused the royal family of corruption and 
said they had lost their legitimacy because of their dealings with the West.”292 As a 
result, and because Saudi Arabia was a very conservative country, it had to be very 
careful when choosing appropriate projects for the community. The situation was 
further complicated by the fact that influential extremist Islamic mainstream scholars 
had continued to convey a message about Western thought, including mandatory 
lessons and practices, which promoted a perspective of anti-Westernism. 
However, in the years that followed these confrontations Anglo-Saudi 
relations have grown closer, and military and commercial co-operation has deepened, 
as will be examined in the next chapter. 
The Anglo-Saudi cultural relationship responded swiftly to this shift in 
attitude. A series of high-level visits by officials quickly became a regular feature of 
this important trading partnership,
293
 and as Saudi Arabia looked to bring in western 
investment the UK looked to benefit from a Saudi strategic priority to make “national 
education and training policies”294 central to their national policy.295  
Consequently, Saudi Arabia looked set to bring in Western investments, not 
merely for developing the country but also as a means of lessening some elements of 
extremism within its society, a concept now known as a “soft power”. Thus, the Saudi 
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Government provided opportunities to use technology in innovative ways, despite the 




“Saudi Arabia is emerging as the dominant force in Middle 
East politics. [...] The shift actually began after the 1973 
Middle East war, according to one experienced Middle 
Eastern diplomat, when the Saudis first realized that their 
economic strength might provide political leverage.”297  
 
To this end, King Faisal led a well-articulated plan on developing the Saudi Arabian 
workforce by encouraging his citizens to enrol in formal education. King Faisal’s 
contribution to promoting the expansion of higher education should be commended. 
One aspect related to this research is the scholarships provided by the Saudi 
government to citizens to study abroad, which started during the 1970s in order to 
tackle this problem. Such initiatives were important, both in terms of building up a 
local workforce and in terms of developing cultural relations. Figures reveal that 
between 1970 and 1979, the Saudi Arabian government invested $4 million USD for 




1970 1974 1979 1985 1990 1995 1999 
No. of Students (in 1,000s) 
 
Secondary 16 42 93 172 291 452 734 
(Female only) 2 10 29 72 132 232 368 
Universities & Technical 8 23 70 116 154 204 377 
(Female only) - 3 13 41 62 87 181 
Overseas 2 5 10 8 3 4 7 
No. of Schools 3,283 5,634 11,070 15,093 17,038 21,854 22,770 
No. of Teachers (in 1,000s) 23 44 78 151 209 281 355 
Table 5: Progress in Saudi education each 5 years from 1970-1999 
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With regard to higher education in Saudi Arabia, Table 5 confirms that from the start 
of the education reforms, there was a steady growth in the number of university and 
technical college students between 1970 and 1979. More specifically, the percentage 
of growth in both male and female students over the same period increased by 167.3 
per cent. With regard to female students, the increase was most significant in higher 
education, reaching 35 per cent over that in 1970. In all cases, where there were 
different categories of higher education for women (academic and technical), growth 
increased by 775 per cent, an almost nine-fold increase. 
 By the same token, the number of Saudi Arabian trainees abroad increased by 
400 per cent compared to the previous decade. This clearly indicates that policy 
changes at home resulted in a much greater flow of students studying abroad. 
Moreover, the education and school-building programme during the 1970s, with an 
increase in the number of schools and teachers in Saudi Arabia, reflected an 
improvement in the infrastructure of the country when the oil boom, followed by a 
thriving economy, attracted considerable investment.  
 
4.1 British Investment in the Development of Saudi Society 
4.1.1 Investments 
In the autumn of 1968, the British government made a decision to withdraw a large 
part of its military forces from the Arabian Gulf. At the same time, the government 
declared that Britain was actively looking for opportunities to enhance its investment 
and economic role in the region to replace the political and diplomatic one of previous 
decades. As such, the British government began to explore the possibility of 
enhancing relations through investments, particularly in military hardware, 




In 1970, the British authorities and Saudi Arabia began to engage in military 
commerce by trading in air defence equipment. In 1973, they signed another deal, 
worth £250 million GBP, in which Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase the latest 
weapons, aircraft and missiles from the UK. In response, Britain pledged to send 
aircraft and nearly two thousand advisers, maintenance and military personnel to 
provide training for the Saudi Arabian military.
300
  
Much of the training was provided at King Faisal Air Academy at Al Kharj, 
delivered in an intensive twenty-seven-month course conducted in English. Most 
instructors at the air academy, and at the Technical Studies Institute at Dhahran, were 




In October 1975, Crown Prince Fahd (later King Fahd) made a royal visit to 
Britain for the purpose of strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries. 
During that visit, both Britain and Saudi Arabia agreed to encourage trade between 
the two countries and signed a memorandum of understanding on economic, industrial 
and technological co-operation.
302
 In 1975, Jonathan Aitken, a British parliamentarian 
who had close dealings with Saudi Arabia, addressed the House of Commons and 
stressed the importance of building strong relations with Saudi Arabia: 
“I am painfully aware that the gap between British export 
potential and performance is the Achilles heel of our reputation 
in that vital area. [...] I believe that there is plenty of room for 
improvement in the Foreign Office’s own arrangements for 
promoting British exports. [...] Saudi Arabia, which is the most 
important export market of all in that area [Middle East]. If 
Britain is to win the glittering export prizes held out to us by 
the remarkable £80,000 million five-year plan of Saudi Arabia, 
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the Government and our top export companies must become 
much more active in that kingdom, where Britain has hitherto 
been conspicuous largely by her absence.”303 
 
 
Throughout the Middle East conflict, Saudi Arabia kept its own stand in which it 
criticised Britain’s unfair approach to the conflict by calling it “unhelpful”. However, 
such attempts required effort, and a photograph of the British prime minister giving a 
warm welcoming embrace to the Israeli Prime Minister, Mrs Golda Meir, triggered a 
horrified reaction from Arab countries. In the Foreign Affairs debate of November 
1975, Jonathan Aitken admitted this was “a public relations error”. He commended 
the new chapter in the British relationship with the Middle East which was 
“symbolised by many ministerial visits in various directions”, especially the visit by 
the Foreign Secretary to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States that took place in 1975; 
“the first visit to the Gulf by a British Foreign Secretary since the present Mr. Speaker 
went to Bahrain in 1960.”304 
“The fact that 15 years have elapsed since that occasion is a 
sad reflection on foreign policy priorities by successive 
Governments. [...] I think we all now appreciate the 
momentous significance that these countries have in terms 
of our future as an exporting and trading nation and as a 
world financial centre.”305 
 
 
4.1.2 A Review of Export and Import conditions between Saudi 
Arabia and the UK (1969-78) 
Table 6 shows the trends of the Saudi-Arabian investment with Britain, the European 
Common Market and the US during the 1970s. Following the visit of Prince Fahd in 
1975, imports from the UK increased significantly. It is also noticeable that during the 
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first five years of the 1970s levels of exports from Saudi to the UK rose consistently, 
particularly in 1971 when they reached more than a billion riyals. This trend increased 
year on year, until it peaked in 1974 at SR 11,754,241. However, in 1975, exports to 
Britain decreased by 46.7 per cent and continued to decline further up to 1978. 
 
 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Common 
Market  
2,594,142 818,317 6,665,209 747,772 5,926,901 788,481 8,376,905 875,560 11,190,499 1,239,417 
UK 775,613 301,177 827,642 230,737 1,509,886 327,697 1,845,744 344,961 2,651,377 466,058 
US 252,008 622,341 194,786 568,558 589,507 615,079 1,128,878 916,721 1,625,357 1,497,036 
 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Common 
Market  
40,771,406 1,784,751 31,225,039 2,591,492 38,738,724 6,509,704 43,681,899 12,309,447 37,922,446 19,302,552 
UK 11,754,624 491,599 6,271,198 1,147,112 6,618,285 1,814,559 6,491,054 3,181,688 4,678,208 5,093,081 
US 4,417,199 1,735,257 4,031,089 2,538,367 6,377,228 5,738,634 14,575,422 9,621,323 21,771,037 14,433,459 
Table 6: The value of imports and export according to main trade countries 1969-1978 
(quoted as 000s SR).
306
 
Common Market Countries: France, Holland, Italy, Belgium, and West Germany. 
 
On the other hand, Saudi-Arabian imports from Britain were modest for the first five 
years of the 1970s until 1975, when import levels increased dramatically by 133.5 per 
cent between 1974 and 1975. Subsequently, imports increased progressively until they 
peaked at 51 billion riyals in 1978.  
Rising oil prices over the previous few years were probably an important 
catalyst that contributed to an upsurge in the focus on exports to Saudi Arabia, and 
also enabled Saudi Arabia to adopt long-term policies and measures to expand its 
trade and investment with Britain.  
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As noted in Table 6, 1975 was the year that post-oil crisis prosperity began to 
be clearly seen in the Kingdom, and this was complemented by a series of measures 
designed to strengthen institutions that were keen to boost higher education and 
cultural exchanges with the British Council. Most importantly in this regard were 
initiatives designed to establish a viable training and education system for Saudi-
Arabian students in both Riyadh and London. 
 
 




Figure 9: Value of Saudi imports from the UK. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate the progress made between Saudi Arabia and the UK in 
laying the foundation for trade relations. For example, Saudi Arabia’s imports were 
steady at around SR 0.3-0.5 billion from 1969, then increased exponentially from 
around 1.2 billion SR in 1975 to just over SR 5 billion by 1978. These trade activities 
were linked to and influenced by the royal visit of Crown Prince Fahd to Britain in 




of the Saudi Arabian economy, with remarkable growth in petrochemicals, 
construction and the financial sector. 
 
 
Figure 10: Value of Saudi Arabian exports to the UK & US. 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the commerical relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UK and 
US. Looking at the trend from 1969, several points can be noted. Exports to both 
countries from Saudi Arabia were similar up to 1973. However, from 1974, this 
relationship completely changed, when exports to the UK more than doubled 
compared to that of the US. This was due to the fact that Britain suddenly increased 
the amount of oil it imported from the Kingdom, which was linked in part to the 
military bid by the British to provide the air-defence needs of the Kingdom. 
 Though Fahd’s visit was to a great extent a recognition of the boom in 
bilateral relations with the UK up to 1975, interestingly, as the data above shows, 
following that year the trade balance changed in favour of the US, which continued to 







4.1.3 Saudi Arabian Imports from Britain 
 
Table 7 and Figure 11 illustrates the source of imports to Saudi Arabia from five 
major European countries. It shows that imports from Germany increased steadily 
between 1972 and 1977, followed by a sharper rise in 1978 and a significant fall the 
following year. Despite this drop, Germany remained the top exporter to Saudi Arabia 
from the mid-seventies until the end of the decade, accounting for more than 8 per 
cent of Saudi imports. Britain was the second highest exporter over the decade with a 
peak of 8 per cent in 1975, during which it actually topped imports from Germany. 
However, by the end of the decade Saudi Arabia imported more goods from Italy, at 
approximately 6.8 per cent, than Britain, which accounted for only 6.2 per cent of 
imports at that time.  
 
Table 7: The source of Saudi Arabian imports from European Countries (1972-1980). 
 
 
 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
UK 7.33% 6.37% 4.84% 7.74% 5.91% 6.16% 7.36% 7.10% 6.48% 
France 2.28% 2.14% 0.18% 2.24% 2.68% 3.34% 3.86% 4.57% 5.42% 
Germany 6.24% 6.25% 6.03% 6.86% 8.27% 8.36% 10.79% 10.98% 9.08% 
Italy 4.05% 2.70% 2.76% 3.90% 4.90% 6.13% 7.15% 7.35% 7.32% 









Figure 5: The share of European countries exports to Saudi Arabia (1972-1980). 
 
Furthermore, when comparing the average over the period from 1972 to 1980, as 
demonstrated in Figure 13, Germany took the lion’s share of exports to Saudi Arabia, 
at 8 per cent, followed by Britain with 6.6 per cent of total European exports, Italy at 






Figure 6: The average percentage of Saudi Arabian imports from some European countries as 
a total of its import value (1972-1980).  
 
 
Table 8 and Figure 14 illustrate the proportion of Britain’s exports to Saudi Arabia as 
a percentge of overall European exports for the same period. This ranged from a peak 
of 24.5 per cent in 1975 to 15 per cent in 1980. Overall, the last five years of the 
decade saw a gradual decline in imports from Britain.  
 
 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
UK/EU 
(%) 
23.99% 22.22% 18.22% 24.57% 16.74% 16.38% 16.26% 15.86% 15.05% 
Table 8: The Percentage of Saudi Arabian Imports from the UK in relation to the total of all 







Figure 7: Percentage of Saudi Imports from the UK as a fraction of its Imports from EU 
 
4.1.4 Saudi Arabian Exports to Britain 
When looking at Saudi Arabian exports to the same European countries over the same 
period of time (Table 9 and Figure 15), it is clear that the highest percentage of 
exports were to France, of between 9 and 11.5 per cent, while Germany accounted for 
the least amount, between 2.7 per cent and 4.4 per cent over the decade.  
 
 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
UK 8.11% 7.96% 9.31% 6.01% 4.90% 4.24% 3.38% 3.33% 3.54% 
France 9.27% 9.19% 11.54% 10.81% 11.53% 9.60% 10.69% 8.38% 9.24% 
Germany 3.23% 3.31% 4.39% 3.50% 3.14% 2.89% 2.73% 2.82% 3.04% 
Italy 11.19% 9.97% 10.34% 7.56% 6.35% 7.30% 6.77% 8.12% 6.15% 
Netherlands 11.90% 9.34% 2.58% 5.07% 5.14% 5.30% 4.35% 5.54% 6.82% 








Figure 8: The percentage of Saudi Arabian exports to the UK, France, Gerany, Italy and 
Netherlands (1972-1980). 
 
Between 1972-1980, at 17 per cent Britain was the fourth highest recepient of Saudi 
Arabian exports in Euorpe (Figure 16). France was the leading importer of Saudi 
Arabian goods, at 30 per cent, followed by Italy with 24 per cent and the Netherlands 
with 19 per cent. 
 








Figure 10; Average percentage of Saudi exports to European countries (1972-1980). 
 
 
Table 10 and Figure 18 show that UK imports from Saudi Arabia, as a percentage of 
EU imports, rose between 1972 and 1974 and then suddenly dropped from 18 per cent 
in 1974 to 8 per cent in 1979. 
 
 
 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
 UK/EU 
(%) 
14.67% 15.18% 18.05% 13.81% 11.92% 10.72% 9.08% 8.00% 8.51% 











4.1.5 Comparison of Saudi Arabian Imports and Exports with Britain 
 
Figure 19 illustrates that from 1972 to 1980 Saudi Arabian imports from the UK and 
the EU were higher than exports. This gap was most significant in 1975, when exports 
fell to less than 15 per cent while imports peaked at 25 per cent. 
 
 
Figure 12: Percentage of Imports/Exports the UK and the EU (1972-1980). 
 
Considering the imports and exports from five EU countries from 1972-1980 (Table 
11), Britain accounted for 5.6 per cent of Saudi exports, the second lowest share after 
Germany with only 3.23 per cent. In contrast, France possessed the largest export 
market, followed by Italy and the Netherlands.  
However, comparing the imports and exports of the five European countries, 
although Britain was not the biggest European exporter, nor the biggest importer, 
there was certainly not a major bilateral trade gap between Saudi Arabia and Britain 
during that period. On the other hand, there was a yawning bilateral trade gap between 








 Exports Imports 
UK 5.64% 6.59% 
France 10.03% 2.97% 
Germany 3.23% 8.10% 
Italy 8.19% 5.14% 
Netherlands 6.23% 3.69% 
Table 11: Average percentage of exports and imports between Saudi Arabia and five 









Figure 20 clearly highlights the Franco-German situation. Germany, after enjoying the 
status as the top supplier to the Kingdom, started to lose its advantage providing 
opportunities for France to capitalise on this.  
 
 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Import 
UK 
7.33% 6.37% 4.84% 7.74% 5.91% 6.16% 7.36% 7.10% 6.48% 
Export 
UK 
8.11% 7.96% 9.31% 6.01% 4.90% 4.24% 3.38% 3.33% 3.54% 






Figure 13: Comparison of the average percentage of Saudi Imports/Exports with the UK as a 




Figure 14: Comparison of th average percentage of Saudi Imports/Exports with the EU (1972-
1980). 
 
4.2 How Export and Import conditions between Saudi Arabia 
and the UK Affected Cultural Relations 
The impact of how import and export conditions affect cultural relations are one of 
the most complex elements to be considered, especially the impact on relations and 
cultural exchanges, which as we have shown in this chapter are associated strongly 
with other factors, such as the economic situation, trade agreements and elements as 
diverse as the oil price and terrorism. However, examination of the growth of 
economic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom during the 1970s 




providing a part of the picture of to what extent this relationship has grown and how it 
might be improved in the future.  
Any assessment should always consider the impact of the growth in economic 
exchanges in attracting foreign tourism and international investment. Yet the great 
advantage of increased economic exchange is that it could also lead to the entry of a 
wide range of cultural products from both countries, including brands, language 
courses, music, food and so on. These cultural products, which automatically move 
with an increase in foreign investment due to the higher proportion of foreigners who 
bring their cultural baggage with them, extend its economic impact far beyond simple 
profit and into heritage transmission. 
Although investment and trade relations between the UK and Saudi Arabia 
continued to grow, cultural exchange did not develop at the same pace. The researcher 
believes that the concept of the small village has been reflected in Saudi Arabia since 
the 1970s, the start of a period of exacerbated Saudi investments with Western 
countries. Britain was not, of course, the only country who was responsible for that, of 
the multiplicity and diversity of sources of international trade adopted by King Faisal 
in the five-year plan, Britain shared the benefits with United States, Europe, Japan and 
others, which led to a complexity of foreign investment. The plan turned a number of 
dignitaries toward foreign investment and they began to rely on it, instead of the 
government jobs or agricultural projects that Saudi society was dependent on, 
resulting in Saudi Arabia becoming a top notch consumer.Until the start of the 1980s, 








The important trend, at least for this research, was the one that began to appear 
with increasing levels of foreign investment, which had a profound effect on Saudi 
cultural patterns and features. The result was the emergence of Western costumes and 
commercial products in Saudi Arabia, whereupon some clerics began to fear of the 
transmission of Western culture and thought into Saudi Arabia.
308
 
With the increasing pace of Western investment across the Saudi border in all 
sectors of production, and increased commercial projects in the possession of British 
companies, the inevitable result was an influx of British citizens and institutions into 
Saudi Arabia with their appearance – alongside the citizens of other Western countries 
– in large cities such as Jeddah, Riyadh and the Eastern Province. Thus, the passage of 
Western thought and culture especially among Saudi youth, who they were often 
dealing with directly through various projects, resulted in a quantum leap in the 
thoughts and ideals of the Saudi youth in those big cities. That resulted in a collision 




Any search of what was published by some scholars in the second half of the 
last millennium in this regard reveals that it was focused on the cultural effects of 
those investments on the Islamic world and alarm bells were sounded, portents that a 
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cultural invasion was coming and alarm at a new aggression on the cultural specificity 
that requires a vigilance and preparedness for defence.
310
 
Assuming that it is true that Islamic culture in Saudi Arabia was targeted by 
Western cultural invasion is an idea that penetrates the national identity. However, the 
question that arises here is: Was not it required from the 1970s onwards to create and 
develop international cultural strategies and plans to meet this challenge? What were 
the cultural strategies and plans to support Saudi culture internally and externally, and 
were they developed from a perspective that fits in with a strategy for the future of 
Saudi Arabia of opening up to Western investment? But it seems to have just been a 
warning at that time and the officials did not have an adequate reaction to it, resulting 
in further rejection of Western culture in Saudi Arabia and increased cultural isolation 
in the West. 
Some of the prevailing thoughts and reactions of those scholars and their 
followers was to panic in the face of anything not familiar to them, and rather than 
trying to discover the unknown culture, they became scared and fled back to the past 
of their predecessors, leading to the pre-stage of their confrontation with the problems 
and complexities of the modern world. 
Since Saudi Arabia was under the control of religious scholars, there was no 
cultural policy, and this researcher believes that was because of the fear of a collision 
between Saudi society and its scholars. Furthermore, the politicians and scholars did 
not follow the example of the economists, who had planned practically and 
realistically for prosperity from international trade and economic future of their 
                                                 
 
310
 As a model for such writings, see the contribution of Professors Mohammed Abed al-Jabri and 
Abdelilah Belkeziz at a conference, “The Arabs and Globalisation”, which was held in Beirut from 18-
20 December 1997. Shu’un al-Wasat, No. 71 (April 1998), pp. 77-100. See also a conference on 
“Globalisation and Issues of Cultural Identity” held in Cairo from 12-16 April 1998, al-Mustaqbal al-




country, who had used sober critical analysis which proposed practical responses to 
developments rather than the hysterical reaction of the scholars.
311
 
However, internationally Saudi culture remained stagnant. The Kingdom 
waited all those years “and decades” and escaped from a confrontation with other 
cultures until the point she received cultures from all over the world without her 
permission. 
At a time when sociologists, cultural anthropologists and scholars were 
engaged in a discussion of the evolution of cultures and spoke for acculturation, 
cultural cross-fertilization, the openness of cultures with each other and intercultural 
dialogue, some scholars were lulled into an argument about cultural invasion, cultural 
rape, loss of security and cultural penetration from another culture and people, and so 
on. 
Whereas in fact the Arab culture had demonstrated throughout its long history 
and track record, for the opening of that rare counterpart. See, for example, the works 
of such Arab philosophers and scientists as the book of Al-Jahiz, Kitab al-Hayyawan 
(The Animal), and Ibn Khaldun, Al-muqaddimah (Introduction).
312
 Ibn Khaldun 
believed that the Arab culture and civilisation, even in her best eras, was not just open 
to other cultures, but also “infiltrated” by others, though it was a culture of 
“victors”.313 
Also the establishment of Bayt Al-Hikmah (the House of Wisdom) by Al-
Ma’mun Abbasi holds more significance and meaning in this context. “This became 
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the central meeting place for Christian and Muslim scholars of many different 
nationalities from within the Islamic empire. It was also a huge universal library and 
academic centre, specialising in the translation into Arabic of original Greek 
philosophy and science, as well as Indian and Persian wisdom, knowledge and my 
stoicism.”314 
It can be seen from the foregoing that economic exchange with Britain, or the 
West in general, and its unintentional consequence of dynamic cultural exchange, 
would not necessarily cause a dissolution of the Arab and Saudi culture, and the 
events of the 1970s and afterward was a great example of this. Melting of the Arab 
culture seems only to threaten those who imagine that progress and modernity is 
assault on identity. However, the Arab culture – as mentioned earlier – has overridden 
history and its variables time and again, maintaining its own special elements over 
time and despite many challenges. 
Moreover, the vision linking identity to history and considering it as a 
complete and unchanging template may be true in some way, but it could still accept 
openness and invest in it for cross-cultural benefit. The fact that the identity was 
linked to the future as well, complete with ambitions and hopes for the nation in the 
renovation and construction of a new future that does not deny the achievements of 
previous eras under the pretext of preserving identity from the vicissitudes of history, 
but works to absorb it in its favour. 
However, the author of this thesis believes that this fact could be true if it is 
not regulated, or if there is an intentional plan. But even if it were intentional, Saudi 
cultural diplomats and officials must take the stance of highlighting their cultural 
identity by innovative and effective means. 
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Taken from another aspect, it could be considered that bilateral cultural 
exchanges cannot be separated from trade exchanges. Cultural exchanges help to 
increase mutual understanding and enjoy a similar importance to economic and trade 
exchanges. Consequently, in line with the increase in economic and trade exchange 
between Saudi Arabia and Britain in the 1970s and beyond, the need to learn English 
gradually became a common habit among young Saudis. Even the British Council 
opened its second branch in Jeddah at the time in response to an economic and 
cultural need to learn English, and the number of institutes that taught English 
language significantly increased, as will be discussed in chapters 5 and 7, alongside 
the number of travellers between the two countries, as will be analysed in the next 
section. 
Hence, economic and trade exchanges between the two countries have 
provided an opportunity for cultural exchanges and the construction of the first clear 
cultural bridge between the two nations. Where once the traditional Saudi culture 
achieved outward success yet only displayed a timid presence in Britain, the adoption 
of the cultural agreement brought the sort of exchanges that strengthened its position, 
to the point where it began sending undergraduate Saudis to Britain to learn English 
and to continue their Higher education. This cross-cultural impact will also be 
covered in some in detail later. 
 
4.2.1 Travellers between Saudi Arabia and the UK 
One indication of the degree to which nations are mixing economically and culturally 
is to look at the number of individuals travelling to and from different countries. In 
this section, we will consider how the travel situation changed when Saudi Arabia 




travelling to Europe before and after the agreements of 1975, with particular emphasis 




1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Total 
London 2,456 2,768 4,382 6,232 12,602 20,552 40,672 60,446 76,949 72,700 299,759 
Frankfurt 1,012 1,009 667 487 - - - 1,550 10,199 14,178 29,102 
Rome - - - 3,596 3,548 4,819 7,514 14,184 22,454 31,185 87,300 
Paris - - - - - - - - 17,436 28,824 46,260 





Considering the number of passengers travelling to Europe, there was a significant 
increase in the number of visitors travelling to the European cities of London, 
Frankfurt, Rome and Paris from Saudi Arabia during the 1970s (Table 13 and Figure 
23). London was certainly the most popular destination for Saudi travellers over the 
decade, with 299,759 arriving in the capital city. Although Saudis did not start 
travelling to Rome on direct flights from Saudi Arabia until 1974, it was the second 
most popular destination overall.  
 
                                                 
 
315
 Passengers Travelling by Saudi Arabian Aircrafts from Domestic to Foreign Airports 1970–1979 





Figure 15: The number of passengers travelling by Saudi aircraft from Saudi Arabia to 
London, Frankfurt, Rome and Paris (1977-1979). 
 
Considering the total number of passengers over the decade, the United Kingdom was 
the most popular destination, with 65 per cent of passengers travelling to London, 
followed by Rome with 19 per cent (Figure 24).  
It is noticeable that following King Fahd’s visit to the UK in 1975, there was a huge 
increase in business activity, and therefore the number of travellers also increased 
from just over 10,000 in 1974 to nearly 80,000 by 1978. Ironically, Saudi Arabian 
trade and investments with Germany were higher than those with Britain in general, 
as shown in the previous section, and yet Frankfurt had the lowest percentage of 







Figure 16: The fraction of passengers travelling by Saudi aircraft from Saudi Arabia to 
London, Frankfurt, Rome and Paris (1970-1979). 
 
 
Considering Britain alone, during the 1970s Britain received the highest number of 
visitors from Saudi Arabia year on year, reaching a peak of around 76,949 in 1978, 
which was an increase of 27 per cent over the previous year. This influx was primarily 
due to extensive Saudi Arabian government investments that had been ramping up 
through the decade. 
 
 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Travelling 
to London 
2,456 2,768 4,382 6,232 12,602 20,552 40,672 60,446 76,949 72,700 
% - 12.70 58.31 42.22 102.21 63.09 97.90 48.62 27.30 -5.52 
Table 14: Passengers travelling by Saudi Arabian aircraft to London (1970-1979) and the 







Figure 17: Passengers travelling by Saudi Arabian aircraft to London (1970-1979). 
 
 
Considering the travel of European citizens to Saudi Arabia, from the late 1970s the 
number of visitors travelling from the UK to Saudi Arabia showed a dramatic increase 
over the decade, reaching 85,030 by 1979. Table 15 and Figure 16 show the number 
of passengers arriving in Saudi Arabia from four European airports on Saudi Arabian 
carriers between 1970 and 1979. These figures were issued by the Central Department 





 Dhahran Riyadh Jeddah Total 
London 1,332 47,009 36,689 85,030 
Frankfurt - 13,059 3,949 17,008 
Rome - 22,200 12,675 34,875 
Paris - 14,902 15,987 30,889 
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Figure 18: Total number of visitors arriving on Saudi Arabian aircraft from London, 
Frankfurt, Rome and Paris to Saudi Airports during the 1970s. 
 
It is clear from the total number of passengers arriving in Saudi Arabia from London, 
that Britain could be considered a major European country for air mobility to Saudi, 
with passenger levels five times greater than Germany and more than two and a half 
times that of France, which incidentally also received massive oil imports from Saudi 
Arabia. 
Figure 27 illustrates the fraction of arrivals from major European countries to 
Saudi Arabia, which also shows Britain had the largest share, at 51 per cent of arrivals 
to Saudi Arabia, compared with Italy with 21 per cent, France with 18 per cent, and 






Figure 19: Percentage of total passengers arriving in Saudi Arabia from London, Frankfurt, 
Rome and Paris by Saudi Arabian aircraft during the 1970s. 
 
The visitors to Saudi Arabia are not only economic visitors or tourists, but as the 
centre of the Islamic world there are also a large number of pilgrims visiting Saudi 
Arabia to perform the pilgrimage. 
 
 
 Males Females Total 
U.K 1,083 545 1,628 
France 340 162 502 
Spain 181 19 200 
Greece 264 126 390 
Yugoslavia 1,900 177 2,077 
Total overseas visitors of 
both gender (in1000s) 
  919 
Table 16: Comparison by gender of the number of pilgrims arriving in Saudi Arabia from 





Considering Europe as a whole (Table 16), in 1974 the highest number of pilgrims 
came from Yugoslavia, a country with a large concentration of Muslims, particularly 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this figure was only 25 per cent higher than the 
number of pilgrims who arrived from Britain. 
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With respect to and in consideration of the high proportion of Muslims in 
Britain, one consequence of cultural exchange was the desire of Islamic countries to 
create the Islamic Cultural Centre in London. The total cost after its completion in 
1977 was about 43 million SR, which included a contribution from the Saudi 
Kingdom of approximately 14.5 million SR, equivalent to 34 per cent of the cost. At 
the same time, the Kingdom also allocated 5 million SR to buy an endowment with 
the proceeds to be spent on running the Centre. The Islamic Cultural Centre consists 
of a mosque, which can accommodate more than 2,000 worshippers, or 7,000 
worshippers with the use of the basement and the yard surrounding the mosque, and a 
huge Islamic library designed to hold 75,000 books, The Centre also includes offices 
to manage the Centre, galleries and meeting rooms where seminars and conferences 




 Leaving Entering 
U.K 21.684 21.856 
France 4.246 3.827 
Italy 5.162 4.898 
Norway 2.141 2.119 
Germany 4.095 3.625 
Greece 5.893 5.619 
US 29.957 28.018 





The year 1974 was considered the peak year for investments between Saudi Arabia 
and Britain. It also witnessed the highest number of visitors between the two 
countries. That year the number of departures and arrivals to and from London were 
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higher than other years during the 1970s and also higher than any other European 
country.  
Moreover, the difference between those leaving and entering that year was just 
172 in favour of those entering Saudi Arabia. In comparison, the number of American 
citizens leaving and entering Saudi Arabia that year was still higher than Britain, 
despite the long distance between America and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Total Travelling from Saudi Arabia to 
UK 
Total Travelling from UK to Saudi 
Arabia 
299,759 85,030 
Table 18: Comparison between passengers Arriving and Travelling between Saudi Arabia and 




Figure 20: Total number of passengers travellingbetween Saudi Arabia and the United 
Kingdom during the 1970s. 
 
 
By 1979, the total number of travellers from Saudi Arabia to Britain reached 299,759, 
while the total number of visitors from the UK to Saudi Arabia was just 85,030. These 
figures show there was a significant effect on the movement of Saudi Arabians as a 




highlighted that the new Saudi strategy for economic growth was positively effecting 
bilateral relations.  
It seems that the British government made it much easier for Saudi Arabians 
to visit Britain than their Saudi counterparts. The low number of British visitors to 
Saudi Arabia did not contribute significantly to the breaking of barriers between the 
two countries to enhance cultural relations. 
4.3 Anglo-Saudi Cultural Relations 
In 1975 the first British-Saudi Arabian Cultural Relations Convention was signed. 
This led to the opening of the British Council office in Jeddah, as noted in chapter 2, a 
move that was central to the Kingdom’s attempt to improve education and human 
capital development, in order to acquire the required knowledge, skills, attitudes and 
values needed to meet new economic, social and cultural challenges. Related to this, 
the UK agreed to establish and manage key departments – engineering and medicine – 
at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. Regarded as two of the biggest educational 




However, the British Council in Saudi Arabia was a relatively small 
organisation, and it was incapable of meeting the demand in a rapidly evolving 
society. Nevertheless, the British Council represented the largest educational scheme 
at that time for Saudi Arabia, at a cost of about £10 million GBP for school 
curriculum development in English, Mathematics, Science and audio-visual systems. 
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The scheme involved the recruitment of specialists to devise courses and produce 
materials as well as to monitor student progress and provide training for staff.
321
  
The scheme illustrates the convergence of cultural relations between the two 
governments, a dynamic that the British Council played a significant role in 
achieving.
322
 In particular, the Council worked closely with the Saudi Arabian 
Ministry of Education and schools to advise and consult on teaching the English 
language,
323
 and essentially Saudi Arabia was in need of the services the Council 
provided. By the second half of the 1970s, the British Council was running 24 
projects in the country.
324
  
In 1973 a new education policy allowed local students to be granted passports 
and visas, and to obtain travel tickets and sponsorship from the government, 
demonstrating their willingness to study abroad. This trend reflected the changes in 
scholarship opportunities in Europe, where the booming economy of the late 1970s 
attracted large numbers of students from Saudi Arabia. The British authorities 
responded to those new policies by speedily issuing student visas to Saudi Arabian 
students. 
As Tremblay noted, “a period of study abroad allows students to absorb the 
cultural and social customs of their host country, and thus to act as ambassador for 
both their host country and their own”.325  
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 UK Holland Belgium Switzerland Spain Greece Germany Austria Italy France 
Total 118 2 1 10 1 2 289 63 61 20 






 Male Female Total 
London 468 36 504 
France 30 4 34 
Italy 40 2 42 
Germany 128 1 129 
US 5,892 159 5,851 




Because Saudi statistics for most of these years only cover the total number of 
students who studied in Europe as a whole, the researcher was unable to obtain the 
number of Saudi Arabian scholarship students in Britain for each year of the 1970s. 
However, it can be observed from Tables 19 and 20 that while the number of Saudi 
students on scholarships to study in the UK from 1970 to 1971 was very low, at only 
118 students, by 1978-79 the situation had changed and Britain had the highest 
number of Saudi Arabian students in the whole of Europe.  
In the early 1970s, the UK fared well compared to the other European 
countries with the exception of Germany. This was due to the fact that at the time the 
German government subsidised university fees for students from developing 
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countries, and also offered a number of free places.
328
 On the other hand, by 1978-79 
the situation had changed and Britain had the highest number of Saudi Arabian 
students in the whole of Europe, four times more than Germany. 
Outside Europe, and on a global scale, the Saudi government consistently sent 
more students to America than Britain. This was more a function of the nature of the 
massive university system in the US, as well as the extent of political and economic 
relations between Washington and Riyadh, than any superiority of American 
universities over their British counterparts.  
As a result of young Saudis studying abroad, there was a critical need for 
offices in these countries to engage with those students. Moreover, educated people 
who were living in Saudi Arabia were increasingly being treated as a resource for 
educational networks between the Saudi Arabian government and British universities. 
Mr Abdul Wahab Fattal, who was chosen by King Faisal to be the first Educational 
Attaché to the Saudi Arabian embassy in London in 1970,
329
 had a wide network of 
British contacts. Fattal not only used to meet students personally at Heathrow Airport, 
but also provide them with accommodation and help them gain university admission. 
In this context, the Educational Attaché was seen as an essential resource that 
contributed to the development of Saudi Arabian students abroad, especially with his 
cultural knowledge and active social and professional network.  
Saudi Arabia in the 1970s did not need Britain to subsidise the Saudi Arabian 
education system, as this “would clearly be inappropriate” because Saudi Arabia was 
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a PES member (Paid Education Services) of the OPEC countries.
330
 Jeremy Barnett, 
the British Council’s representative in Riyadh in 1975, emphasised the influential role 
the Council played in the British economy through its PES. Barnett asserted the 
significance of the money spent on education in Saudi Arabia. There was also 
recognition from the UK that remittances from international students “represent a 
source of foreign exchange earnings and investment.”331 
Interestingly, the British Council had more success in building ties with 
Saudis than any American institutions in the country. During the 1970s, the Saudi 
government “rejected a proposal from an American university, on the grounds that 
the institution was interested only in making a profit and the non-profit nature of the 
British Council was a real attraction”.332 
There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia was interested in Britain and at that time 
was in need of knowledge of its language, science, expertise and organisation, 
although the ordinary Saudi was not fully aware of the need to know the culture, 
literature and arts of Britain.
333
  
This meant that although educational and cultural exchanges would have been 
an excellent way of strengthening connections between Saudi Arabia and the British, 
during the 1970s there were no such proposals for such an exchange. Instead, the 
1975 Convention called for the provision of professors, scientists and lecturers. 
Moreover, the flow of Saudi Arabian students to the UK was one way, as at the time 
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Tremblay cited a study by Jinyoung Kim in 1998 that examined empirically 
the economic impact of technology transfers that send students from their home 
countries to study abroad. Kim referred to “foreign education as a process of 
knowledge import” which enhances the economic growth of developing countries 
when they return to their home countries with “embedded human capital” or a 
knowledge and practical experience of other cultures. The main findings of this 
research was that the number of students enrolled abroad in higher technology degrees 
in developed countries, correlated positively with a “growth rate of per-capita income 
in the sending country, and the effect is even stronger when considering the students 
enrolled abroad in technology-related fields”.335 One consequence of this was that 
students educated overseas often obtained jobs earning higher salaries than home-
educated students. 
Another benefit from overseas student programmes is that students can 
maintain ties with the host country when they return to their country of origin. 
“Greater co-ordination and co-operation between student countries’ of origin and 
destination appears as a promising way to share the advantages linked to international 
student mobility in a fair way.”336  
Available statistical data suggests that former Saudi Arabian graduates that 
studied abroad have actually made a significant contribution in developing and 
building Saudi Arabia. The minister of Education, Al sheikh Abdul-Aziz Al Khwiter, 
was not only the first postgraduate, but also the first Saudi PhD graduate from Britain, 
after he attended the History department at London University in 1960.
337
 During the 







 Noor Alamain, 2014. Adib Al Arabia ( Arabic Literature) Dr. Abdul-Aziz Al Khwiter Aldaay 




1970s most ministers, highly qualified employees and senior professionals obtained 
degrees from abroad, such as the former Minister of Labour Dr Ghazi Al-Qusaibi who 
obtained his PhD degree from Britain.
338
  
The Saudi Arabian government did not need to encourage scholarship students 
to return home, as was the case in some countries such as China. On the contrary, 
Saudi Arabia needed to overcome the fears that had prevented her youth from 
travelling to Western countries, and that was a greater concern for cultural differences. 
For this reason, young students were encouraged to study abroad with various 
incentives and benefits upon their return (including the opportunity to have a well-paid 
job).  
Further evidence of the strength of Anglo-Saudi bilateral relations, which later 
influenced their cultural relations and was also in part a consequence of the 
implementation of the Saudi-British Cultural Agreement of 1975, was the opening of 
Saudi press centres in the Western world, initially in London. Set up in 1977, with a 
staff of nearly 10 employees, the London office of the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) was 
the first office of its kind outside the Arab world.
339
 Subsequently, Al Majalla (the 
Magazine), a well-known political magazine, was first published in February 1980 
from its head office in London,
340
 and ASharq Al-Awsat (the Middle East) newspaper 
is also London based. The first issue of ASharq Al-Awsat was published on 4 July 
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Strong cultural connections open markets, boost trade and investment opportunities 
and overcome obstacles to the efficient conduct of international business, leading to 
strengthened economic partnerships. However, throughout the 1970s fostering Saudi 
interaction outside the country was complicated by the fact that influential Islamic 
mainstream scholars continued to convey a negative message about the West. Despite 
these obstacles to his attempts at modernization, King Faisal had ambitious plans, and 
he managed to persuade influential members of society to help him achieve them, 
plans that have continued even after his death in 1975. 
As discussed throughout this Chapter, although there were many stumbling 
blocks to widespread cultural exchanges between the two countries, and cultural ties 
were totally overshadowed by economic co-operation and investment priorities, 
economic links did open the way to some extent for cultural development. Notably, 
Saudi Arabia attracted British workers from numerous sectors to work in the country, 
thus broadening the makeup of society at the same time as working for modernisation. 
Moreover, the British Council came into its own in the mid-1970s and evolved 
quickly into a key cultural institution in Saudi Arabia. The British Council played a 
key role domestically in Saudi Arabia, but also in terms of promoting Saudi plans for 
scholarships abroad, paid for by the rising trade and investment on a bilateral level.
342
  
In response, Britain looked to consolidate its growing economic ties in the 
cultural and educational sectors. The first British school was established in Jeddah in 
1973, followed by the British Council in Riyadh, followed by the signing of a contract 
of cultural partnership between the two countries in 1975. 
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But if Saudi Arabia at that time was in need of teachers and expertise in 
English language, sciences and organization, it was not really interested in British 
culture, literature and arts, so it was not surprising that no cultural activities were held 
by the British Council in those areas.  
The Kingdom has been patient in its quest for modernisation, although the 
belief that promoting Saudi culture abroad both protects the culture and promotes it 
internationally was lacking. Despite the fears of the conservative elements, the 
uniqueness of the Saudi culture has been protected, until the events of 9/11 in 2001 
undid a lot of the positive work and drew the attention of the international community 
upon Saudi Arabia, leading to a considerable amount of cultural misunderstanding. 
Britain, on the other hand, ignored most of the misunderstandings in this regard by 
virtue of its long-standing and advanced cultural and economic relationship with the 
Saudi government and the Saudi people, stretching back to the signing of the 
agreements of the mid-1970s. 
The lack of a positive cultural exchange with the UK after the signing of the 
agreement in 1975, which may be considered a turning point in Anglo-Saudi 
relationships after the lacklustre relationships and crises of the 1950s and 1960s, was 
slow to take off, since the Saudi government displayed little interest in promoting 
Saudi culture outside of the country, or learning about the culture of the UK, instead 
focusing on importing knowledge, in the form of teachers and scientists. 
The author maintains that belief in cultural penetration requires efforts toward 
unification to be made, to bring together intellectuals, politicians and officials to 
highlight the Saudi identity internationally, in order to introduce knowledge of the 




to the same degree. Such knowledge should be introduced by those who deeply know 
the Saudi culture, not by those who not belong, or are not related to the culture.  
From the 1970s onwards, when international agreements opened up the 
borders of Saudi Arabia to international investment and economic and educational 
development, politicians and cultural officials failed to draw a roadmap to promote 
their culture internationally. Consequently, when the 9/11 attacks happened this 
sobered up everyone as to the need for such a strategy, and to a need for cultural 
diplomacy, to overcome the many obstacles and problems that could have been 
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HIGHER EDUCATION LINKS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND BRITAIN 
DURING THE 1980S AND 1990S 
“It is one of my firmest beliefs that although there are 
certain basic standards and goals we should expect from 
every member of the international community, the precise 
pace and approach must reflect different societies’ cultural, 
social, economic and historical backgrounds. And Saudi 
Arabia, in particular, is a complex society, which 





The current chapter provides an investigative deliberation on cultural activities during 
the 1990s, concentrating primarily on education and security. These have had a great 
impact on the development of Saudi society as a whole, and on the growing number 
of university students in particular, coinciding with an increase in the international 
political, social and educational activities of the State. 
This chapter will begin by showing how a number of security challenges that 
engulfed the Saudi Kingdom and the Middle East forced both the British and Saudi 
governments to better equip their security forces in order to counter the rising threats. 
The Grand Mosque incident in 1979, along with the Iranian revolution in the same 
year and other occurrences in the region, provide an insight into the complexities of 
the region’s politics with respect to Anglo-Saudi bilateral relations.  
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5. Margaret Thatcher and King Fahd Visits: The Impact on 
Anglo-Saudi Cultural Relations 
5.1 Thatcher’s Visit to Saudi Arabia during the 1980s 
“Prime Minister Thatcher was determined to shake off the 
trauma and prevailing morbidity of post-Suez declining 
Britain. She did so in an expertly executed propaganda 
offensive which, had it failed, could have had the same 
consequences as Suez. Thatcher’s treatment of the media 
and her understanding of propaganda was in some ways 
more advanced than Eden’s.”345 
 
There were numerous official exchanges between the British and Saudi establishment 
during the 1980s focusing on arms contracts. Margaret Thatcher, the then British 
prime minister, was the leading supporter of strengthening the business relationship 
between the two countries as a means of reviving the British economy.
346
  
On her visits, Thatcher, who was fond of both the Sahara and the Bedouin, 
complimented Saudi Arabia as a peace-loving nation. Both of her visits to Saudi 
arabis certainly strengthened cultural relations, and the other official exchanges, 
which followed on from these two visits, paved the way for strengthening business 
and cultural exchanges. 
The second visit by Margaret Thatcher to Saudi Arabia, in 1985, can be 
considered the starting point of strategic engagement and the sharing of intellectual 
resources, paving the way for the development of closer ties in various sectors, 
including culture, defence, trade, and investment.  
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It is reasonable to argue that during the Thatcher era, Britain and Saudi Arabia 
had the strongest relationship since bilateral relations began. When Thatcher made an 
official visit to Saudi Arabia, she deferred to Islamic custom on appropriate attire for 
women by wearing a long-sleeved, ankle-length dress throughout the day, and during 
her talks with King Khalid, she wore a net veil over her face. 
The arms sales, in exchange for oil, were intended to bail out the economy, 
and underpinned the first stage of the arms deal between Britain and Saudi Arabia in 
1984. The deal was largely attributed to Thatcher’s own lobbying initiative on behalf 
of the British defence industry.
347
 
During the early 1980s, there was a tense regional atmosphere as a number of 
events unfolded; the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the Iran-Iraq war, and the 
assassination of the Egyptian President, Anwar El Sadat all defined the epoch and 




As well as the arms industry there were numerous other British trade sectors 
represented in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s looking to sell goods and promote 
British exports to the Kingdom. These included the Federation of Sussex Industries 
and the Birmingham Chamber of Industry and Commerce as well, for example, the 
British Health-Care Export Council, the Croydon Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, the Federation of British Electro-technical and Allied Manufacturers 
Association, and the London and Glasgow Chambers of Commerce. Interestingly, in 
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terms of bilateral economic relations, with few exceptions Saudi Arabia was the sole 
destination of these trade missions.
349
 
In 1986 the ‘Saudi-British Society’, a new non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) was set up as a cultural, social, non-commercial, and non-political 
organisation. Its aim was to promote “closer friendship and understanding between 
the people of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom” and aimed to bring together 
British citizens who have an interest in Saudi Arabia, whether commercial, 
professional, or cultural, with their Saudi counterparts. As well as organising 
programmes of events and publishing guides and information about Saudi Arabia, the 
activities include receptions for important visitors, dinners, lectures, and other events 
such as its Annual Dinner. 
The activities of NGOs, which while being private institutions set up by 
private citizens are often funded by governments, denote an interesting trend globally 
with regard to cultural relationships between countries, since: 
“An interesting trend is that while in public diplomacy the 
visibility and role of government is decreasing, giving ways 
to more credible actors, such as NGOs and other non-state 
actors, nation branding practitioners call for more 
government involvement to achieve co-ordination and a 
holistic approach. Global surveys, such as the 2008 
Edelman Trustbarometer – an annual study of opinion 
leaders in eighteen countries from four continents – 
confirm that NGOs and businesses are more trusted than 
messages from media and governments, which has an 
important bearing on the credibility of the message 
originators.”350 
 
There is a distinct lack of scholarly research on the impact of national and 
international NGOs on Saudi society, even their influence on Saudi cultural relations 
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with the world. The Saudi-British Society was one of the first common cultural NGOs 
dedicated to Saudi-British relations, although they fell clearly under the umbrella of 
the Saudi embassy in London which could take a formal arrangement, at least from its 
audience at events.  
By looking at its committee
351
 it is surprising, then, that the Society has so 
many British staff. Nine committee members out of thirteen are Britons, and as the 
researcher noticed since starting this research in 2014 not many Saudi students who 
study in Britain actually know about this Society or attend the Society events. It is 
clear, therefore, that the Society targets certain segments of the Saudi and British 
public, and it is likely that these are the political and business elites of each country, 
whereas Saudi students in Britain are apparently not a strategic target, despite the 
organisation claiming to focus on cultural relations between both countries. 
Saudi identity in Britain is increasingly formed through an increase in the 
number of Saudi students and visitors to the UK interacting with people at all levels, 
not because of an increase in sharing trade and investment. Yet while cultural 
diplomacy is known to use all opportunities and tools available to it to improve its 
performance and to reach its goals, students in Britain are a powerful tool yet are 
seemingly ignored by the Society. 
However, the Society has engaged with some cultural projects, though rather 
than doing their own cultural projects they have engaged with other Arab, Western, 
and other international organisations such as:  
                                                 
 




The Omani Connecting Cultures organisation
352
 in 2004 and 2008, an 
“educational initiative that promotes face to face dialogue with young people from the 
western and Arab world via short wilderness journeys.” The project was formally 
endorsed by the director general of UNESCO, and worked closely with the EU office 
in Riyadh. Media coverage of the event in 2008, where a group of European and Arab 
women spent five days travelling through the desert in Oman “reached out to 15 
million people via the press, and BBC News Online covered the event via an image 
diary.”353 
Windlesham Connecting Cultures 2007: “An organisation established by 
Windlesham teacher Mark Evans to promote cultural awareness and understanding 
between young people, in the UK and Saudi Arabia” sent a group of young people to 
the Arctic Circle to experience “challenging wilderness journeys.” 
Both projects had a great impact on the young people who participated
354
  
“I learnt that the world and its people make excuses to 
avoid cultural connection by using “language barrier” 
among others as a means to not even try.”  
Mona Mughram – Saudi Arabia.  
 
“I now strongly believe that if the core principles and 
practices of all faiths could be discussed and taught in 
school then misunderstandings and friction would be 
reduced. The importance of basing an opinion on 
knowledge and correct facts. Cultural misconception is 
endemic in today’s world. I came to Oman with a vague idea 
about all of the countries that were participating. However, 
as I learnt more about the girls, their customs and 
countries, I have come to realize what little knowledge I 
had built my opinions on.”  
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Kate Muir-Jones – UK. 
 
“This journey has made me see the real faces and voices of 
Middle East people, and I can say right now that they’re 
quite different of the news about this region that we watch 
in our western media. Because of that prejudgment, I 
wasn’t sure about the good understanding between all of us 
in this journey. I see how the lack of communication is one 
of the fundamental problems of our days, and knowing that, 
we have tried to communicate as much as possible between 
us to break down these walls who separated us. 
 
When thinking in more concrete knowledge. I’ve learned 
more of the Arabic religion and language, both of them so 
interesting to me. The Arabic people have explained us 
more about their political system that was kind of unknown 
to me. And also, it was very interesting to hear them when 
we speak about us, the western, because it can help us to 
understand better our own society.”  
Santiago Lozano Lopez – Spain. 
  
“I am now aware of and like nature more than before, can 
make good relationships with British people who often had 
the wrong information about my country. The best part of 
this expedition was sitting around the fire exchanging 
information about our cultures.”  
Abdullah Al Shalhoub, King Faisal School, Riyadh. 
 
 “I’ve learnt about Saudi Arabian culture and Islam and that 
my new friends are some of the nicest people you could 
meet, and when push comes to shove they can do whatever 
they set their minds to.”  
Dickon Cole, Windlesham House School, West Sussex. 
 
“I found the boys from Saudi Arabia fascinating, and 
admired how they adapted to the many things that they had 
never done before. The highlight of the trip was the visit to 
the glacier, and meeting people from a different culture.” 




                                                 
 




Despite the great advantages for cultural diplomacy that exist with involvement in 
international and regional cultural projects such as these, it is disappointing that the 
participation in each event was so small and that there have been just four such 
projects since 2004. It is also disappointing that a Society promoting cultural relations 
between two such heavyweight, and wealthy countries cannot have their own special 
cultural projects and be on its soil, Saudi and British. The Society has issued a series 
of important briefings in challenges facing Saudi Arabia in her relations with Britain 
and about Saudi culture.
356
 
In addition, it was noticed that the sponsorships of this Society are very little 
compared with the position of the two countries and their large size compared to the 
rest of the Gulf states. The Society is supported by just five sponsors, all of them 
Saudi. They are: Dar Alriyadh, Rawabi Holding, Riyad Bank, Saudi Airlines, and 
SEDCO Holding. 
Similarly, the Saudi-British Relations Information Service 
(www.saudibrit.com) is a high quality new website which “has articles, interviews, 
special reports and reference materials relevant to the relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain.” However, although it contains lots of news and information 
about Saudi Arabia, its information about Britain is sparse. For example, it covers 
Saudi history, religion, energy and education but contains very little about Britain. 
Also in term of the Saudi-UK relations it covers most of aspects of relations; 
politically, economically, and military etc., but not culturally. However, it does give a 
an overview of Saudi Arabia as a flourishing and developing country, and researchers 
and interested parties can search for any topics in articles, resources, books, 
conferences, events and news by choosing the subject area they looking for about 








 This institute, and others like it such as the Middle East Association
358
 and 
the Gulf Research Centre
359
 produce high quality cognitive materials about different 
aspects of Saudi Arabiaand about Saudi international relations in several fields. 
However, it can be easily seen that none of them have much engagement in the 
cultural field. But cognitive publishing about Saudi could provide a host of cultural 
relations tools. 
So we can see, although NGOs exist to promote Anglo-Saudi relationships, 
their targets are often not cultural, such as students and visitors to each of the 
countries, but are economic and political. Hence it is likely that NGOs are failing to 
fulfil their cultural remit. 
 
5.2 King Fahd’s Visit to Britain 
In March 1987, King Fahd Bin Abdu Aziz visited the United Kingdom. Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher said in an interview with the BBC: “Relations between 
Saudi Arabia and Britain are excellent. We have common interest in peace and 
stability in the Middle East.”  
This visit was followed by an arms deals with Thatcher’s government.360 King 
Fahd’s visit also looked to bring about a change of attitude on Britain’s part towards 
Saudi Arabia, though improving Saudi Arabia’s relationship with West. The visit was 
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successful in achieving what it set out to do as it was well received at all levels, 
including the large community of Arabs and Muslims living in Britain. 
Following King Fahd’s visit and his reception by Thatcher, he was seen as a 
moderniser and there was a continuing improvement in relations between the UK and 
Saudi Arabia. Each year, millions of Muslims travel to Saudi Arabia in order to 
perform the Umrah and Hajj pilgrimages,
361
 and it was significant that the UK became 
the first predominantly Christian country to organise a Hajj delegation tasked with 
assisting the 20,000 British pilgrims in 1999. This delegation was made up of 
members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Muslim community.  
 
5.3 The Anglo-Saudi Bilateral Relations Paradigm 
The world’s search for cheap energy sources saw Saudi Arabia rise to the centre stage 
of international politics, and in terms of Anglo-Saudi relations this created 
opportunities for bilateral relations between the two countries.
362
 This new Anglo-
Saudi alliance brought with it new opportunities as well as challenges
363
 which will be 
addressed in detail subsequently, in particular the arms deals of the decade, 
unprecedented on a global scale, propelled Anglo-Saudi relations to a new level. 
At the beginning of the exchange programme most of the army personnel, 
including high-ranking officers, were sent to the British army for training after a 
rigorous selection. The selection process mandated a good functional skill in English 
as an important criteria of selection for training, and was seen as central to the 
development of the skills of Saudi army personnel to the level of their western peers, 
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as Thatcher explained subsequently.
364
 The mutual benefits and objective of this 
rising bilateral relationship, crowned by such arms deals were clear and so was the 
size. According to the Guardian, it was “the biggest arms contract that Britain has 
ever signed with anybody for anything?”365 
After five years of attempting to buy F-15 fighter-bombers from the US, when 
the Saudi government signed the contract with the British government in July 1985, 
estimated at the beginning to be worth £20 billion GBP, led Nonneman to describe 
this as the largest single defence contract in British history,  
“and shifted the entire structure of the Saudi air force from 
dependence on the United States to dependence on Britain. 
[...] In January 1993 ‘al-Yamamah II’ was signed, bringing 
the scheme’s total value to some £35 billion and conferring 
on it the status of the world’s largest ever oil-for-arms deal. 
By 2000 it had led to the establishment of seven joint 
companies, and it is estimated to have supported some 
30,000 jobs in Britain.”366 
 
However, it is important to note that Saudi Arabia did not rely solely on Britain, or the 
US, for its arms. As Nonneman observes, up to 1988 France was Saudi Arabia’s 
largest arms supplier, and the UK only came first from 1989-94 after signing the 
second part of the arms deal. Yet the arms contract with the UK was not insignificant, 
the signing of the arms deals led to the purchase of more than 50 more BAE 
Tornados, 60 Hawk aircraft, and more than 80 military helicopters. 
The importance of these arms deals for the UK and Saudi governments went 
deeper than just providing weaponry but led to agreements for the supply of oil. As 
has been mentioned previously, in the modern world oil is essential for keeping 
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countries moving and powered with electricity. But there are other conditions that 
affect supplies of oil. For example: 
 
 Oil supplies depend on stable Saudi political and social order: From the early 
days of oil discovery in Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz and his successors 
realised the importance of strategic relations with the west and the transformation 
of Saudi society from a nomadic to an urban way of life, without upsetting the 
balance of social and cultural heritage. 
 Economic security: Depends on a steady flow or circulation of oil money (petro-
dollars) via trade and investment. “Designated a ‘High Growth Market’ by UK 
Trade & Investment, Saudi Arabia is the UK’s largest trading partner in the 
Middle East. The UK is Saudi Arabia's second largest foreign investor after the 
US.”367  
 Political stability: there exist political paradigms that present a degree of freedom 
for citizens and remove the oil assets from the political debate.
368
  
 Social order: If there exists political and economic stability, social order, good 
governance and growth follow on smoothly. 
 
5.4 Other Factors Impacting on Anglo-Saudi Relations 
5.4.1 The Grand Mosque incident 
The Grand Mosque incident took place during November and December 1979 when 
extremist insurgents, led by Juhayman al-Otaybi, took over the Grand Mosque in 
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Makkah during the Hajj pilgrimage and called for the overthrow of the House of 
Saud. After two weeks, in which Hajj pilgrims were taken hostage, hundreds of 
militants and security forces were killed and injured, the Islamic world was left in 
shock. 
According to British diplomatic cables at the time, the Makkah incident 
“raised some doubts about the loyalties of the National Guard. [...] any confirmation 
of these doubts would be worrying.”369 This raised fears in the British government 
that the Saudi leadership could not deal effectively with internal threats and led the 
British to prioritise supporting and helping the leadership in whatever way possible 




Interestingly in this context, the British Embassy in Jeddah had its own 
reading of the situation on the ground, and it concluded that the situation would not 
improve by selling more arms and training packages to Saudi Arabia to bring security. 
However, other complex variables, including political factors, overrode such views. 
There were simply too many benefits for both sides from the arms deals. It led to the 
establishment of various projects and relationships throughout the 1980s that had a 
positive impact on bilateral cultural ties in all their forms. More students and 
institutions became engaged in educational and training programmes, which helped to 
facilitate cultural interaction, despite ongoing opposition and suspicion from the 
religious establishment, especially in the wake of the Grand Mosque incident. 
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5.5 The Revolution in Iran 
The Iranian revolution of 1979, which created a series of incidents involving the 
overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, brought a 
new threat to the region’s stability.371 
For the Saudi government the prime issue was the sectarian divide in the 
eastern provinces, where most of its oil reserves were found. This had an impact on 
British trade interests in Saudi Arabia. For example, in 1980 the Saudi British Bank in 
the majority Shia city of Qatif was a target of protests and demonstrations.
372
 
The Iranian revolution forced the UK to transform its Middle East policy from 
one of containment to one that empowered regional allies to deal with the emerging 
hostile threats in the area. In these terms, the Iranian revolution strengthened
373
 the 
Saudi position in putting forward a claim for strategic military hardware, capable of 
protecting the security of Saudi Arabia and its regional allies, as well as acting as a 
deterrent to the Iranians. 
 
5.6 Iran-Iraq War  
The conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq, lasting 
from September 1980 to August 1988, was last century’s longest conventional war 
after the Second Sino-Japanese War. The prolonged war caused the death of at least 
half a million people at a cost of more than $1 trillion USD.
374
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It can be said assuredly, that the Iran-Iraq war had a negative effect on the 
security of the region, forcing Iran and Saudi Arabia to seek out the West for security. 
Ironically, these security needs, set up bilateral relations between Britain and Saudi. 
 
5.7 From Death of a Princess and British Aerospace (BAE) to 
Iraq and British Nurses 
In 1977, the British media covered the story of a 19-year old royal adulteress who was 
shot to death with her Saudi paramour on the orders of the girl’s grandfather.375 In 
1980 a docudrama entitled Death of a Princess was aired in Britain. In response, 
Saudi Arabia expelled its British Ambassador and boycotted UK products as a sign of 
protest. King Khalid, who was the third ruler of the country, even went to the extent 
of cancelling his visit to the UK to show his outrage over the issue.  
Another example of cultural difference related to the major arms deals of the 
1980s. The British media reported extensively on allegations of bribery and 
corruption in Saudi Arabia relating to the arms contracts. But in the Middle East in 
general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, this was not viewed as an important story. For 
example, the story was not even aired on Al Arabiya though it was addressed in other 




Saudi-UK bilateral and cultural relations were seriously affected by such 
cultural differences. After the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia decided to 
internationalise the kingdom’s media presence by launching its Middle East 
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Broadcasting Centre (MBC) in London, which was responsible for keeping Saudi’s 
King informed.  
The Arab Radio and Television Network (ART) based in the UK followed in 
1993, which was founded by Saudi mogul Saleh Abdullah Kamel; the said Network 
lined up its own entertainment, music and sport programmes. The Rome-based Orbit 
Communications Corporation was also a subsidiary of the Saudi Arabian Mawarid 
Group, which ran a BBC Arabic Television channel for two years until it got pulled 
off air in 1996
377
 because BBC Arabic Television broadcast an episode of Panorama 
which was critical of the Saudi Arabian government. As a result, many of its 
employees went to its rival television station Al-Jazeera. 
In 1996 two British nurses, Lucille McLauchlan and Deborah Parry, were 
arrested for the murder of an Australian nurse, Yvonne Gilford. It is very important to 
mention that the media coverage regarding the two nurses was highly negative 
following conflicting reports.
378
 Unfounded incidents inside the detention cell 
spiralled in the media over a very short time and reports became more about the 
perpetrators and less about the victim. The coverage in the broadsheets was more 
restrained and conservative than the tabloid newspapers, which campaigned using 
very damaging and highly emotional views.  BBC news covered the story as it broke 
and made a Panorama programme.
379
 The coverage by Panorama contained several 
factual errors that damaged the reputation of the prosecution and the legal system in 
Saudi Arabia. For example, the two nurses made allegations against the Saudi Police 
by claiming they were tortured to make them confess.
380
 According to Observer 
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journalist David O’Reilly Canberra, a book about the case concluded that despite their 
denials they did kill their colleague, Yvonne Gilford, in a Saudi Arabian hospital 
dormitory in 1996.
381
 Mick O’Donnell an Australian investigative journalist argued 
that the circumstantial evidence on which they were convicted was convincing despite 
the fact the two nurses did not receive a fair trial.
382
 
The negative coverage subsided and became more positive immediately after 
the Saudi government decided to release the two nurses. The British government was 
quick to put a positive spin on the situation with Prime Minister Tony Blair's official 
representative saying that the prime minister believed the decision to free the women 
was “a generous act by the king Fahd”383 and the foreign secretary, Robin Cook, 
calling it a “generous humanitarian act”.384 
 
5.8 Saudi Higher Education – links with Britain  
The education system in Saudi Arabia is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Higher Education. During the 1990s, universities in the country were free from any 
sort of tuition fee and the majority of students who applied received scholarships 
when they completed their bachelor’s degree. In the 1990s, there were only six 
universities and colleges in the main cities of the country. Thus, the Saudi Ministry of 
Higher Education actively built relationships overseas, especially with British 
universities, through donations, academic chairs, and Saudis studying at British 
universities. Primarily, the aim of these overseas higher education scholarships was to 
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study science-based subjects, such as engineering, medicine, and general science. 
Donations were in the domain of culture, politics and economics.  
5.8.1 Saudis Studying in the United Kingdom 
From the mid-1980s onward, the number of Saudi students going abroad to study 
dropped sharply, with only 5,000 students studying abroad in the academic year 1991-
92. These figures contrasted hugely to the 10,000 students on scholarships in 1984.
385
 
Previously, students who went abroad received substantial financial assistance, 
although during the 1980s the numbers of women in third level education receiving 
sponsorship remained low.
386
 Nonetheless, women who went abroad to study were a 
particular concern for the ulema (religious scholars), who believed that the rightful 
place of women was at home, and in recognition of this in 1982 government 
scholarships for women to study abroad “were sharply curtailed.” This resulted in 
almost three times more men studying abroad than women in the 1990s, in contrast to 




5.8.2 Saudi Donations to UK Universities 
In recent decades Saudi Arabia has been the largest source of donations to British 
University departments that are devoted to the study of Islam, Arabic literature and 
Middle Eastern studies. The largest beneficiary has been Oxford University. Although 
Islamic studies are the most popular target for donors, support does not go solely to 
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this subject. The Said Business School was founded, with an initial donation, of £23 
million GBP by Wafic Said to Oxford University.
388
 
A report by the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC) indicates that Saudi 
donations represent the biggest part of foreign governmental and private donations 
obtained by British universities in funding chairs and centres, including Arabic and 
Islamic studies.
389
 In the US by comparison, Saudi donations over the last 15 years 
come third, after Japan and Switzerland.
390
 A study carried out by the Saudi Ministry 
of Higher Education for Saudi donations to US universities indicated that this figure 
represents approximately ten per cent of the sum of foreign financial scholarships and 











1 Japan 194,690,567 11 Taiwan 29,544,530 
2 Switzerland 133,852,383 12 Italy 21,132,078 
3 Saudi Arabia 114,143,144 13 UA Emirates 21,036,957 
4 Germany 69,291,985 14 China 19,842,170 
5 United Kingdom 68,144,814 15 Thailand 16,871,670 
6 Hong Kong 58,418,500 16 Sweden 16,379,857 
7 Canada 49,405,163 17 Qatar 14,898,671 
8 Indonesia 44,282,020 18 South Korea 14,205,573 
9 France 41,744,935 19 Mexico 14,035,908 
10 Brazil 33,198,409 20 Greece 13,113,489 
Table 21: Size of Saudi Support to American Universities among 20 Donating Countries to 
American universities. 
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Available statistics show that American universities lead in terms of the size of their 
endowments, in comparison to British universities. The following table shows the 
great discrepancy between American and British universities in this regard,
392
 with 










1 Harvard 36,556 Cambridge 3,129 
2 Yale 22,870 Oxford 3,129 
3 Stanford 17,200 Edinburgh 251 
4 Princeton 12,349 Glasgow 188 
5 Univ. Texas 12,111 King’s 157 
6 MIT 10,069 Liverpool 146 
7 Michigan 7,572 Manchester 141 
8 Northwestern 7,244 UC London 127102 
9 Columbia 7,147 Birmingham 102 




Most of the research chairs supported by the Saudi Arabian government have been 
established since the 1990s.
394
 The first Saudi government academic chair in Britain 
was the King Fahd Chair.
395
 King Fahd’s donation to establish his chair for Islamic 
Studies at the University of London in 2001 was followed by a donation to London by 
Saudi businessman Mohamed Ben Aissa Al-Jaber of £1.25 million GBP to create the 
London Middle East Institute.
396
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According to the Telegraph newspaper, eight British universities accepted 
more than £233.5 million GBP from Saudi and Muslim sources between 1995 and 
2008, with much of the money going to Islamic study centres.
397
  
5.8.3 King Fahd Chair for Islamic Studies 
The School of the Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) is one of the few institutes of 
its kind in the world. The King Fahd Chair for Islamic Studies was established in 
1995 through a £1 million GBP donation from King Fahd to the School. The donation 
was announced in a ceremony held at the Saudi Embassy on 17 May 1995, and 
attended by the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom, Dr Ghazi Al-




5.8.4 Feedback on the Kingdom’s Donation for the King Fahd Chair 
On 20 June 1995, the Guardian reported that thirty academics and faculty 
members affiliated to SOAS signed a petition to protest against the University’s 
acceptance of such a donation from King Fahd. The newspaper stated that one of the 
signatories said that they were protesting against the University’s acceptance of the 
donation without consulting with them, and that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had a 
specific agenda concerning Islam, which would have repercussions on the 
University’s acceptance of the donation.399  
SOAS refused to comment on the petition. The Saudi Embassy told the 
newspaper that the donation was not made at the Kingdom’s initiative, but came as a 
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request from the University, that it was not a conditional one, and that the protest 
petition was an internal matter for the School. For their part, senior SOAS officials 
expressed understanding of faculty members’ anxiety about the School’s acceptance 
of foreign donations and their possible repercussions on academic freedom, and 




In 1997, commenting on the Saudi donation, Professor Akbar Ahmed, a 
Cambridge academic, commented to the Financial Times that it must impact 
negatively on research activity if donations are from one family.
401
 
In 2009, a report was published by the Centre for Social Cohesion titled, A 
Degree of Influence: The Funding of Strategically Important Subjects in UK 
Universities.
402
 It addressed foreign donations (both governmental and private) that 
British universities had obtained to fund chairs and centres, including in the areas of 
Arabic and Islamic studies.  
Amongst the report’s most serious allegations were that the universities of 
Cambridge and Edinburgh changed their administrative regulations and procedures in 
nominating professors as a result of accepting donations from Prince Al-Waleed bin 
Talal. The report also claims that SOAS withdrew, under instruction from the Saudi 
government, the “al-sirat” (path) tableau of the Saudi artist, Abdunnaser Gharem, 
under the pretext that it was an offence to Islam and Muslims. It is worth noting that 
Abdunnaser Gharem had previously participated with the tableau in local exhibitions 
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 David Shariatmadari, a Guardian journalist, wrote an article 
criticizing the report, and denounced the allegations it included.
404
  
A team from the Saudi Arabia Higher Education Ministry paid a visit to 
SOAS, and met with the King Fahd Chair for Islamic Studies, Dr Mohamed 
Abdulhalim. The discussions addressed the importance of having a thriving oriental 
studies sector in British universities, in part to correct many of the historical errors in 
understanding Islamic and Arab cultures.
405
 
In these terms, as part of his responsibilities as the director of the Centre for 
Islamic Studies, Dr Abdulhalim worked to organise a series of academic symposia 
and conferences on Islamic Law, the Hadith (Prophet’s sayings), and Qur’anic 
studies. In March 1998, the Centre organised a symposium in London on “Hadith: 




The symposium addressed documentation styles and methods in the study of 
Hadith and its role in contemporary jurisprudence. The Centre also worked on 
establishing a series of periodic biannual symposia on Qur’anic studies. These began 
in 1999 entitled, “Conference on the Qur’an,” and were held again in 2005, 2007 and 
2009, the most recent under the title “The Qur’an: Text, History & Culture.”407  
The first holder of the Chair, Dr Abdulhalim was also the editor of the Journal 
of Qur’anic Studies, a biannual refereed academic journal published in Arabic and 
English that looked to emphasise the importance of the Qur’an in Islamic studies, and 





 David Shariatmadari, “A study in scare-mongering”, (the Guardian, 02 April 2009). 
405








to consolidate the position of Qur’anic studies as an academic field. The first issue of 




As described by UNESCO, Endowed chairs work towards the promotion and 
protection of world peace and security through closer international co-operation in the 
areas of jurisdiction of these chairs. At the same time, such chairs lead to significantly 




Saudi claims that their university chairs are initiatives to support excellence in 
scientific research and enhance opportunities for creativity and innovation and 
development of knowledge. The aims are to attract outstanding scientists to local and 
international work by researching and leading research projects, training and raising 
the efficiency of academic staff in the areas of qualitative research, and dealing with 
sophisticated scientific techniques and providing stimulating environments and 
structures of excellence, creativity and innovation. 
The reason for the establishment of the Arab and Islamic chairs is the need for 
dissemination of correct Islamic concepts in the West, and to highlight the Muslim 
interest in education; to change the prevailing stereotypes about Islam and Muslims in 
the West, and to support various scientific and cultural research; to serve the 
community, and to advance the development and sophistication of distinctive 
capabilities in the global scientific community service culture. 
Therefore, the Saudi Government chairs in the West have gradually emerged as a 
strategy towards reform and improve the stereotype of Islam and the kingdom. 
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It is difficult to be certain that these chairs have resulted in the role asigned to 
them. References available have been unable to determine with precision this concept. 
However, there is no denying that these Saudi chairs have succeeded in correcting the 
image to a certain extent, and have done a great job in the Islamic research provision 
in western universities. It can easily be seen that the Saudi chairs revival has emerged 
and spread in various well-known Western universities, targeting Arab and Islamic 
Studies, and has had a significant impact in the revitalization of research in these 
areas, and that could have corrected a part of the stereotype that has lodged in the 
Western conscience, especially since post-colonial Orientalism did not focus - as it 
was earlier - solely on studying Arabic and Islamic communities social, cultural, 
demographic and other, but has targeted the ‘Western agenda’.410 
 
5.9 Statistics of Saudis Studying in Britain 
The beginning of the 1980s witnessed a steady increase in the number of students on 
scholarships to the United Kingdom, while over the same period there was a decline 
in the number of students on scholarships in different regions of the world. the 
number of students in the United Kingdom reached a peak in 1984 (Table 23, Figure 
29) with 1,207 students, approximately 12 per cent of the total number of students 
studying abroad at that time.  
However, the number of students on scholarships in different regions of the 
world also continued to decline through the 1980s, to reach 2,127 in 1989, a reduction 
of 62.7 per cent compared with the previous year. By 1989 students on scholarships in 
                                                 
 





the United Kingdome made up 27.6 per cent of total number of students abroad, in 
spite of a slight decrease of 0.3 per cent compared with the previous year. 
 
UK student weight out 





In the UK Year 






4.4 0.19 11,921 -0.04 530 1981 
5.8 0.05 12,521 0.37 725 1982 
8.7 -0.11 11,097 0.33 967 1983 
12.0 -0.09 10,092 0.25 1,207 1984 
0.0 -0.05 9,559 -1.00 NA 1985 
13.4 -0.13 8,362 NA 1,117 1986 
13.4 -0.14 7,165 -0.14 957 1987 
10.7 -0.20 5,698 -0.36 608 1988 
27.6 -0.63 2,127 -0.03 588 1989 
14.3 0.88 4,007 -0.02 575 1990 
13.4 -0.11 3,554 -0.17 477 1991 
16.3 0.01 3,589 0.23 586 1992 
17.6 0.00 3,601 0.08 632 1993 
16.9 0.04 3,733 0.00 630 1994 
8.1 0.76 6,583 -0.15 535 1995 
15.8 -0.48 3,410 0.01 539 1996 
14.3 0.31 4,463 0.18 637 1997 
13.1 0.07 4,763 -0.02 625 1998 
13.0 0.24 5,900 0.22 765 1999 
NA -1.00 NA -1.00 NA 2000 
10.0 NA 11,671 NA 1,170 2001 
19.0 -0.42 6,745 0.09 1,281 2002 
24.7 -0.78 1,508 -0.71 372 2003 
22.9 3.58 6,913 3.25 1,580 2004 
7.6 1.28 15,728 -0.24 1,200 2005 
10.5 0.62 25,433 1.23 2,675 2006 






Figure 21: Saudi Students Studying at British Universities and Abroad (1980-2006). 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s there was a significant rise in the number of students on 
scholarships abroad, an increase of approximately 88 per cent in 1990 compared to 
the previous year, while the first half of the 1990s saw a steady yet insignificant 
increase in the number of students as a percentage change, Despite this, the UK based 
students consistently made up almost 15 per cent of all students studying abroad. It is 
worth highlighting that in 1995 Saudi Arabia increased the number of student around 
the world to 6,583, almost 76 per cent more than the previous year.  
After a steady increase in the number of students studying abroad from 1995-
2000, there was a dramatic fall from 2001-03, to levels far below those even of the 
1980s, before a sudden and dramatic rise both world-wide and of students studying in 
the UK. One might speculate that during the 1980s and 1990s the Saudi government 
was keen to allow students to gain knowledge from Western universities, but not 




September 2001, following a sudden contraction of students being allowed to study 
overseas, together with a fear from foreign governments and security services of 
further terrorist attacks, the sudden increase may represent a cultural ‘reassurance’ 
and encouragement to learn more about Saudi culture and society. The impact of the 
War on Terror and Anglo-Saudi relations will be discussed more in the next chapter.  
Table 23: Number of Saudi Students Studying Abroad for the First Time by Main Field of 




                                                 
 




Table 24: Number of Saudi Students Studying Abroad by Country and Educational level 
(1979-80). 
 
Tables 24-28 provide a summary of Saudi students studying abroad over a period of 
years and demonstrate how a large number of students travelled to the United 
Kingdom during the 1980s. As with previous decades, the vast majority of those were 
male.  Of those females who did travel abroad to study, the vast majority were in non-
technical areas, primarily the Humanities, while male students were much more 
commonly to be studying the technical disciplines of science and engineering. 
Although, as Table 28 highlights, the social sciences and humanities were not only 
popular with some travelling abroad for gender reasons, but also because the courses 
tended to be shorter – 3 or 4 years – and thus required less time away from home. The 




given for the choice of the social sciences, which included humanities and education. 
However, it is also true that studying the Humanities and Social Sciences in particular 
offered students the opportunity to gain an in-depth understanding of western cultures 
and values which they brought home at the conclusion of their studies. 
 


























The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that cultural diplomacy between the UK 
and Saudi Arabia was greatly improved over preceding decades and that the political 
aims of both governments; for the UK to secure oil supplies no matter what and for 
Saudi Arabia to secure technical and military expertise to preserve and enhance its 
security in a region of the world with some uncertainty was proceeding apace. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the good relations between the leaders of Saudi 
Arabia and Britain, King Fahd and Margaret Thatcher, respectively, led to the 
solidification of good relations, and the signing of arms deals worth billions of pounds 
to the British economy, as well as securing a supply of oil. Yet while the political 
friendships continued, the cultural relations were not so well developed. 
From a previous review of the scientific aspects and cultural activities, it may 
be worth reminding of such activities - for example the chair, King Fahd Islamic 
Studies at the University of London -  has led to a multiplicity of activities. With a 
focus on the Koran, it has held its sixth periodic studies of the Holy Koran – a 
conference that is held once every two years over three days, from 12-14  November 
2009. That year the King Fahd chair received more than 230 research studies on the 
Koran from a large number of scientists and researchers in many universities. from 
these were selected 36 research through 11 sessions. The conference hosted a number 
of professors at British universities, and universities in the Arab and Islamic world 
and Europe who delivered their research on a number of topics including studies of 
the Koran. 
All that could create awareness and better understanding of Islamic and Saudi 
culture. It can be evidenced by continued effectiveness of these chairs and the 




not the situation before, as was explained by Abdul Rahman Abul Magd, an expert in 
scientific Islamic chairs.
412
On the contrary, they should creating new chairs, and find 
new ways of communication between the chairs, in order to produce competent 
research on Arab and Islamic Studies, characterised by academic and scientific depth 
and  encouragement for deeper research by  professors and students of Western 
universities.Also, it needs further objective study of these chairs to take advantage of 
the experiment, and confirm the accurately of the results such that one can verify the 
advantages and disadvantages of the system. 
 
Non-governmental organisations, such as the Saudi-British Society, were keen 
to promote their activities to business leaders and politicians, but were lacking in their 
promotion of the country to the population at large. So the mistrust and cultural 
misunderstandings that had been so prevalent in earlier decades continued, with Saudi 
justice and law being probed and doubted, such as with the trail of the two nurses, 
Lucille McLaughlin and Deborah Parry, or with the chill in diplomatic relations 
following the broadcast of Death of A Princess. 
Those activities by the NGOs in building cultural relations were few and far 
between, with only four such activities in as many years, and it may be concluded that 
this was a greatly missed opportunity. Attempts to build cultural relationships, 
especially in the educational field such as donations to schools and universities were 
also misconstrued as attempts to bribe the establishments, which was perhaps a 
response to the bribery scandals surrounding the arms deals of the 1980s, which were 
a big controversy in the UK but were barely reported in Saudi Arabia. Some of these 
                                                 
 





were quickly debunked by the UK broadsheets, but the tabloids continued to 
sensationalise stories of Saudi torture and brutality, such as of the two nurses, that 
could only alienate the population toward Saudi Arabia. 
Despite this, there was a continued desire by Saudi students to travel abroad to 
study, and the UK consistently provided a large number of students with educational 
opportunities. As we have shown, from a peak in the mid-1980s and a steady decline 
to 1989, from 1990 to 2000 there was a steady increase in the number of students 
travelling abroad to study, and it was only in 2001-2 that this trend was curtailed 
following the events of 9/11, which first led to a rapid reduction in the number of 
students travelling, or allowed to travel, abroad and then led to a rapid increase in the 
number of students such that by 2006 there were twice as many students studying 
abroad as during the peak numbers of the 1980s. 
In terms of gender, Saudi students travelling abroad were mostly male, with 
opportunities for female students to travel reduced following the Saudi government’s 
appeasement to the demands of religious scholars in 1982. Those female students that 
did study abroad took mostly humanities and social sciences, while their male 
counterparts studied technical and scientific subjects. Of whichever gender, though, it 
appears that many of the students remained unware of the activities of NGOs such as 
the Saudi-British society. 
In conclusion, the period of the 1980s and 1990s was good for political and 
economic relations, with the signing of arms deals and the promotion of Saudi Arabia 
as a market for business, yet not so good for cultural relations, which were filled with 
a period of mistrust, misunderstandings and accusations. In terms of education, 
attempts to sponsor cultural relations were misconstrued as attempts at bribery and 




few and far between. It appears that it was only the events of 9/11 and the War on 
Terror that resulted in a sudden increase in opportunities for Saudi students to travel 





THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ATTACKS ON ANGLO-SAUDI CULTURAL 
RELATIONS 
  
 “Reforming the Kingdom is not a choice, it is a necessity.” 





This chapter examines and analyses the impact of the New York attacks of 11 
September 2001 on Anglo-Saudi cultural relations in the years 2001-11. One 
interesting and original aspect of this chapter will be its examination of how the 
Anglo-American relationship has influenced Anglo-Saudi ties in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
From there it will also look at the impact of the 7/7 attacks in London on the 
Anglo-Saudi cultural relationship, especially on cultural institutions that were born 
out of the 1975 Agreement, such as the King Fahad Academy, Islamic Schools and 
Mosques, and its effect on the wider Muslim community in Britain.  
 
6. The War on Terror 
The phrase was first used by US President George W. Bush, in an address to a joint 
session of Congress on 20 September 2001
414
 in the aftermath of the attacks on New 
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York and Washington. It was a war declared by the Bush administration against 
international terrorism, specifically al-Qaeda and their affiliate terrorist groups, with 
the aim of searching out and destroying international terrorist groups – their camps, 
money and leaders. 
In the same speech, Bush articulated the goals of the “War on Terror”, which 
he said, “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated”. In that same speech, he called the war “a task that does not 
end”, and that phrase was used again by Bush in his 2006 State of the Union address.  
There are numerous definitions of terrorism, although some see the one put 
forward by the French scholar Raymond Aron as most appropriate for the events of 
9/11 and thereafter.
415
 Aron argued that terrorism occurred when the “psychological 
effects [of violence] are out of all proportion to its purely physical result.”  
The separation between the psychological impacts and actual physical damage 
is an important way of thinking about the implications of 9/11. The psychological 
effect has been enormous and arguably has been transmuted into the cultural 
relationship between Saudi Arabia, home to many of the 9/11 attackers, and Western 
partners, in particular the US and Britain. 
 
6.1 Britain and the Attacks of 9/11 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on New York, there was an enormous feeling of loss, 
sympathy and support for the US and a growing consensus that the US was too slow 
in dealing with Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist network after the August 
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1998 bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and subsequently, in 
2000, the bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen.
416
 
The Anglo-American relationship has seen continuous growth and further 
comity on global issues, such as the Middle East, for much of the period since the end 
of World War II. Therefore the events of 9/11, centred as they were on Saudi Arabia, 
meant that it was inevitable that they would have a direct impact on the Anglo-Saudi 
relationship. 
Then British prime minister, Tony Blair, offered the US unconditional 
diplomatic and military support, as well as intelligence co-operation, and promised 
that important considerations in the coming war on terror, such as extradition laws,
417
 
the financing of terrorist groups and money-laundering, would all be reconsidered in 
the light of the attacks.
418
 
On 14 September 2001, Blair set out his three main initial objectives: 
1. To seek, capture and punish the perpetrators. 
2. To establish a global alliance against Terrorism. 
3. To contribute to agreement over a legal framework for the global alliance 
against Terrorism.  
One month after 9/11, Blair’s government provided evidence to the British parliament 
implicating Al-Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden, as the perpetrators of the attacks 
of 9/11. In addition, Blair importantly attempted to draw a distinction between 
Britain’s right of self-defence against the terrorists and the many grievances voiced by 
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the Muslim World. Thus the War on Terror, he argued should not to be misinterpreted 
as an attack on the Muslim World or impact negatively on Britain’s close relations 
with Saudi Arabia. But Blair also defended the morality of any forthcoming military 
action that saw the involvement of British forces. The goal, he insisted would not be 
revenge, but “justice”, as well as the “protection of our people and our way of life.”419  
Within hours of the 9/11 attacks, the Saudi government issued a statement 
characterising the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as “regrettable 
and inhuman.”420 King Fahd denounced the attacks, adding only that the Kingdom 
stood by the world community in fighting terrorism and was quoted as saying that his 
country “rejects being associated with any person whose name is linked to 
terrorism
421
. In contrast to the British position, Saudi Arabia was the only country in 
the world, after the United States, which felt the full force of the blast of 9/11. The 
Saudis spent a huge amount of effort and money to bring back the standard of 
relations it had with The West, particularly the US, prior to the crisis. Although 
fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi nationals
422, the Congress’s Joint Inquiry 
report published in 2004 found no relation linking the Saudi government and Al-
Qaeda terrorist network. However the media frenzy campaign against the Saudi 
people had done the damage, in that Saudi nationals were treated as terror suspects 
just because they were Saudi. 
Domestically, the Saudi Arabian alliance with the West, in particular the 
willingness of the royal family to open Saudi territory – the home of Islam’s two 
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holiest sites, Makkah and Medina – to non-Muslim soldiers in response to Saddam’s 
invasion of Kuwait, resulted in a backlash from Islamists. Salman al-Awda and Safar 
al-Hawali, who earned the title the “awakening preachers”423, epitomised this. Both 
were outspoken critics of the Saudi government’s relationship with the West and their 




Following a series of deadly domestic terrorist attacks in 2003, that threatened 
to destabilise Saudi Arabia and the region, the government of Saudi Arabia began an 
aggressive and sweeping counterterrorism initiative. In addition to long-established 
security and law enforcement efforts to kill and capture terrorists, a parallel strategy 
was launched to combat the ideological justifications for violent extremism within the 
Kingdom
425. This “soft”426 counter-terrorism strategy is made up of three parts, firstly, 
prevention programmes to deter people from getting involved with violent extremism, 
secondly, rehabilitation programmes designed to inspire supporters and sympathisers 
to renounce violence, and finally after-care programmes to prevent relapse and to 
reintegrate people back into Saudi society.
427
 
The growing use of unusual, “soft” measures to fight vicious extremism in 
Saudi Arabia showed success and encouraged other nations in the region, including 
the United States in Iraq, to adopt similar programmes
428
. According to the Saudi 
authority in Riyadh, roughly 3,000 detainees have engaged-in Saudi Arabia’s 
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rehabilitation campaign—which seeks to address the underlying factors that 
encourage extremism and stop further brutal extremism. Saudi authorities claim a 




Saudi Arabia pursued the help, knowledge and the support of the UK 
government in fighting the extremist; in doing so, it benefited a great deal from the 
UK’s longstanding experience in combating terrorist groups in Ireland and elsewhere. 
In turn, the UK looked to learn from the Saudi programme of Prevention, 
Rehabilitation and After-care programmes that made up its “soft” counterterrorism 
response.  
 
6.2 Political Impact of 9/11 and British Public Opinion 
The British government had considerable previous experience dealing with terrorist 
groups at home, for example the Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaigns 
across the UK over a number of decades.
430
 Nevertheless, the 9/11 attacks had a 
profound effect on the British psyche, a large-scale terrorist attack that unfolded on 
daytime TV for the first time in British history. The attack claimed more British lives 
than any other similar incident, including the Lockerbie bombing, when Pan Am 
Flight 108 was blown-up over the Scottish town in 1988. However, the decision by 
British prime minister Tony Blair to join the US “War on Terror” in Afghanistan, and 
subsequently in Iraq in 2003, has contributed further to polarizing British public 
opinion on numerous issues, from the use of force to the status of Muslims in Britain.  
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This latter issue has always concerned Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi 
government has worked hard to promote a positive impression. For example, in 1998 
the biggest Mosque in Scotland, the King Fahd Mosque and Islamic Centre of 
Edinburgh, was inaugurated by HRH Prince Abdul-Aziz bin Fahd in 1998, in the 
presence of a large number of Saudi diplomats. Every year, during the Edinburgh 
Festival in August, the Mosque hosts a “Discover Islam” exhibition, a free exhibition 
which discusses topics about Islam and is open to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
431
 
The Labour government’s support for a military campaign was motivated by a 
desire to assist its long-time ally the United States in its new global initiative and to 
play a role on the world stage. Though always set within a political framework that 
has prioritised humanitarian values, Blair’s government’s manipulation of the War on 
Terror also turned out to be largely damaging, destroying trust between citizen and the 
state, putting the armed forces under increased pressure fighting multiple wars, 
diminishing Britain’s global status and arguably heightening the threat from radical 
Islamic terrorism as evident by the 7/7 London bombings in 2005.
432
  
The 7/7 bombings were the culmination of a period in which British public 
opinion became increasingly sceptical of the UK role in the Middle East, especially 
the Iraq war. The bombings also highlighted the strains on the Anglo-Saudi bilateral 
and cultural relationship in those years. These developments led to a new dynamic
433
 
in Anglo-Saudi cultural ties, as the Anglo-American alliance on the War on Terror, 
especially the April 2003 invasion of Iraq, exerted regional pressure on Saudi Arabia, 
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a situation that was not helped by a failed copycat attack on the London transport 
system on 21 July 2005, two weeks after the 7/7 bombings.
434
 
Saudi officials were quick to play down the Saudi aspect of the attacks and 
distance Saudi Arabia from the London attacks. Soon after the 7/7 attacks on 
London’s transport networks, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to London, Prince Turki Al-
Faisal, told BBC Radio 4, that, “The modus operandi, the sheer cowardice associated 
with them and the attacks on innocent civilians - these are all part and parcel of Al-
Qaida [sic].”435 The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Sheikh, 
denounced the deadly blasts that rocked London, saying, “Killing and terrorising 
innocent people and the destruction of property are not condoned by Islam”. He also 
censured the terrorists for tarnishing the image of Islam by attaching their heinous 
crimes to the religion.
436
 Saudi Arabian Social Affairs Minister Abdulmohsen Al-
Akkas said, his country, battling a two-year wave of attacks by Osama bin Laden's Al 
Qaeda network, knew what London was suffering. “We understand. Since May 2003 
we have been experiencing the horrors of terrorist acts”, said Akkas, who was visiting 
London at the time of the bombings.
437
 
As well as expressing its affinity with the British suffering, Saudi Arabia 
sought other ways to improve its political and diplomatic stand against the tide of 
international terrorists. They successfully established an International Cultural 
Relations Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the primary goal of 
dealing with international crises and minimising their impact on the Kingdom. The 
new department provided more flexibility for the Saudi state to work on different 
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The forming of the new department showed the commitment of the Saudi 
government to peace and security in the region and throughout the world.
439
 Saudi 
diplomats worked very hard during the last decade to establish, maintain and promote 
a broad alliance within the Arab and Islamic world, as a means to confront and defeat 




6.3 Anglo-Saudi Relations and 9/11 
As a new world order was unfolding after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade 
Center, British relations with Saudi Arabia were forged by two primary concerns, in 
addition to the conservation of long-established ties and good trade relations.
441
 The 
first issue was the war in Iraq, which began in 2003 and for which the US and Britain 
required the operational and logistical support of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the 
Arab Gulf States. The second issue was the urgency to encounter and defeat Al-Qaeda 
and its sympathisers from threatening Saudi Arabia and the region.
442
Already, by the 
end of 2002, Saudi Arabia had stepped up its support for many international and 
regional efforts in the fight against terrorism through multilateral and bilateral 
agreements. This included working more closely with US, European, and Asian 
governments, as well as the United Nations, in order to ensure that information was 
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shared accordingly and more effectively than in the pre-9/11 era. This included a 
number of major initiatives:  
 The establishment of a counterterrorism committee with the US, made up of 
intelligence and internal security personal to share expertise and information. 
 The encouragement of Saudi government departments and banks to participate 
in international seminars, conferences and symposia on combating terrorist 
financing activities.  
These measures allowed for the exchange of information on money laundering 




The Saudi Estakhbarat’s (Saudi General Intelligence Service) assistance with 
fighting Osama bin Laden’s terrorist group is cited as a key strategic element for 
continuing bilateral agreements to strengthen Anglo-Saudi relations.  
The War on Terror and 9/11 also brought about a new dynamic in Anglo-
American relations. Tony Blair was clear that his country stood “shoulder to 
shoulder” with the US. The first consequence of this new reality to impact on Saudi 
Arabia was Britain’s adoption, in co-operation with Washington, of a new opinion of 
religious extremism, charitable donations, money laundering and intelligence 
sharing.
444
 On the other hand, in response to the 9/11 attacks Saudi Arabia 
increasingly paid attention to alternatives to formal diplomacy to achieve its 
objectives. At the heart of this approach is the concept of “soft power” in bridging 
differences between nations.  
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In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the fact that fifteen of the 
nineteen hijackers were from Saudi Arabia came as a serious blow to the image of 
Saudi Arabia and its international relations, especially with the US and Britain.
445
 In 
the US, the Saudi government hired the PR Company Burson-Marsteller to “place 
newspaper ads all over the US condemning the attacks and dissociating Saudi Arabia 
from them”. This was the first stage of a concerted effort undertaken by the Saudi 
embassy to publically disassociate their country from the attacks. Although there was 
no such formal approach in the UK, the BBC was used regularly to present the Saudi 
position and to publically denounce terrorism and defend Saudi Arabia’s stand on the 
War on Terror, in order to alleviate the harm done to the reputation of the country.
446
 
However, Saudi Arabia’s greatest contribution came with the co-operation and 
influence it offered in combating extremism. Like the British, the Saudi security 
forces had a depth of understanding of Al-Qaeda’s terrorist network. As such, the 
Saudi security force’s handling of the 2003 waves of attacks by Al-Qaeda on the 




Prince Turki Al-Faisal, head of the Saudi Estakhbarat, was one of the key 
architects in invigorating the Anglo-Saudi bilateral relationship in his short time as the 
ambassador to London in 2002. His appointment was seen as a sign of the difficulty 
the Saudi government was facing at all levels; local, regional and internationally. 
While in residence in London, he managed to boost the bilateral relationship at the 
time of attacks at home and abroad. He also established a Women’s section in the 
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Saudi Embassy in London, the first of its kind in all Saudi Diplomatic missions 
worldwide. On the cultural front he established “The Saudi Days” festival, which 
consisted of exhibitions, a book fair and folklore. Prince Charles was one of the 
important guests to attend and enjoy a taste of Saudi culture in London.
448
 
As noted above, much of this public/cultural diplomacy offensive by Saudi 
Arabia after 9/11 was focused on the US, its key ally and the victim of the al-Qaeda 
attacks. However, it is very difficult, and not necessarily productive, to try to 
delineate between Saudi efforts in the US and UK. This is because the position of the 
British, the reaction of the Americans, and the stand of the Saudi government in 
relation to 9/11, can be described as a pyramid, where the base is the British-
American relationship.  This explains why the Saudi government continued the 
consultation process with both the British and American governments on various 
issues, including political, economic and security affairs for the duration of the post-
9/11 crisis. It also explains why the Saudi government shared information 
systematically with both governments and why it felt compelled to develop its own 
strategic approach to combat terrorism, in defiance of the Americans but in agreement 
with Britain. Highlighting in the process the possibility for Saudi Arabia to exploit the 
differences between both parties on specific issues. Indeed, in relation to Anglo-Saudi 
bilateral and cultural relations, 9/11 was the perfect benchmark to test the durability, 
viability and strength of the bilateral relationship. Bilateral ties have suffered a great 
deal of strain, as was clear in the first days after the attack when the Saudi ambassador 
to London was either fobbed off or ignored, indicating the seriousness of the situation. 
In response, the Saudi government spent a great deal of effort and money to lessen the 
damage caused by 9/11. 
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As was discussed in Chapter 5, in the period from 2001 to 2006, there was a 
distinct and rapid upward trend in the number of Saudi student scholarships. In 2004 
the number of students on scholarships to the United Kingdom comprised 22.9 per 
cent of the total share of students, with about 1,580 students, an increase of 32.5 per 
cent compared with the previous year. Then the total number of students on 
scholarships in 2006 dramatically increased to 25,433 students around the world, 
including approximately 10.5 per cent in the United Kingdom. 
Similarly, in tables 29 and 30, showing the number of passengers travelling to 
and from Saudi Arabia by air, there was an increase in the number of Saudis travelling 
to London in the period of 2002-2005, with a slight drop in 2006. Comparing the 
numbers of Saudi travellers to New York with those to London, there was no similar 
increase to that seen in London with four times less passengers travelling compared to 
London, and numbers staying roughly similar until 2006, when there was an increase 
of over 5,000 compared to the previous years. This suggests that Britain, even after 
the 11 September attacks, continued to accept travellers from Saudi Arabia without 
fear that they might stage terrorist attacks. It was perceived to be a positive sign that 
Britain continued to be open and embracing to Saudi nationals and respect whatever 




New York 18,594 







2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 To 
7,243 9,160 8,814 7,998 8,185 Frankfurt 
73,530 80,035 72,507 64,339 64,384 London  
18,286 13,004 14,422 13,524 14,456 New York 
 
Table 29: Saudi Airlines: Passengers Travelling from Saudi Arabia to London, Frankfurt and 
New York (2002 -2006).
449 
 
We have established that cultural exchange is a necessary part of cultural diplomacy. 
In 1999, two years before the events of 9/11, HRH Prince Khalid Al-Faisal formally 
launched the Painting & Patronage Foundation in Riyadh, with its principal 
international office in London. The foundation hosts prominent cultural and 
educational exchange initiatives between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
international community, and especially with Britain.
450
 After the September 11 
attacks, it can be said that these exchanges continued between Britain and Saudi 
Arabia, with the hope of not only strengthening their partnership but also in making 
each of their own communities more diverse; accepting and embracing various 
cultures. 
In an informal interview with Daniel Kawczynski MP, Chairman of the All-
Party Parliamentary Group for Saudi Arabia, he indicated that the group was not very 
active in Parliament until he took over in 2006. He described the function of that body 
as:   
“The group is there to host debates. We go to see the foreign 
ministry sometimes, with members of the group, to talk about 
Saudi Arabia or we hold discussions here in Parliament. We 
have entertained members of the Saudi Council here at formal 
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dinners and we have taken members of the Council to other 
parts of the United Kingdom. If there are any visiting Saudi 
dignitaries (important high-ranking people) we will always 
invite them to Parliament as well to meet with 
parliamentarians. So it is a caucus group of parliamentarians 
who are interested in promoting relations with Saudi Arabia. 
We will try to promote relations with Saudi Arabia on a 
binational basis, politician to politician, but inevitably if there 
are opportunities to promote British companies in Saudi 
Arabia, or to try to help with the Saudi investment in the 
United Kingdom and that is something we want to support as 
well.” 
 
When asked about cultural and social exchange, and whether this has been 
achieved, he raised an important point:  
“No, not so much. I don't think we have achieved anything like 
as much in terms of cultural and social interaction because 
there are various impediments in our way. I think that the 
difficulties in obtaining a visa to Saudi Arabia is in my view 
very detrimental to furthering relations between the countries, 
and I have had experience of people outside of politics who 
have found it very difficult to get visas to go to Saudi Arabia, 
so that is a restriction which impedes progress in this area.” 
 
This  point  of view has been heard many times while the author was living in 
Britain; from a colleague, who married a crew member who works in Saudi Airlines 
and found it difficult to get an a visa to visit her, and from Mrs Ionis Thompson, the 
Honorary Secretary of the Saudi-British Society, with whom the author also spoke. 
Daniel continued that, 
“the consensus is a lot of British people find getting a visa a 
rather complicated procedure and there can and have been 
delays in the past. That’s certainly the feedback I have been 
given, but […] people in Saudi Arabia are not cognisant of the 
group to anything like the degree they should be and there is 
very little coming from Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom in 
terms of actually wanting to interact with Parliament. When 
they come here they always go to see government ministers 
and they don’t make requests to come to see Parliament. So 
building a relationship is a two-way process and if people 
aren’t coming to see us and aren’t giving us proposals about 




6.3.1 The media impact on events between 2000-10 
The media has a formidable role to play in enhancing global awareness and promoting 
multiculturalism, religious tolerance and living with different ethnic and gender 
differences in all societies across the globe.
451
 However, there are also many 
disadvantages to the role of the media, such as circulating messages that create and 
magnify negative stereotypes, false statements and misconceptions. The media also 
can play a part in undermining the constructive dialogue and can work against mutual 
understanding between nations. The current 24/7 media organisations have removed 
the barriers and shortened the time between events unfolding in different countries 
and their reporting.
452
 The media in the twenty-first century works through education 
and political tolerance by simply using consistent and repeated messages.
453
 The 
tabloid media and suitable television reports are successful to design tools of 
cognitive sophistication for target groups in order to put messages across, and the 
media can “impede great lies and propel great truths.”454 Perhaps this why there is 
always a close co-operation between what is emphasised in official statements and 
what emerges in the media coverage.
455
  
6.3.1.1 British Media and Saudi Arabia 
There is a debate among academics and researchers in the field of humanities and 
social sciences as to whether the level of trust between the leaders of Saudi Arabia 
and the UK can be transformed to the perception of the public in both countries 
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through trusted media coverage.
456
 Significant controversy surrounds the British 
media, and westerners as former imperialists, who tend to see Arab cultures through a 
prism of inferiority.
457
 Accordingly, Arab elites who have been trying to 
accommodate their traditional values and heritage within their practiced western 




In this regard, it is fair to say the throughout history the negative coverage in 
British media far exceeds that of unprejudiced coverage. Richardson pointed out an 
inherent bias against Muslims and against Islam, especially in British national 
newspapers. Also, Muslims in Britain are usually excluded from coverage in the print 
media, and if it is included press coverage is generally negative and usually coded in 
the context of terrorism, violence and extremism.
459
 According to Nourah al-Khereiji, 
both Saudi students and the public at large are adversely affected when Islam or 







argue that the way in which Saudi citizens and Islam is portrayed in the western 
media has a direct impact on the whole process of understanding.  
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Furthermore, many Saudi citizens are aware of harsh criticisms heaped on 
their cultures and heritage by the British media.
463
 According to al-Fahadi, some 
parents in Saudi Arabia may discourage their children or relatives from learning 
English, or at least give less encouragement to them to do well in learning the English 
language, when British media display such hatred of Arabic and Islamic cultures.
464
  
Undoubtedly, some sections of Saudi citizenry by nature might be ambivalent 
about English culture, as they seem to be about many foreign cultures.
465
 But 
ambivalence can quickly turn into negativity if negative information about one’s 
country is broadcast in the media. Portraying Muslims as violent nations pinpoints the 
growing cultural isolation among members of conservative Arab society, suggesting 
that their children may be more likely treated in the same manner if they travelled 
abroad to learn another culture.
466
 The media can deploy powerful visual images on 
the television to form a collective political and cultural perception of the Muslim 
world, which can be presented to British public as fact.
467
 No matter how noble one 
might believe the media coverage to be, affronted by images or reports have a 
negative impact on Muslim societies.
468
 Most of the time, some British media outlets 
were hopelessly naïve, not only in their presentation of the issues covered in their 
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 Michael Rosie et al. emphasised that the media of a country alone does not 
create the kind of image portrayed about another nation or country, but there are other 
institutions that work to achieve these goals and seek to create a certain stereotypical 
image of Muslims and Arabs. In those countries, some communities and institutions 
specialise in the provision of sensitive materials and information that is used in the 
creation of volatile ethnic or religious stereotyping. For example subjects about the 
Muslim community, or other ethnic or religious minorities for that matter, and use 
appropriate ways to form people’s opinions.470 Those who believe that Arabs are lazy, 
terrorists and fundamentalists are likely to slow or halt any cultural exchange with the 
Middle East simply through their affirmative opposition of issues and news received 
through a variety of means.
471
  
Of course it is well known that stereotyping has intensified after 9/11, the 
series of coordinated suicide attacks in central London on 07 July 2005, and the 
killing of Theo van Gogh by a terrorist in Amsterdam in 2004.
472
 Indeed, as terrorist 
activities continue to dominate in other countries such as Spain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, negative publicity became even more closely linked to certain ethnic and 
religious groups than they were in the early 1980s and late 1990s.
473
 The more the 
term Islam becomes associated with negatively-stereotyped terrorist groups by the 
western media, the more likely religious tolerance will be undermined by the public, 
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in both in Saudi Arabia and the UK.
474
 The volume of fears created by the media may 
instigate hostility against innocent people, because people rarely form their opinions 
based on a complete account of the facts. Public opinion in western countries could be 
easily manipulated by the media, reflecting demands for protection of the public even 
in the absence of real danger.
475
 In some instances, the media made the British public 
less tolerant of Islam and Islamic related cultures.
476
  
Sometimes, the media as a main source of information about other cultures 
can breed contempt from both sides. In more recent studies, as a result of negative 
media coverage, the phenomenon of Islamophobia was found to be on the rise, and 
even native-born minorities were not immune from such prejudicial attitudes.
477
  
The contribution of cultural exchange between the two kingdoms has often 
been associated with the learning and tolerance of each other’s culture, but the British 
government has not utilised Saudi education institutions as vital propagators of the 
English language.
478





 such that better English educated people earn more social 
status and financial rewards, and are generally less associated with terrorist activities 
than less educated ones.
481
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 In contrast, at the moment the positive coverage of Saudi policy in the British 
media is few and far between, although perhaps at some time the British media might 
adopt a more flexible understanding of Arab culture.
482
 To make a case in point, from 
26 January to 15 April 2012, the British Museum hosted a major exhibition, “The 
Hajj; Journey to the Heart of Islam”. Charting the history of the Hajj pilgrimage, 
which has remained unchanged since the Prophet Mohammad’s time in the 7th 
century, the exhibition contained historical and contemporary art, textiles and 
manuscripts that were presented in the Museum for British people.
483
 According to 
Maev Kennedy, the exhibition was the first in any museum in the world to focus on 
the pilgrimage.
484
 There is no question that the coverage of the Hajj exhibition was 
one of the most constructive coverages of Saudi Arabia in British media history. The 
Guardian newspaper published a special report on Mecca and the Hajj pilgrimage.
485
 
The newspaper viewed the exhibition as a major opportunity to solidify British-Saudi 
relations, and the exhibition elicited a positive response from the British public, who 
cannot visit Mecca for religious restrictions.
486
 Indeed, the Guardian newspaper still is 




Prior to the Hajj exhibition, the British Museum had been awarded a grant 
from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) to finance the research for 
the exhibition and accompanying publication
488
. The award covered the cost of the 
academic conference on Hajj in a collaboration with the Department of Theology and 
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Religious Studies, University of Leeds to explore British Muslim communities’ 
experiences of Hajj.
489
 Co-operation between the British Museum and the King 
Abdul-Aziz Public Library was also established during the exchange. The library was 
so pleased with their successful collaboration during the Hajj exhibition in London 
that it expressed its intention to disseminate knowledge and cultural exchange with 
British Museum in the future.
490
 Some British academic institutions have been active 
in the cultural aspect of the Hajj. Dr. Sean McLoughlin a leading academic, was 
funded by the British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship to report and talk about his 
research project on sociological, anthropological and religious elements of the Hajj 
and British Muslims.
491
 Moreover, there are varying levels of involvement among 
anthropologists and historians from both countries who have worked to understand 
the common symbolic form of Muslim communities.
492
 
It is also important to recognise that in the UK the State visit of King Abdullah 
to the UK in October 2007 received very intensive media coverage from the British 
Press. According to the BBC, King Abdullah was the guest of Queen Elizabeth II at 
Buckingham Palace and met British political leaders from both government and the 
opposition.
493
 During his visit, King Abdullah stressed the importance of Saudi-
British relations through the tens of thousands of Saudis studying and working in the 
UK and the hundreds of thousands of Saudi citizens who come to Britain to visit or do 
business.
494
 Saudi Arabia has opened its doors to British media and they have been 
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allowed to observe for themselves what is going on.
495
 According to the Times 
newspaper, Saudi Arabia and the UK clearly matter to each other, with the 
relationship going well beyond being just a simple trading partner, with British 
commercial exports to Riyadh exceeding £11.5 billion GBP. The bilateral co-




According to the Foreign Affairs Committee in London, relations between the 
UK and Saudi Arabia have traditionally been guided at two levels; that of government 
and that of the Royal Families. Such strong relations have also been supported by the 
more than 34,000 Saudi citizens resident in the UK.
497
 Although Saudi Arabia is not a 
tourist destination for Britons, over 70,000 British Muslims visit the holy sites in 
Mecca and Medina each year, and British Muslims make up the largest contingent 
from any Western state to the annual Hajj.
498
 The UK, particularly London, is 
considered a tourist destination for Saudis, and over 100,000 visits are made from 




Frank Gardner, who was shot and paralyzed by terrorists in Riyadh in 2002, 
wrote his story about Saudi Arabia in honest terms, illustrating his remarkable 
survival after being shot nine times by al-Qaeda operatives. 
500
 The tragedy of his 
journalistic coverage in Saudi Arabia did not frighten him from saying in an interview 
with the Daily Mail,  
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 Foreign Affairs Committee “Bilateral Relations with Saudi Arabia”, (Annual Report, March 2010). 











“my return to Saudi Arabia was not just for journalism. This 
was a personal mission to a great country. I wanted to 
revisit the hospital where the doctors had saved my life, 
though I knew it would bring back painful memories. The 
King Faisal Specialist Hospital has a first-class reputation in 
medical circles but on the night I was taken there, close to 
death, I’d never heard of it”.501  
 
His book was a very important piece of media coverage, and vital to cementing the 
foundations of the relationship on a public level. Other reports in the British press 
stress the importance of reform within Saudi Arabia and seek to explain the 
background to the Saudi Royal Family away from the overwhelming number of 
reports linking Saudi Arabia with terrorism.
502
 
Yet the shadow of terrorism is never far from reports about Saudi Arabia in 
the British media. When the appointment of Prince Turki al-Faisal as Ambassador of 
Saudi Arabia to London in 2002 was announced, this created wide-ranging media 
coverage. Some sections of the British media kept their reservations to the nomination 
by raising the fact that Prince Turki maintained contacts with the Taliban and Osama 
bin Laden.
503
 According to Anton La Guardia, diplomatic editor of the Daily 
Telegraph, “the Foreign Office should hold up the appointment of a new ambassador 
until Saudi Arabia releases British and other Westerners arrested in the kingdom on 
dubious charges of masterminding a series of bombings in the country.” Even after his 
appointment, the British media frequently reported these links, always associating the 
new Ambassador with “murky tale[s] of espionage, terrorism and torture.”504  
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Nevertheless, Prince Turki displayed an ability to engage with the media by 
telling the BBC he was shocked at the Kingdom’s poor image in Britain.505 When he 
arrived, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was facing two allegations of al-Qaeda, and 
Osama bin Laden as a Saudi citizen.
506
 Prince Turki decided he wanted to show the 
British public the right image of Saudi Arabia as a country with magnificent scenery, 
art, crafts, music and sport.
507
 He managed to engage with British media to present 
several cultural festivals in London, Manchester, Birmingham and Edinburgh.
508
 
Through his remarkable ideas he created one of the most strategic forum. The forum 
was designed to show the importance of investment in Saudi Arabia through private 
and public partnership in Riyadh and London.
509
 
The impact of the media on British public opinion and on political 
mobilisation was clear for Prince Turki Al-Faisal. When the Foreign Office in London 
issued a warning to the British people not to travel to Saudi Arabia he addressed the 
British press: “The kingdom wishes that when such advice is given by sources outside 
the kingdom that there would be co-ordination between the people giving the advice 
and the authorities in the kingdom.”510 
The role of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the overwhelming attention the 
country has received throughout the country’s history has provided the kingdom with 
significant positive and negative media coverage during the last decades.
511
 Despite 
enormous challenges facing the Kingdom with regard to regional security, the media 
coverage continued to ignore the major difficulties and has often concentrated on 
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stories intended to sensationalise the reforms in the country.
512
 Nevertheless, most of 
the mainstream media coverage considers the Kingdom as a country with an 
exceptional economic power and solid international relations,
513
 and the British media 
rightly acknowledges the Kingdoms role in the global oil market.
514
 The Asharq Al-
Awsat newspaper gave full coverage to the fourth Saudi-British Club held in April 
2009, in which the British Foreign Secretary emphasised Saudi students in the UK are 
participating effectively within the British educational system.
515
 He also supported 
the existing co-operation between the Saudi universities and their British counterparts, 
including Leeds and Sheffield Universities who signed an agreement with King Saud 




The British media also acknowledged the impact of cultural exchange and co-
operation as an important element of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United 
Kingdom comprehensive strategic partnership.
517
 The media is expected to play an 
exceptional role in enhancing mutual understanding between Saudi citizens and 
British public in promoting the value of their historic relations.
518
 At the Two 
Kingdoms Dialogue hosted by the United Kingdom in London in October 2009, Saudi 
and British officials pointed out that cultural exchange is one of the pivotal factors of 
Saudi-British relations. The establishment of the Saudi-British high-level dialogue 
mechanism has resulted in creating two workshops to discuss higher education and 
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 The media has succeeded to highlight the success of those 
unique dialogues. And has presented a positive role of activities of the British Royal 
Family in Saudi Arabia and the influence of the Saudi royal Family on the 
international stage. During Prince Charles’ visit to Saudi Arabia he praised the British 
expatriates working in the country,
520
 and a BBC profile of Prince Saud Al-Faisal 
praised his “diplomatic bearing, his knowledge of the West and his command of 
English [that] made him a natural choice for a role representing Saudi Arabia on the 
international stage.”521  
The concept of forging a strong media is at the heart of Saudi government 
policy. What is really being envisaged is a policy of cultural exchange which will, at 
least, seek to encourage the two nations to come together. Therefore, it is very hard to 
believe that relations will be improved without taking considerable steps to remove 
stereotypes and opinions about each others culture.
522
 Hence, since its inception the 
two Kingdoms Dialogue believes that issues of cultural integration are relevant to 
opinion formation through the media, because it can influence understanding process 
and decision-makers in both countries, and when the British government is keen to 
show the Prime Minister visiting a de-radicalisation centre then this has the effect of 
lessening the negative impression that terrorism and Saudi Arabia are linked.
523
 The 
outcome of those conferences has underlined in particular the role of British media in 
promoting co-operation programmes in the higher education institutes, universities, 
scientific research centres, and enhancing the role of the British Council in different 
parts of Saudi Arabia. So when the British media report positively the Queen 
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welcoming the Saudi King, and asking that the two nations “continue to work together 
to promote common values, strengthen mutual understanding and encourage 
appreciation of what is best in both our cultures,” this is a positive reaffirmation of the 
Two Kingdoms’ Dialogue.524 The two sides emphasised the importance of 
exchanging experiences between the two countries and agreed to establish common 
Saudi British technical training centres in Saudi Arabia.
525
 In addition, they agreed to 
expand the current level of trade agreements between Saudi Arabia and the UK which 
has had positive results for trade and industry.
526
  
6.3.1.2 Positive Media Coverage 
As we have discussed, positive media coverage plays a vital role in shaping the 
relations between communities and nations. The media can make citizens more 
sensible and able to accept other cultures, language, customs and way of life. Positive 
media coverage plays an important role in making people understand the value of 
tolerance and co-existence. The media can show the public the strength and the 
weakness of any society. On the other hand, unchecked and unfounded media 
coverage can cause unnecessary confusion and even political instability. 
According an extensive report by the BBC, Saudi Arabia is considered one of 
the largest social media markets in the Middle East region. The popularity of social 
media has been increased by the high rate of smartphone ownership in Saudi 
Arabia.
527
 The BBC also argued that Saudi Arabia has the highest per-capita YouTube 
use of any country in the world. Despite these opportunities, many countries’ 
impressions of Saudi Arabia are still formed from “distorted perception”, and Use of 
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such visual social media would be a great opportunity for Saudi people to enhance 
their cultural relations in informal way and to introduce their culture to the rest of the 
world and correct the negative image they have.
528
  
It is clear the British media considers the Kingdom as a stabilizing force and a 
key partner in the whole Middle East. The tone of such positive coverage is so clear in 
the case of reporting of the positive impact of the King Faisal Center for Research and 
Islamic Studies, the Prince Mohammed bin Naif Care Rehabilitation Center
529
 and the 




When considering the coverage of British newspapers it could be argued that 
the most news covered about Saudi Arabia is the finance, energy, and economics 
news. According to the BBC, Saudi Arabia has transformed from being an 
underdeveloped desert kingdom to become one of the wealthiest nations in the region 
for its vast oil resources. Saudi Arabia holds more than 25 per cent of the world's 
known oil reserves, and it is able to produce more than 10 million barrels per day. 
Edward Crook, energy editor at the Financial Times, argues that Saudi Arabia has 
been the world’s biggest oil exporter for decades - a title it now shares with Russia – 
and that Saudi Arabia has been central to the health of the global economy.
531
 
According to Bloomberg, Rex Tillerson, the chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil since 
2006, praised the role of Saudi Arabia as an “energy partnership” that “has been a 
cornerstone of the global trading system”.532 Over the next Ed two decades, according 
to official forecasts, the world will rely even more heavily on Saudi oil. The 
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International Energy Agency, which represents the rich oil-consuming countries, 
predicted in its “business as usual” scenario that by 2030 Saudi Arabia’s oil output 
would have roughly doubled from about 9 million barrels per day this year to about 
17.5 million barrels per day. The kingdom’s share of total world oil production was 
forecast to rise from under 11 per cent to 15 per cent.
533
 Such articles as these, and 
others shown throughout the thesis demonstrates how much British media is 
concerned about the Saudi economy, and it is one of the ways that the UK can 
identify with part of Saudi culture. 
6.3.1.3 Negative Media Coverage 
In much the same was that good media coverage can reinforce the positive things 
about a country, negative media coverage has the opposite effect on public opinion 
and hence undermines cultural relations. The negative coverage of minor incidents by 
certain journals and/or journalists is a two-edged sword. On the one hand it 
encourages the British public to increase their misconceptions about Saudi Arabia, 
and on the other hand it makes Saudi families very reluctant to send their children to 
the UK for study.
534
’
535 One of the most negative media reports about Saudi Arabia is 






 Most of these articles ignore the 
fact that the education system for females and women’s rights in Saudi Arabia is 
actually advancing day by day, and not by any means are rights being eroded in one 
of the most conservative societies on the planet. They also overlook the fact that the 
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Saudi government in general, and policy makers in particular, are pushing for the 
increased participation of women and encouraging their role in society. However, 
most religious conservatives are understandably desperate to halt all Saudi 
government initiatives to accommodate women in society.
539
 
An example here, in what seems to be an orchestrated negative media 
campaign, came from the case of four British Expatriates, Ronald Grant Jones, 
Alexander Hutton Johnston Mitchell, William James Sampson and Leslie Walker.
540
 
The broadsheets as well as the tabloids claimed Saudi police tortured the British 
suspects while they were in custody to force them to confess they carried out the 
bombings. The entire media outlet described how detainees were subjected to a 
systematic regime of solitary confinement, sleep deprivation and torture. The 
Government officials also exacerbated the situation by making several heated 
statements.
541
 The negative coverage even went further, with British diplomats and 
military advisers saying; “the most likely perpetrators of the blasts were anti-western 
Saudi supporters of Osama bin Laden, who the Saudi regime has been unable to 
suppress.”542 
There are examples of news stories exaggerated by the media that incensed the 
Saudi authorities, and stemmed and were dominated largely by BBC coverage. For 
instance, the BBC claimed a Saudi-funded Islamic school uses text books contain 
controversial passages which allegedly brand other faiths as worthless.
543
 
Subsequently, the initial report by the BBC quickly propagated in the media and 
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dominated the UK tabloid and broadsheet media.
544
 However, the media failed to 
examine the issue carefully and sensibly, and a report on the BBC programme 
Newsnight did not give the Academy an opportunity to address the issues concerned 
the media. The King Fahad Academy Director made a series of statements saying the 
academy promotes “inter-culturalism and inter-faith awareness” and that the 
translations were “taken out of context” and had “lost some of their meaning”.545 
Because of the negative coverage, parents suffered discrimination and intimidation, 
and a local shop put a sign saying pupils from the King Fahad Academy are not 
welcome.
546
 Undoubtedly, during that time, the BBC report increased the level of 
mistrust in the local communities.
547
 
One of the most profound aspects of the negative media coverage of Saudi 
Arabia and the Muslim world in general in the UK, particularly since the 9/11 attacks 
and the London Bombings, has been the rise in Islamophobic incidents.  
“‘Islamophobia’: this term has been coined by Muslim 
fundamentalists who use it with much success to prevent 
any criticism to be made of them. One should not forget that 
the first victims of fundamentalists are other Muslims, 
whether in our countries of origin or in Western countries. 
However, Islamophobia now increasingly refers, in the 
media for instance, to discriminations against migrants 
from Muslim countries, i.e. to xenophobia and racism, 
rather than referring to an attack on the religion of Islam 
per se. It is therefore an extremely perverse term (in the 
original meaning of per vertere) that one should avoid using 
when dealing with social and political problems.”548 
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Since that time, it is estimated that 40-60 per cent of Britain’s mosques and Muslim 
centres, a number that totals to around 700,
549
 have experienced some form of violent 
attack or hate-related form of protest. Such feelings of hatred and racism again rose 
hotly in light of the May 2013 Woolwich attack, which is the term used for the killing 
of Lee Rigby, a British soldier who was killed in broad daylight in what was 
supposedly a Muslim terrorist attack meant as an act of vengeance for all the Muslim 
deaths caused by the British army. In the days that followed, anti-Islamic attacks in 
both the public and the private sector were described as increasing tenfold, with 




Islamophobia has always been a problem for Muslims residing in Britain. 
British Muslims have always been ostracised by the predominantly white British 
society or treated as outsiders, despite the fact that they are quite well adjusted to life 
in Britain. A study conducted by the University of Essex
551
 revealed that Muslims 
actually identify more with the concept of “Britishness” over their white Briton 
counterparts; when asked to rate the importance of being British on a scale of 1-10, 
the surveyed Muslim Pakistani sector of the British population gave an average rating 
of 7.76, as compared to the white British population of survey which gave an average 
rating of 6.58.
552
 While British Muslims do appreciate the freedom they have to 
practice their religion in Britain, they describe their concerns as the same as any other 
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 The effects of Islamophobia are a hindrance to the daily 
goings-on in the lives of British Muslims. Aside from being targeted and attacked in 
their homes, many British Muslims suffer from all sorts of abuse and harassment 
through other means; for example, many non-Muslim Britons have taken to the web 
and social media to express their hateful sentiments online, and British Muslim 
women have had their scarves pulled as they walk in the streets.
554
 
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is the largest umbrella organisation for 
Muslims in Britain, with over four hundred national, regional, and local Muslim 
associations and organising bodies in their scope, including mosques as affiliates. As 
a result of the rise of Islamophobia, the MCB was vocal in raising awareness about 
the issue in order to prevent more ignorance-driven hate crimes from occurring. 
According to the MCB, the “positive legal duty to promote equality on racial grounds 
should be extended to cover religion.”555 Likewise, the London Central Mosque and 
Islamic Cultural Centre (LCMIC) also focused on eradicating Islamophobia via the 
educational system. Aside from the integration of the cultural awareness of Islam into 
public school education, which the MCB also endorses, the LCMIC and its affiliate 
Muslim educational organisations pondered “over the attainment and achievement of 
Muslim pupils at the State Schools and the prospects and future of the Muslim Faith 
Schools and the Supplementary Schools.”556 
In the battle against Islamophobia, the role of the LCMIC has been to 
champion understanding and awareness between the various Muslim and non-Muslim 
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communities of Britain. The LCMIC also centralises the efforts of the private sector 
and the government for this endeavour. Conferences are also held to discuss Muslim 
culture and ways to deal with Islamophobia on both the local community and 
international relations levels. 
557
 
Islamophobia continues to be an obstacle in the improvement of Saudi-British 
cultural relations. Ignorance and scepticism about Muslims has led to many non-
Muslim Britons to lump the Muslim British citizens into a “they’re all the same” 
category, with no acknowledgement of individuality or variety within the religious 
sub-group. As such, the association of the words “Muslim,” “refugee,” “asylum 
seeker,” and the like has become commonplace, despite the seamless integration of 
Muslim Britons in society. 
In 2004, a former British teacher at King Fahad Academy (KFA) in London 
brought to the public attention that the KFA was teaching their students to become 
Islamic fanatics. The school was being accused of institutional racism and the 
textbooks from the school were being criticised in the BBC and by other British 
scholars.
558
 As the public had taken this issue as a promotion of hatred in school, the 
KFA became a target of terrible publicity in all types of media. Because of the issue, 
the community near the school reacted by prohibiting students from the school to 
enter some business premises. The KFA was not the only one who suffered from 
scrutiny, as other Islamic schools had been shut down by the UK education authorities 
with the excuse that they are not following the correct procedures when it comes to 
school operations.
559
 The Muslim community had experienced discrimination and the 
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KFA had tried to pacify the issue by providing explanations on the issue at hand. 
Howevr, the issue had a greater effect in that it deteriorated the relationship between 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. 
As the bad publicity came out the director of the KFA, Somaya Alyusuf, 
issued statements and gave interviews to discuss and explain how the problem came 
about. In an interview, although she accepted that the textbooks that were seen as 
promoting hatred were still in the school, she said the books were not part of the 
current school curriculum.
560
 When asked if they were going to remove the said 
textbooks after the issue had been publicised, the KFA director at that time did not 
commit to any decision as she stated that the books were still important as reference 
materials for their new curriculum. Alyusuf denied the allegations against their school 
and reiterated that the texts being cited were taken out of context.
561
 As the issue 
progressed and more articles came out branding the KFA as Islamic fanatics, the 
school took the offensive by taking legal action against one of the UK newspapers, 
the Sunday Express.
562
 The Saudi Embassy also tried to pacify the public by providing 
statements regarding the issue.  
The KFA legal action against the Sunday Express paid off as they won in the 
UK courts and the newspaper paid an undisclosed amount, published an apology and 
retracted its statement that the “King Fahd Academy in London has been infiltrated by 
fanatics and was teaching an extreme version of Islam.”563 Adding to the legal action 
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that the school had taken, the Director of the academy also issued a statement that “in 
the public interest” the offensive passages would be removed.564  
As a result of this issue, consultations were held between the Saudi Ministry of 
Education and British educators which lasted for two years, and eventually decided to 
adopt the “International Baccalaureate Curriculum”. The KFA for its part had 
continuously reiterated that the Saudi school curriculum had changed. Other 
companies, like ARAMCO, stood by the Saudi government and made their presence 
felt by showing their support when the management of the company visited the school 
in 2005 and publicised that they were donating funds to improve the school’s 
facilities.
565
   
To enhance the community relationship with the United Kingdom, the KSA 
intensified its cultural diplomatic activity in many ways, such as attendance at Islamic 
celebrations and events. In 2004, the Saudi Ambassador to the UK, Prince Turki Al-
Faisal, delivered a speech during Islamic Awareness Week. In his speech he 
recognised Shakespeare and his happiness for taking part in such an event. The 
Ambassador also called “for a fruitful dialogue amongst Muslims and non-Muslims 
and for not allowing a small group of extremists to damage relations amongst 
Muslims and others in the British society.”566 The embassy became very active in 
patching up the relationship with the United Kingdom.  
 
6.3.2 Cultural Relations Projects since 2000  
After “Painting and Patronage” was established in 1999, exhibitions were held in 
2000 and 2001 in London and Riyadh, in conjunction with HRH The Prince of Wales 
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and Mr James Hart-Dyke. The exhibitions were formally visited by HM Queen 
Elizabeth II in London, and opened in Riyadh by the Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz. The “Painting and Patronage” project also 
organised free summer school courses and community outreach programmes which 
rotated between Riyadh, Abha, Sintra and London. The courses covered subject areas 
such as geometry, calligraphy, drawing natural forms, textile design, stencilling, and 
the design and production of ceramic tiles. Among its partners were The Prince’s 
School of Traditional Arts in London and the Al-Miftaha Visual Arts Village in Abha. 
Scholarship programmes and a lecture series were also held between Saudi Arabian 
Universities and the University of London.
567
 
In 2010, Painting and Patronage organised a cultural exchange programme 
between the UK and Saudi Arabia which was held under the joint presidency of 
Prince Khalid and Prince Charles. The programme, which continued for two years, 
aimed to build bridges of understanding and technical and educational exchange 
between the Arab world and Europe, and to strengthen cultural, artistic and 
educational understanding between the two countries. In a statement to the Saudi 
Press Agency, the chairman of Painting and Patronage, Anthony Bailey praised the 
excellent work carried out by both Prince Khalid and Prince Charles over many years, 
noting that the new programme was another example of the unique cultural and 
artistic partnership founded ten years before by the Prince of Wales and Prince 
Khalid. In the same year Prince Charles hosted, through the foundation of Painting 
                                                 
 




and Patronage, an exchange programme for students from Saudi Arabia, where they 
spent a year in a graduate programme at the School of Traditional Arts in London.
568
  
After the 9/11 attacks, the British Council in Saudi Arabia recognised that just 
teaching English was not enough to enhance the bilateral cultural relations of both 
nations. Therefore, it created cultural initiatives such as the “Connecting Futures” 
programme in 2003. This was a five-year initiative intended to build mutual 
understanding, learning and respect between young people of different cultural 
backgrounds through diverse communities in the United Kingdom and overseas. 
Initially, the programme involved such countries as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria, the Palestine Territories and 
the United Kingdom. The programme involved about five thousand young people 
aged from 15 to 24 to determine how they viewed the UK and other countries as well 
as their future aspirations.  
One of the rationales behind this programme was to develop new types of 
British cultural relations with a wider audience of young people through education, 
arts, sports, and sciences, as well as school links and youth exchanges; networking of 
young professions made possible by the opportunities provided for open dialogue and 
debate; and finally, through widened access to information and educational 
services
569
. As a result, after the British Council in Saudi Arabia re-opened in the late 
2003 the programme conducted exchange visits by young trainee teachers from both 
Saudi Arabia and the UK from 2004-7. 
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The British House of Commons has regularly addressed the issue of bilateral 
Anglo-Saudi relations. On every occasion since 9/11 that this has been raised it has 
been agreed that it is in the interest of the British government and people to strengthen 
relations with Saudi Arabia, particularly in the areas of defence, trade, security and 
counter-terrorism. However, cultural relations are never acknowledged as a key issue 
in the bilateral relationship like those noted above, it is the contention of this author 
and thesis that cultural components of the bilateral relation, in particular links in the 
educational sphere, are an important part of the Anglo-Saudi relationship and will 





In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon in the United States, the world-wide reaction, including in Saudi Arabia, 
was one of horror and sympathy. However, instead of building on this sympathy, the 
US President George W. Bush engaged in the “War on Terror”. The British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, promised to stand shoulder to shoulder with his American ally, 
but when it became apparent that fifteen of the nineteen terrorists were from Saudi 
Arabia this had an immediate impact on the Anglo-Saudi relationship. We have 
demonstrated that soon after the attacks, the number of Saudis travelling abroad 
dropped dramatically, to levels below that of the early 1980s, and despite the Saudi 
government constantly distancing itself from the attacks, and taking all actions it 
could to reiterate that it was not involved with the atrocities, in a part of the media 
such conclusions were cemented. 
The attacks of 9/11, and the British bombings of 7/7, had a dramatic impact on 
cultural relations, and the efforts of the Saudi government in increasing the number of 
scholarships available to Saudi students to travel abroad, the funding of “soft” de-
radicalisation treatments, and the formation of cultural programmes like “Painting and 
Patronage” were an attempt to regain lost ground. However, in the 24 hour news cycle 
available in the current technological age, the media has an almost instantaneous 
power to affect opinions and public perceptions all over the world, and this has 
significantly changed the way people see one another.
570
 
The coverage of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the British media has 
become widespread in almost all media outlets. Broadsheets such as the Financial 
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Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Times, the Independent and the Guardian have 
covered news about the kingdom in a more balanced way over a wide range of issues.  
However, the British tabloid media has been particularly critical of a broad 
range of subjects both in the UK and Saudi Arabia well ahead of seeking concrete 
evidence from Saudi authorities before publishing their stories. The media outlets, 
however, are not guilt-free, they have routinely downplayed the progress made by 
Saudi authorities in the field of counter-terrorism, education, female employment and 
de-radicalisation of extremists. One side of the progress that has been widely covered 
in a more objective way is the role of the Saudi economy and its pivotal role in the 
energy market.  
The level of understanding between the two countries should be reflected in 
the media. To enhance cultural relations between the two countries, a high profile 
cultural exchange should be put in place. The political and economic partnership 
should be matched with the necessary support for cultural exchange, which is clearly 
lagging behind other elements of the bilateral relation. Educational staff should be 
encouraged to spend time in educational institutes in Saudi Arabia and the UK 
through comprehensive programmes. Cultural exchange can provide the two 
Kingdoms with significant added value and expertise. Negative media coverage will 
have a negative impact on the process of cultural exchange between Saudi Arabia and 
the UK. Short-lived negative campaigns have less impact than prolonged negative 
media coverage. The role of a proactive and positive response from Saudi officials is 
very important to avoid blurring the vision between substantiated and exaggerated 
stories. Some media coverage has exhibited a lack of respect and understanding 
towards the other community. The very few positive media stories covered alongside 




cultural exchange between the two kingdoms has become a matter of critical 
importance. Different plans and initiatives to advance cultural exchange have been 
delayed and derailed for bureaucratic reasons. Beyond the bureaucratic issues 
surrounding this aspect, there is a need for both countries to create a wider system of 
co-operation through cultural exchange; otherwise, this stagnation will reinforce the 
preconceived notions and concepts held by some sections in both societies.  
The UK is in a position to implement a long overdue cultural exchange. In 
fact, the British government should put plans for cultural exchange on top of its 
partnership with the Saudi government. Cultural exchange will familiarise and 
harmonise Saudi British relations in other fields. In order to succeed in political, 
economic and security fields, the British government would need to create a concrete 
plan for training and teaching Saudi youth. This will fundamentally alter the dynamics 
of cultural exchange and remove a major of source of hatred that is feeding narrow-
minded thought on both sides. Such cultural co-operation could lead to a tremendous 
result.  
Finally, a real commitment to the development of intensive cultural 
programmes for Saudi students will be a critical aspect of pushing negative media 
coverage towards the positive. It should be known this task is a complex and multi-
faceted issue, which requires a real dynamic.  
The common argument made by some media, including newspapers in the 
UK, appear to suggest that negotiations about equality and human rights should be 
conducted in the British context. However, the Western media, including the British 
media, is devoid of any socio-cultural analysis which gives rise to demands for 
separation of religion from public and governmental institutions and the removal 




For example, in the analysis of the King Fahad Academy by British Media 
there was a complete absence of any examination of the Islamic social and political 
history and law, which was based on the premise that all people of different religions 
should be able to live together peacefully under the authority and domain of the 
Islamic State. 
Moreover, most non-governmental organisations mentioned in this thesis, and 
others, are engaged in some form of cultural relations in both countries. There is a 
crying need for their work to be widely circulate in the media. However, media, 
publishers, and researches do not give such activities sufficient visibility, and the 
NGOs themselves often seem to target business interests rather than cultural interests, 
which take a “back seat”.  
The main aim of this thesis has been to chronicle Anglo-Saudi cultural 
relations, and to investigate how this aspect of bilateral relations has been promoted –
through, for example, public diplomacy, co-operation and cultural diplomacy, the 
promotion of exports and investments, and promotion of educational co-operation. All 




Studying the cultural relationship of the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia teaches one to learn that here we have two different cultures with 
compelling differences yet are still able to find common ground to help each other, 
complement each other, and accept each other for the differences each has in order to 
end up with a mutual and respectful relationship 
                                                 
 
571 Marta Ryniejska – Kiełdanowicz, n.d. Cultural Diplomacy as a Form of International 




Saudi Arabia may still be in the infancy stage in terms of cultural relations as a 
vehicle to strengthen further positive awareness about Saudi culture abroad. It can 
learn from the UK’s long-time investment in cultural relations. 
Undoubtedly, that there are tremendous differences between the two 
Kingdoms – geographically, ideologically and politically – as well as culturally. 
Nevertheless, at the governmental level, bilateral cultural relations have added value 
to overall bilateral ties. For example, the British have played a key role in meeting the 
ever increasing demand of the Saudi population in seeking better education for their 
younger generations. Both governments believe cultural exchanges through 
educational institutions are vital propagators of healthy political relations. The 
ongoing relationship of cultural diplomacy has also been a springboard to political 
and strategic understanding. The Two Kingdoms Dialogue established in 2005 under 
the auspices of the foreign ministries of both countries continued until 2009. This 
dialogue was intended to put forward recommendations on various aspects of the 
bilateral relationship. One example was the recommendation to improve participation 
of Saudi women in the civil service by providing technical and professional training. 
This resulted in the opening of a Women’s section in the Saudi Embassy in London to 
deal with Saudi women’s affairs in Britain. 
Another important recommendations was the call for the two governments to 
establish a joint committee of British and Saudi experts to identify areas of co-
operation for youth training programmes and to develop strategic plans for the labour 
market. This is vital as proper funded networks of cultural exchanges that bring 
together British and Saudi youth are a key to future relations.  
On a more official level, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) report 




issued by British consulates in the world (after China, India and Pakistan, and before 
the US).
572
 Indeed, the number of Saudi student visas increased from 6,000 in 2010 to 
10,000 in 2012.  573 As the story of globalisation continues to unfold, Britain continues 
to offer Saudis numerous opportunities for overseas education and cultural 
integration.  
Existing cultural organisations in both countries have the experience and 
know-how to foster a real dialogue based on communication and understanding and to 
tackle the complex web of issues and problems that developing cultural ties inevitably 
have to deal with. One potential future development could be to borrow from 
proposals put forward by Cynthia Schneider in 2011 in relation to US-Saudi bilateral 
ties,
574
 and to establish a Saudi organisation linked to the Foreign ministry that has the 
task of leading on cultural diplomacy. Certainly, this would not be very far from the 
existing British Council model, as that body is partly funded by the British FCO. 
However, the role and functional of such a new body should be different from 
both the British Council in Riyadh and Saudi Cultural Bureau in London. This new 
body would be mandated to bridge the gap between British culture and Saudi culture 
as a priority. Furthermore, this body could become to a powerful institution to serve 
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ANGLO-SAUDI EDUCATION EXCHANGE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Rapid progress in Anglo-Saudi relations has advanced mostly in the areas of 
development, educational exchange, defence, security and strategic relations. Of 
particular relevance to this thesis, as the Kingdom develops an infrastructure to deal 
with its citizen’s demands, is the help of British technology, in addition to the policies 
for cultural and educational exchange that are also being put into place. These 
exchanges are moving gradually towards a tangible reality, to the extent that the Saudi 
Arabian youth are trying to remove or reduce cultural barriers, for the benefit of their 
own lives and their society.  
Due to the expansion of commercial activities and their contribution to the 
Saudi Arabian economy, the development of educational exchange has increasingly 
stimulated bilateral networking and the evolution of interdependent relations. The 
economic integration of both countries has been, and continues to be, based on 
making an effort to combine trade in military, medicine and economics with 
education and training policies, and to minimise the low levels of productivity due to 
inadequate formal training.  
The authorities in Saudi Arabia believe that after establishing comprehensive 




reallocation, will result in economic welfare for all its citizens. Some researchers
575
 
have expressed their concern with regard to the benefits of national wealth in fiscal 
terms without real development in education and social aspects. It is therefore very 
important that a country like Saudi Arabia, with little history of engagement with 
foreign languages and cultures, develop an interest in both.  
The impact of globalisation on educational and cultural exchanges began to be 
felt more intensely in Saudi Arabia and several other neighbouring countries in the 
1990s, when the State of Kuwait was liberated from the Iraqi invasion and when 
English language, mainly through the CNN News Channel and military personnel 
stationed in the Gulf, became part of everyday culture and life.  
While older generations understandably resisted this change and looked down 
at foreign cultures, the young have shown a degree of enthusiasm in engaging with 
foreigners. In the British case, this has been helped by a number of additional factors.  
The first is that English is the foreign language of choice in Saudi Arabia, 
which puts the British at an advantage over other European countries. The second is 
that the political strength of long-standing bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia 
and Britain also influenced the decision of the Saudis to choose English as the 
preferred second language. 
The Saudi-Arabian government, in particular, has made a concerted effort to 
build education-based relations with Britain, leading to a significant improvement of 
English language-learning capabilities. Similarly, since the end of the last century, the 
growing understanding between the two countries has led to a tangible improvement 
in the role of the British Council across Saudi Arabia. 
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This Chapter examines the changing relations between the two countries, 
using scholarship schemes as a method of building more cultural bridges. These 
scholarships are particularly interesting in the context of Saudi Arabia, where English 
language learning has gained importance in the youth civic culture and politics, and 
where new types of complex and elaborate interactions between young people from 
all over the world, have developed as a result of the revolution in information 
technology. 
Both the British Council (BC) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian Cultural 
Bureau (SCB) in London have become central actors in the promotion, coordination 
and running of educational and cultural campaigns between the two Kingdoms. The 
size of funds allocated by the Saudi Arabian authorities for such efforts in the area of 
English language tuition is enormous. 
 
7. Education Sector 
Undoubtedly education, and especially higher education, has the potential for further 
fostering a strong bilateral relationship, and both countries are keenly aware of that 
fact. There has been a remarkable boom in higher education in Saudi Arabia since 
2005. This has come in different forms and styles and reflects an unprecedented 
interest in the quality of education provided in institutions of higher education. 
Among the large number of initiatives in this sector is the King Abdullah Scholarship 
Programme for students to study abroad for undergraduate and postgraduate (MA, 
PhD) degrees. Over $1 billion USD has been invested in this programme over the last 
decade, through a special government controlled fund that has so far fully funded 
120,000 students to study abroad in programmes that range from intensive English 




7.1 Saudi and British Universities 
In the last decade, as highlighted above, the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education and 
those responsible for education and training in the government and the country’s 
private sector, introduced clear standards and more stringent criteria to the scholarship 
process. One example is the move of the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education to draw 
up lists of accredited universities and higher education institutions in different 
countries which are considered eligible to host funded students.  
At the same time the government has greatly expanded opportunities in higher 
education in the Kingdom, through the creation of more than 10 new national 
universities during the last decade.
576
 For example, King Abdullah founded an 
institution dedicated to women’s education at the cost of $5 billion USD. On top of 
this a number of private universities
577
 have received licences during the same period. 
Interestingly, in the context of the relationship between ties with overseas 
educational institutions and domestic development of the university sector, Saudi 
higher education has not attracted branches of foreign universities in the way that 
most of its GCC partners have done.  
While the contribution to local education of such imported universities is still 
a matter of extensive debate, there is no doubt that introducing major international 
research institutions into the local community has had a notable impact on cultural 
relations between Gulf nations and the outside world,
578
 as have the growing links 
between indigenous universities in the region and foreign universities, by way of 
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strategic partnerships and co-operation agreements. These include the Universities of 
Edinburgh and Birmingham, with branches in the UAE, and the Universities of 
Glamorgan and Hull in Bahrain
 579
  
Saudi Arabia was more enthusiastic about this second type of relationship as it 
views co-operation in higher education as offering a number of advantages in 
particular in the research context.
580
 However, the enthusiasm voiced by Saudi higher 
education was not always reciprocated by the outside world, as experiences with the 
EU demonstrated: 
“Following a 1995 EU-GCC agreement, three strands of such 
cooperative projects were tentatively started up: in 
business, in technology and in university cooperation. The 
latter moved ahead most swiftly-with keen interest from 
King Saud and King AbdulAziz Universities especially-until 
becoming stranded on intra-EU bureaucratic and 
communications problems. [...] The project was finally, and 
embarrassingly abandoned by the European Commission in 
2000.”581 
  
On the learning and teaching front Saudi universities, like others in the region, look to 
benchmark their degrees by gaining academic accreditation from internationally 
recognised bodies, something that is vital if a degree is to help a young graduate find 
employment in the international labour market, and to increase the prestige of Saudi 
institutions and their rankings in university league tables.
582
 
One of the most important objectives of the British Council is nurturing ideas 
and encouraging innovation, especially among young people around the world. The 
British Council has invested greatly to meet those objectives, as has Saudi Arabia, as 
evident by the establishment in 2008 of the King Abdullah University of Science and 
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Technology. With the support of the British Council, this Saudi postgraduate only 




There is a real case to be made, in terms of promoting cultural developments 
between Saudi Arabia and Britain, for building similar relationships in the arts and 
humanities. Saudi universities are lacking in expertise (in both research and teaching) 
in the broad areas of cultural and creative studies, or European and American Studies 
with an arts focus. In fact, many Saudi higher education institutions do not even have 
standalone History, Politics or even Middle Eastern Studies departments.  
The then Secretary of State for Wales, Peter Walker, visited Saudi Arabia in 
February 1990 as the guest of Shaikh Hisham Nazer, the Saudi Minister for Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources. Walker was accompanied by a team of Welsh businessmen 
and representatives of the University of Wales. This led to new and valuable academic 
links between Wales and Saudi Arabia including a formal co-operation agreements 
between the University of Wales and the King Saud University and King Fahd 
University of Petroleum and Minerals. As he indicated, “this will lead to significantly 
more Saudi students studying in Wales and an expansion of staff and student 
interchanges.” There were also reciprocal visits to Wales by the principals of the five 
Saudi colleges of agriculture and by a mission of Saudi businessmen.
584
 
7.2 Studying Abroad and Student Exchange 
Saudi Arabia has achieved, primarily through King Abdullah’s Foreign Scholarships, 
a leading global position in terms of student mobility. According to a UNESCO report 
on students mobility published in 2009, in absolute terms, Saudi Arabia came behind 
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the top countries for the number of scholarships, which were China (421,000) and 
India (153,000) and South Korea (105,300). With 70,000 students studying abroad, 
Saudi Arabia came ahead of Japan and the US although in terms of population, Saudi 
was ranked first by UNESCO in terms of the proportion of scholarships available at 
0.03 per cent. With more than 163 British universities and higher education 
institutions recommended by the Saudi authorities, Britain was at the forefront of 
countries benefiting from this large scale funding of overseas scholarships.
585
 
Although the statistics indicate that the US is the destination for the largest 
number of Saudi Arabian scholarship students, Britain is in second place, with the 
number of students reaching 16,000 in 2012. Moreover, as the Saudi ambassador to 
London noted in a speech to mark the graduation of Saudi students in that year, 
Britain has an appeal to many, not offered by other destinations, including the US. 
The level of education on offer is high, the language of tuition is English and, most 
importantly, it is much nearer to home in terms of flight time than many other 
potential places of study, with daily flights between London and the Kingdom.
586
 
It is natural that the presence of Saudi students in the UK, in undergraduate 
and postgraduate studies, immersed in every detail of British life, has created more 
bridges of communication and understanding between the two nations. Of course one 
of the risks of this immersion is the loss of cultural and religious identity. This is 
certainly a concern of the Saudi authorities and parents of students studying abroad.
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Huda Alhaysi, a Professor at King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, explained this fear 
and the reasons behind it: 
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“Young children are unaware of cultural differences; 
because everything is so accessible and easy, they are more 
accepting of what is different: in their minds, the ‘foreign’ is 
actually ‘local.’ We understand that people from ‘elsewhere’ 
have different cultures and we accept that these behaviours 
are part of their culture. And this cultural framework which 
is shared by the same community helps them make sense of 
the world around them, interpreting and translating other 
people’s world views by defining their values and beliefs 
into a comprehensible totality, accessible only through the 
lenses created by the shared meanings of the applied 
cultural framework. Each country has its own specific 
expressions of cultures. They are accepted and should, in no 
way, be judged or compartmentalised into stereotypes that 
mock or belittle the reality, or, worse still, produce negative 
images and feelings in those who are unfamiliar with the 
‘other’s world,’ thus creating acts of hatred epitomised by 
speech, violence or abuse.”588 
 
Universities and other education institutions could be considered key players in 
advocating and promoting cultural integration. Such institutions must implement 
integration processes for their faculty and staff to enable them to maintain their 
individual cultural identity while respecting others. Students need to be trained to 
share and respect a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society while at the same time 
encouraging racial equality and fighting stereotypes.
589
 
On the British side, student exchange programmes between British universities 
and other higher-education institutions in various countries, such as America, 
Australia, Canada, China, Japan, India, and others, have been in existence since the 
1970s. Apart from attracting students and revenues from overseas, the motivations for 
British support of these mechanisms has been to enrich university life, to cement ties 
in other areas (such as politics and trade) and to expose local students to other cultures 
and education systems. Exchange programmes alsoshatter misconceptions about 
scientific and cultural aspects, all the while fostering in the entire student body key 









life skills including self-expression, responsibility, personal refinement, and self-
reflection.  
Interestingly in this context, up to this point few British students have had the 
opportunity to go to Saudi universities as exchange students. Nevertheless, there have 
been some exceptions and modest numbers of students have travelled to Saudi with 
sponsorship from voluntary organisations and cultural institutions, for example, the 
Crossway Foundation, Edge of Arabia, and Painting & Patronage. However, officials 
of the Saudi Embassy and the Saudi Cultural Bureau in London have raised the idea 
of university exchanges that include British students going to Saudi institutions, 
although such ideas are in their initial stages and have not been addressed formally by 
the Ministry of Higher Education or the British Council.  
Writing in Higher Education Policy in 1993,
590
 Britta Baron divided academic 
mobility into four main eras. In the first era, during the decades after World War II 
between 1950 and 1975, academic mobility was at its peak, since according to 
UNESCO statistics, the number of international students doubled each year. Such 
academic mobility was mainly one-way and targeted to a few core receiving countries 
with Britain being the main one, namely due to its links with the Commonwealth 
countries. A number of factors influenced such mobility, including the country’s 
possession of institutions regarded as centres of excellence, heritage linkage between 
receiving and sending countries, as well as the available facilities, incentives offered 
to students and the links between foreign aid for developing nations and available 
subsidised university places.
591
 Baron commented that international student numbers 
declined in the 1970s as countries ended their “open-door” policy for students and as 
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national higher education developed globally. For example, in 1979 Britain 
introduced full-cost tuition fees for overseas students, which restricted extensively 
academic mobility into the UK. Nevertheless, such steps did not reduce the political 
aspect of academic mobility, which actually increased as successive governments 
began to introduce substantial levels of public funds for higher education exchange 
and research. In 1990, for instance, grant schemes focused on graduate students were 
provided to 25,000 overseas students, at a cost of £143 million GBP.
592
 
During the second era, between 1975 and 1987, there was a strong increase in 
the flow of students between industrialised countries within Western Europe, but no 
great increase from outside the EU. The UK, for example, saw an 11 per cent increase 
in non-European foreign students between 1980 and 1990, compared with a 55 per 
cent increase in the same period of students coming from EU member states.
593
  
In the third era, between 1987 and 1992, the European Commission and the 
British Ministry of Education initiated a Joint Study Programme (JSP), which was 
officially aimed at “the promotion of joint programmes of study or research between 
institutions in several Member states”.594 This programme advocated co-operation 
between the different higher education institutions in terms of consultation and advice 
between academics and expertise within these institutions.  
JSP faced a number of challenges, such as a limited budget to support growth, 
but it still effectively managed to encourage students to join the scheme through 
offering flexibility in terms of programmes and funding methods. This was further 
enhanced when JSP introduced a new budget line for student grants, which provided 
direct support for academic mobility within the EU. Subsequently, in 1987 the JSP 











scheme was replaced with the ERASMUS (European Action Scheme for the Mobility 
of University Students), which widely captured the public’s interest and achieved an 
impressive success record.  
ERASMUS was a political instrument which aimed to promote European 
identity; enhance higher educational quality within the EU and improve its global 
competitiveness; create a pool of resources in higher education to ensure better 
efficiency; strengthen educational co-operation towards further political unity within 
the EU members; establish equality in academic teaching between the EC members; 
and finally increase European competitiveness over the US and Japan.
595
 
The fourth era began in 1992. In 1991-92 ERASMUS offered 63,000 students 
the opportunity to participate in 1,700 inter-University programmes. The scheme also 
generated and supported a variety of other programmes, such as, COMET, LINGUA, 
and TEMPUS, to the extent that higher education consumption was no longer 
confined to an individual’s home country. This was affirmed in the Memorandum on 
Higher Education (HE) written on behalf of the European Commission and published 
in 1991. It reflected the confidence with which the Commission embraced its role in 
promoting cross-border, pan-European higher education, which had been validated by 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. 
In its new role it was hoped that the European Commission would better serve 
its objectives by focusing more on research and postgraduate exchange, as well as 
widening student mobility schemes beyond the EU and EFTA (European Free Trade 
Association) members, towards the United States and the Eastern Asian region.
596
 
From the Saudi perspective it does not seem that the Middle East region was included 









in these ambitious plans, though despite this the importance of Britain as a recipient 
of Saudi students continued to be important. 
 
7.3 Language  
7.3.1 English 
English is the second language after Arabic in the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, 
proficiency in the English language is considered as one of the basic skills needed to 
be competitive in the labour market, especially in certain sectors such as business, 
banking, industry and health. As one westerner noted, “I spent two years living and 
working in the Gulf, yet I can speak only a handful of phrases in Arabic because the 
English spoken there was so good and because ambitious local families were so keen 
to teach their children English before they learned Arabic.”597 This prompted 
universities to focus attention on teaching the English language in order to ensure that 
graduates have appropriate English skills and are able to obtain adequate employment 
opportunities.  
Additionally, English expanded in most Saudi universities, and has now 
become a formal language for education curriculums for some scientific, engineering 
and management programmes. The centrality of English is also evident in some 
government and private institutions, where scholarships are on offer for staff to study 
English in Britain for varying periods of time. Moreover, many Saudis have travelled 
to Britain to learn English on their own initiative and at their own expense. Although 
travel to Britain for the purpose of learning English is more expensive than staying in 
Saudi Arabia to learn the language, many Saudis, as well as a large number of 
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companies and institutions, prefer this option because it is more useful and effective. 
Being immersed in the country with native English speakers has a positive impact on 
mastering the language and shortens the time required to gain proficiency. 
This demand for the English language, combined with the poor record of 
English language acquisition in secondary schools, has created a profitable 
environment for many education institutions and centres that offer English courses, in 
addition to specialised courses teaching English language for hospital staff, teachers 
in the education sector and diplomats. When it opened in 1975, the British Council 
was the first of these institutes to offer this service to men. In April 1991, following 
the end of the Gulf War the previous month, the British Council opened its first 
Women’s section. In addition to English language courses, it provides educational 
services for Saudi citizens, such as assistance in finding institutes to learn English in 
Britain, as well as undergraduate and postgraduate studies in Britain. The Council also 
supervises the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), which is 
considered one of the most important standardised English tests used in universities to 
measure levels of English language capabilities.  
In terms of its cultural activities and services, it could be argued that the 
British Council, despite the wide experience it has in the field, has played an 
unpretentious role in strengthening bridges of understanding between the two nations 
since the 1970s. This has been made difficult at various times due to the lack of 
cultural openness on the Saudi side and because of the Council’s apprehension in 
engaging in a highly sensitive and culturally difficult environment. This was seen, for 
example, in the fact that the Women’s branch in Jeddah closed only two years after it 
opened in 1991, by order of senior Saudi clerics on the grounds that the British should 




with a new branch in Riyadh launched shortly afterwards. Both centres were opened 
at buildings housing Saudi women’s charitable organisations, Jamaiya Al Nahdhah in 
Riyadh and Jamaiya Al Faisaliya in Jeddah, under the umbrella of Princess Fahida 
Bint Saud, who was their patron.  
In this alone the British Council has had a huge impact, setting a precedent in 
the process and in turn underscoring the centrality of the Council in promoting Anglo-
Saudi cultural relations. Indeed, considering the difficulties the British Council has 
faced, overall it has played a prominent role in building bridges between the British 
and Saudis across numerous fields of endeavour and engagement. This culminated in 
March 2010, with the launch of the Council project “Global Xchange”, run jointly 
with the Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) and launched in partnership with Al-
Majid Society in Jeddah. By the end of the year young male volunteers from both 
countries participated in a volunteer work exchange. Adrian Chadwick, the British 
Council Director indicated at the beginning of the project, “This exchange will help 
build understanding between our two kingdoms, and, importantly, give young British 
people a chance to learn more about Saudi Arabia and share these positive 
impressions and experiences in their communities.”598 The Global Xchange 
programme came to an end on 31 March 2012 when the first cycle of funding was 
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There has been growing demand to learn Arabic in the western world over the last 
decade, especially in response to the September 11 attacks on the US by Al Qaeda 
that focused global attention on the Arab world.
599
 The Universities and Colleges 
Admissions Service (UCAS) indicated that “between 2001 and 2002 alone, the 
numbers applying to learn Arabic in British universities rose by 22 per cent.”600 In 
response to this trend, major British media outlets, led by the BBC, have been 
expanding and developing their Arab language provision.
601
  
In contrast, in the face of this increased demand it could be clearly seen that 
the available opportunities to learn Arabic in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries as a 
whole is very limited and insufficient to cover the growing demand for the language. 
There is an obvious weakness in initiatives along the lines of the work done by the 
British Council by all the Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, to provide 
opportunities to learn the Arabic language and about Arabic culture to foreigners 
either at home or in other countries. This is also true for other Arab Gulf states. A 
report published by the University of Qatar, stated that applications received by the 
Arabic language programme from non-native speakers exceeded the available places 
to learn the Arabic language on an annual basis. This in itself has resulted in leading 
British institutions filling the void in providing such tuition. 
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7.4 International Students in the UK 
7.4.1 UK Council for International Student Affairs602 
In the 1960s, the UK began receiving large numbers of international students, and by 
1963 there were 20,000 international students studying in the UK. Most of these 
students were granted full state support covering their fees and maintenance. Despite 
this, little awareness of individual international students’ needs was recognised at the 
time. At the beginning of the 1960s, no national organisation for international students 
was in place, although several regional “Councils for Overseas Students” did exist 
and the British Council had a network of offices in the major university cities.  
During the 1960s, the National Union of Students (NUS) conducted some of 
the first research to investigate international student life at UK higher education 
institutions. Soon after, in 1968, the UK Council for Overseas Student Affairs 
(UKCOSA) was established, mandated to serve as an independent educational charity 
to service overseas students and those organisations and individuals whose work was 
concerned with them. It also coordinated the efforts of academic and professional 
bodies, voluntary organisations, students’ organisations, and individuals working in 
the field of overseas student affairs. 
During the 1970s there was a rapid increase in international students (from 
34,000 in 1973 to 88,000 in 1979). There was also the introduction of higher fees for 
international students and the launch of new immigration policies that made it more 
difficult for many groups of foreign students to gain entry into Britain. On the positive 
side, during the 1970s UK education institutions began to develop advisory and 
support services for those growing foreign student communities. 
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During the 1980s, for political and diplomatic reasons, immigration and visa 
issues emerged as key considerations for some nationalities, such as Iranians and 
Libyans. Additionally, “full cost” overseas fees were introduced, which all resulted in 
a dramatic reduction in the number of overseas students coming to the UK and by 
1984 numbers had dropped to 56,000 international students. However, over the same 
time period a network of international student advisers was established, and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Chevening Scholarship scheme was launched. 
Additionally, universities and colleges, as well as the British Council, commenced 
large scale marketing operations overseas. Andy Masheter, the director of UKCISA 
between 1987 and 1991, declared, that “UKCOSA in the 1980s grew up as an 
organisation. It became professionalised […] collaborated with other organisations 
[…] to take far better care of them.”603 
During the 1990s, the UKCOSA launched the Overseas Student Advisers 
Group (OSAG) and there was fierce competition between the UK, the US and 
Australia to attract international students. By 1997 there were 184,000 international 
students in Britain. The Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) was launched in 1999 to 
support and authorise the UK’s global marketing campaign. PMI, initiated by Tony 
Blair, the Prime Mi2nister at that time, aimed at increasing the number of 
international students in both higher and further education.  
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, UKCOSA changed its name to the UK 
Council for International Student Affairs (UKCISA) in an attempt to emphasise its 
fundamental focus on the international student experience. This was demonstrated by 
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the second stage of the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI2), aimed at enhancing “the 
quality of the experience” for students as one of four key priorities.  
During the first decade of this century, international student numbers grew to 
over 200,000 (in 2008, international student numbers were 417,000) with an estimated 
annual value approaching £4 billion GBP, as the British Council, optimistic as to 
future developments, published “Vision 2020” predicting further growth in demand. 
However, visa and immigration issues, especially the sudden introduction of 
higher visa charges and the introduction of the new points-based immigration system 
caused continual dispute.
604
 In a critique of these policies, the Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR)
605
 was very clear as to the negative consequences: 
“The UK’s education sector makes a valuable contribution 
to the economy, and to export earnings – it is estimated that 
international students bring up to £10 billion into the UK 
economy every year through fees and direct spending 
alone. Education institutions themselves would be badly hit 
by reduced international student numbers, at a time when 
funding is already extremely tight – the potential impacts 
could include job losses, some courses and departments no 
longer being viable, and increased costs for UK students.”606 
 
In its own report, Global Value – The Value of UK Education and Training Exports, 
the British Council also drilled down into the economic impact of overseas students in 
2003-04: 
“[…] the total value of education and training exports to the 
UK economy is a massive £28 billion, compared to those for 
automotive exports (£20 billion), construction exports (£7 
billion), food & drink exports (£9.4 billion), Financial Services 
(£19 billion) and Healthcare Services exports (£14 billion). The 
direct value of education and training exports to the UK 
economy (excluding consultancy) is £12.5 billion (up from £11 
billion in 2004) and the value of international students to the 
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UK economy has risen by 39%, from £6.1 billion in 2004 to 
£8.5 billion.”607 
 
7.4.2 The Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) 
The Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) was a programme originally launched in 1999 
with the aim of increasing the number of non-EU students studying in UK education 
institutions to 75,000 students by the year 2005.
608
 Initially, the programme was 
established to provide the UK education sector with the fundamentals to adapt to 
change, triggered by the increased complexity and competition within the global 
education market which endangered the strong position of UK institutions.
609
 The 
Initiative was rolled-out throughout the British Council’s network of 109 countries, 
with a particular focus on eight designated priority one countries and fourteen priority 
two countries. The first stage was to raise awareness of the UK’s education and 
training offering through the development and launch of the Education UK brand in 
the UK and in priority countries overseas.
610
 Initially Saudi Arabia was a priority two 
country, alongside countries such as Australia and the USA,
611
 but in 2008-9 Saudi 
Arabia became a priority one country alongside the UAE, China, and Russia,
612
 
After the success of the PMI, part two of the initiative (PMI2) was launched in 
April 2006. The programme was a five-year strategy to keep the UK as a leader in 
international education, both in the UK and abroad. Essentially, PMI2 was targeted to 
enhance the overall student satisfaction rating and achieve the ultimate experience of 
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their study and life within the UK as stated by Archer et al.
613
 Tony Blair explained 
the essence of this in a speech on education:  
“[…] it’s not just about getting students to choose UK 
universities and colleges. It’s about building sustainable 
partnerships between our universities and colleges and 
those of other countries. We want to see many more shared 
research projects, shared courses and joint degrees; we 
want to see more exchanges of students and academic staff; 
we want UK education to become genuinely 
international.”614  
 
The main aim of PMI2 was to build long-term international relationships through 
education and training. The programme’s key targets to be achieved by 2011 were as 
follows:  
 Increase international (non-EU) students in UK higher education by 70,000, 
and 30,000 in further education 
 Double the number of countries which send more than 10,000 students each 
year to the UK 
 Improve student satisfaction ratings in the UK  
 Grow and strengthen partnership relationships between the UK and other 
countries including Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Ghana, 
Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, USA and Vietnam.  
As an indication of the success of the PMI programmes, in 2002-3 the British 
Council reported an increase in successful Saudi visa applications of 26 per cent, 
compared to a 47 per cent increase for India, and 40 per cent for China. The British 
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Council argued that new visa requirements “led to a higher quality of applications” 
and it highlighted the work that had been done to ensure that students were aware of 
the requirements for study in the UK and well prepared when they made their 
applications
 615
 It was also pointed out how the new regulations, in not putting off 
applicants, highlighted the ongoing popularity of the UK as a student destination. 
 
7.4.2.1 Benefits 
According to Tony Blair in a speech, PMI2 “[...] prepares our young people for 
careers in the global economy. I am passionate about raising standards in education in 
our country, but that means that we must be willing to learn about the best in the 
world. It means sharing experience and knowledge and being open to innovation and 
creativity from whatever direction it comes.”616 
 Moreover, Arthur 
617
 argued that international students provide both cultural 
and economic benefits that not only have immediate effects, but also far-reaching 
positive consequences. In addition, the motive for UK institutions to participate in 
PMI2 was their urge to retain their wider social mission, such as; developing human 
resources for a competitive global market, researching and contributing to the 
resolving of global issues through international academic, business and government 
partnerships, and promoting international values through understanding cultural 
diversity and engaging with global issues.
618
 It has always been widely accepted that 
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upon finishing their studies, international students serve as powerful ambassadors to 
promote further student exchange as well as project partnerships. 
Specifically, the British Council listed a number of potential benefits for home 
institutions that PMI2 offered. These included adding an international dimension, 
enhancing learning opportunities for students and staff, providing opportunities for 
professional development, student exchange opportunities contributing towards 
international development and skills, strengthening relationships with local and 




 In assessing its achievements and results in line with its initial objectives and 
aims, Archer et al., examined the International Student Experience in the UK by way 
of a survey aimed at all levels of study across participating universities in the UK. 





Figure 30: Mean Satisfaction Score (2007–10). 
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The figure shows the overall mean satisfaction score for PMI index, which reflected a 
significant increase in the learning and living experience, which according to Archer 
remained high at 81 per cent.
621
  
 A Final Evaluation Report was produced in 2011 based on a vast number of 
primary and secondary research; including surveys with institutions and students, 
regular meetings, and consultations with key stakeholders and project managers.
622
 
The report showed the initiative enhanced the UK’s reputation as an international 
education provider. According to the report, most key processes and systems met the 
initial programme objectives. These included: 
 Reaching and engaging a wide range of students, institutions, 
lecturers, and researchers, professional and practitioners and 
various providers;  
 Providing 24/7 information on UK education sector globally;  
 Put in place the foundations for long-term collaborations and 
better understanding of education systems;  
 Encourage and facilitate mobility of students and lecturers;  
 Enable new ideas and concepts to be trailed;  
 Support policy dialogue meetings to be held with a wide 
range of delegates participating;  
  Engage support at high Government level i.e. ministerial 
engagements between countries.”623 
 
A part of the PMI2 projects, known as the HE Partnerships Projects, was able 
to increase the number of partnerships as well as reinforce existing ones. Most 
crucially, PMI2 activities demonstrated an influence on securing and improving the 
UK position as a leading international educational provider. This was evident in the 
student survey that revealed that students experienced high levels of satisfaction with 
the reputation and quality of courses provided by the UK education system, and 
believed that employment and earning prospects would be enhanced from their time 
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in the British system. Additionally, the survey found that employability and the 
opportunity to complement their study with work experience was a key motivation for 
international students. However, the visa and immigration-related issues revealed a 
negative impact. As the Final Evaluation Report (2011) put it these were “[…] 
affected negatively by Cameron’s decision to cancel the 2 year working visa for 
graduated International students.”624  
From another perspective, the survey also reported the benefits related to 
institutions participating in the project. According to the survey, the PMI2 Programme 
influenced the strategic behaviour and internal culture of participating institutions 
towards international students such as focusing on partnerships rather than simply 
student recruitment. PMI2 funding also encouraged a culture of institutional sharing, 




Finally, this initiative was in line with King Abdullah’s initiative for 
Scholarships that effectively contributed to increasing the number of Saudi students in 
British universities from around 3,000 students in 2003, to 7,000 students in 2006, to 
almost 16,000 students with their families, which would be a total of around 26,000 
Saudis in 2012. This initiative also opened the way for the British Council to expand 
the field of co-operation with different Saudi institutions, especially in education, as 
well as to attract British co-operation in the form of major companies such as BAE. 
Interestingly, the contribution of British universities, with the British Council 
in the lead, served to increase awareness amongst Saudis of British Higher Education 
through the university exhibitions held approximately every two years in Jeddah and 









Riyadh. This is what can be inferred through periodic bulletins issued by the main 
branch of the British Council in Riyadh. Furthermore, this initiative also clearly 
displayed educational dealings between the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education and 
British universities. It contributed effectively to contract deals for scientific exchanges 
between a number of Saudi and British universities, such as King Saud University 
with the Universities of Edinburgh and Cambridge in 2007. 
 
7.5 The Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau and the British Council 
The British Council and Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau are cultural institutes in the 
service of the state. However, there are a number of differences in terms of their roles 
and purpose. The British Council is a non-governmental organisation although it 
receives an annual grant in aid from the British government and has offices in 109 
countries around the world, whereas the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau is a 
government institute that is directed by the Saudi Higher Education Ministry and 
sometimes by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with offices in each developed country 
where there are Saudi students.  
The British Council’s purpose is to promote British culture around the world 
and to facilitate cultural exchanges, whereas the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau was 





7.5.1 Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau in London 626 
Since 1964, the Saudi Arabian Educational and Cultural Bureau, formally known as 
the Saudi Arabian Education Mission, has supported the educational and cultural links 
between the UK and Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, this yielded benefits for UK citizens as 
a result of the annual sum of more than £75 million GBP that went into the British 
economy. Simultaneously, such links also brought substantial benefits to Saudi 
Arabian citizens, who were able to access the British higher education institutions.  
In London, the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau has undergone almost 
continuous change due to the growing number of students and roles it performs in the 
UK. For example, in 1967 a section within the Chancery of the Royal Embassy was 
closed and assigned to the Educational Attaché and its growing staff’s needs. Within 
five years, the premises of the Chancery became inadequate to accommodate the 
increased number of personnel required to meet the demands and serve the needs of 
the rapidly growing numbers of Saudi students and trainees, as well as managing the 
Bureau’s evolving responsibilities.  
This required the Bureau to re-locate in 1970, and by 2008, according to a 
report by the Saudi Embassy,
627
 the number of employees had increased to 17 Saudi 
diplomats and 84, mostly British, employees.  
7.5.1.1 Responsibilities of the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau in the 
United Kingdom 
The Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau aims to provide Saudi students with prime 
educational opportunities at highly recognised educational institutions in the UK. 
Essentially, the bureau provides academic and financial support to Saudi students and 
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trainees, allowing them to focus on achieving their academic goals. Additionally, the 
bureau assists in presenting Saudi culture, traditions, and heritage by actively 
participating in academic, cultural, and social activities. It also connects education 
institutions in the UK and Saudi Arabia, in terms of issues relating to culture, 
education, research and science.  
The Bureau is an integrated part of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in the 
City of London. Nevertheless, in its responsibilities relating to administration, finance 
and student affairs, the Bureau follows the instructions of the Saudi Arabian Ministry 
of Higher Education. The responsibilities of the Bureau
628
 are derived from its 
integration into the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. Fundamentally, the Bureau aims 
to represent the Government of Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Higher Education and 
all Saudi Arabian sponsoring agencies, universities and ministries, in relation to the 
education and training of all Saudi students and trainees in the UK.  
Additionally, the Bureau works to initiate, develop and manage education, 
training and cultural programmes between both countries, such as arranging the visits 
of presidents, deans and professors and other education sector leaders as well as 
organising meetings, lectures and conferences between both Saudi Arabian and UK 
institutions. The Bureau is also responsible for negotiating and signing all education 
and training agreements with British Universities and Technical Colleges, and 
ensuring the implementation and monitoring of these agreements. Moreover, the 
Bureau’s mission is to manage the educational, cultural and social affairs of Saudi 
students and trainees in the UK, and provide required assistance financially, 
academically and socially, as well as coordinating between Saudi students, trainees 
and their sponsoring agencies. 







7.5.1.2 Academic Affairs Section in the Saudi Arabian Cultural 
Bureau629 
Academic Affairs has two main divisions, one for medical training and one for 
non-medical students. Moreover, it is responsible for supporting Saudi physicians and 
students throughout their education in all areas – personal as well as professional. It is 
also mandated to supervise and monitor the students’ progress during their placement 
in UK institutions and to deliver reports to the respective Saudi Arabian sponsoring 
agencies through the Cultural Attaché.  
7.5.1.3 Accomplishments of the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau and 
Benefits to the UK630 
The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in London has declared that the Saudi Arabian 
Cultural Bureau has had a substantial impact on the growth and improvement of the 
educational, cultural and scientific relations between the UK and Saudi Arabia. The 
Embassy also considers the performance of the Bureau to directly benefit citizens tin 
the following areas: 
(a) Economic Benefits631 
 During the last 14 years, the Bureau directly spent £384 million GBP on 
students and trainees in the UK. These expenditures can be divided into 
four main categories: 
I. Tuition fees charged by universities and other educational 
institutions;  
II. Expenses relating to students and trainees such as cost of living 
accommodation, food, clothing, items for the course, travel and 
health expenses; 











III. Research allowance costs related to graduate student training and 
field work; 
IV. Office expenses including rent, office equipment, insurance, and 
maintenance. 
 
 Additional expenditures related to the mutual education partnerships 
established by the Bureau and the UK include: 
I. Purchasing scientific equipment from the UK by many Saudi 
bodies such as universities, hospitals, laboratories, research centres, 
public and private organisations; 
II. Recruiting British scholars and experts to work at Saudi 
universities and other education institutions across Saudi Arabia; 
III. Participating and supporting grants from the Saudi Arabian 
Ministry of Higher Education to research projects and scientific 
studies undertaken by UK universities. 
 




This Programme has accomplished three significant objectives: 
- Saudi physicians are trained in specialist medical programmes in 
the UK and return to Saudi Arabia upon completion of their 
training as certified medical specialists in their field; 
- Direct financial benefits offered to the economy of the UK from 
the funds supplied by this programme, in addition to the provision 
of clinical services provided by Saudi doctors to UK hospitals, 
amount to a direct financial benefit of approximately £80 million 
GBP each year, in addition to compensating the current shortage of 
qualified physicians in the UK. 
 







 In 2008 around 400 Saudi physician/trainees who were fully sponsored by 
the Bureau were designated as Medical Residents and Fellows in teaching 
hospitals throughout the UK. This was one of the largest national groups 
of foreign medical trainees in the UK;  
 The sponsorship also covers expenses such as wages, annual tuition fees 
and living expenses including insurance, books, healthcare, dental and 
daily expenses. Such expenditure is estimated at an average of a minimum 
of £60,000 GBP for a single trainee and £100,000 GBP for married 
trainees annually. 
 More importantly, in the UK, a full licence is provided for Saudi medical 
trainees by the local medical licensing authorities. These trainees are fully 
qualified doctors who perform a variety of operations and clinical services, 
at no cost to the UK taxpayer; 
 All Saudi trainees move back to Saudi Arabia after the completion of their 
training to join the Saudi Health Care System. Since 1964, the Bureau has 
provided a vast number of training opportunities and certification for Saudi 
Arabian doctors in the UK, who then return to Saudi Arabia to acquire 
leading positions in major Saudi health service institutions; 
 The Embassy of KSA has not reported any incidents relating to Saudi 
Medical Residents attempting to illegally remain in the UK upon 
completion of their training; 
 To fulfil the growing need for highly qualified Saudi medical specialists 
to implement standard health care requirements in the Kingdom, the Saudi 
Arabian Postgraduate Medical Training Programme in the UK is 





(c) University and College Education Programmes633  
Since its launch the Bureau has been in charge of a growing number of Saudi non-
medical academic (E.S.L., Graduate degrees, Masters, and Doctoral qualifications) 
students enrolling at UK universities and education institutions as international 
students. In 2007, there were an estimated 7,000 non-medical students. Almost all of 
the Saudis who graduate, return to the Kingdom qualified in a variety of fields, 
including engineering, sciences, computer science, law and business. Furthermore, 
since the Bureau was established, it has organised and hosted several scientific 
conferences and symposia in London and Riyadh, as well as hosting UK university 
visits to Saudi Arabia by numerous delegations. 
Recently, Saudi Arabian students and their sponsoring agencies recognised the 
education provided by UK universities and colleges as their favourite choice globally 
to obtain a higher education. The King Abdullah Scholarship Programme annually 
provides scholarships in the UK to around 2,000 selected Saudi students, to undertake 
doctoral and post-doctoral degrees. The increasing trend in Saudi international 
students seeking to enter UK universities and colleges continues to accelerate and is 











7.5.2 The British Council in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
The British Council has over 75 years experience of practicing international cultural 
relations. It always described itself 
634
 as an organisation bringing international 
opportunities for the people of the UK and other countries to life every day and 
building trust between them worldwide. In the process, they are in many ways, 
guardians of some of Britain’s most attractive assets; the English language, the Arts, 
education and the British ways of living and organising society, etc.
635
 Interestingly, 
research has shown, that in 80 countries more people were aware of the British 
Council than the local British embassy.
636
 In Britain, the British Council is far less 
well known outside “academic circles”. This is inherently due to the strategy adopted 
by the Council over the years in response to an “anti-Council” campaign by the 
Beaverbrook Press in the post-war years fuelled by the Beaverbrooks’ anger due to 
being passed over as the Council Director General. 
The British Council’s  conduct in Germany is an excellent example of how the work 
of the Council impacts on local communities. “One of the Council’s staff at its 
headquarters in Cologne” admired the eagerness, enthusiasm and respect the Germans 
have for the British. The Council’s staff was surprised by the fact that the “whole” 
families of German students who were studying at the British Council “would visit 
Britain on a holiday” and spend the summer learning the English language, not just 
because it is an international language, but because it is spoken in the UK. What was 
acknowledged, particularly among younger Germans, was the feeling that their 
country and Britain are both “moving towards each other”, the Council staff noted. 
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Additionally, the Council’s staff member commented that the German attitude 
towards Britain was that the ‘UK was rather nice’ where Germans recognise English-




The British Council always publishes their earnings.  Approximately 75 per 
cent of the British Council’s annual turnover of £739 million GBP is from services, 
which customers pay for, including education and development contracts that it bids 
for, and from partnerships. A UK Government grant provides the remaining 25 per 
cent. As stated in 2012, they  match every £1 GBP of core public funding with over 
£3 GBP earned in pursuit of their charitable purposes. 
638
 
7.5.2.1  Some British Council Activities in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 
In the spring and summer of 1999, the British Council surveyed perceptions of the 
United Kingdom in several countries, including Saudi Arabia, and produced a report 
entitled Through Other Eyes: How the World sees the United Kingdom. According to 
this study, 81 per cent of Saudis sampled believed that the United Kingdom valued 
its relationship with Saudi Arabia.
639
 The British Council and the British Embassy in 




“The UK through the British Council is partnering with Saudi 
Arabia on a broad range of education-related activity. This 
includes advice on English language teaching, school 
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leadership, institutional partnerships and qualifications and 
accreditation.” 
 
This has also resulted in a shift, in terms of how and in what ways, Saudi students are 
examined. A British Council report from 2010 noted that the “the number of exams 
undertaken with the British Council has risen from 25,000 four years ago to 50,000 
[in 2010]. [...] The area of greatest growth has been the International English 
Language Testing System (IELTS) which is the English language requirement for 
access to English medium university courses across the globe.”641 
The British Council runs a Skills for Employability project and is also engaged 
with different employees training in the Kingdom under the Technical and Vocational 
Training Corporation (TVTC) agreement, which the British Council facilitated by 
signing scholarship agreements with 11 British universities. In 2010, Prince Andrew 
met Saudi students at the British Council men’s centre in Riyadh in a special English 
class where the students were part of the TVTC agreement.
642
 According to this 
agreement, the scholarship programmes were to run for four years, beginning in 
September 2010. Students were “expected to complete three years of study in the UK 
to be awarded degrees in different applied specialisations.” This was also the first 
time that women would have an opportunity “to do an applied degree in the UK 
through TVTC. “ 
BAE Systems Saudi Arabia (British Aerospace) has run a Post-Doctoral 
Summer Research (PDSR) Programme in Saudi Arabia since 1991. It is an academic 
research collaboration programme developed by the British Council which enables 
Saudi academics to work alongside their British counterparts. The programme also 
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increases their insight into the range and quality of British Higher Education. Over 
426 Saudi researchers have conducted research secondments in Britain under the 
programme over 20 years.
643
 
One aspect of education exchange the British Council has been actively 
involved in is to encourage Saudis to apply for scholarships to study in the UK. When 
inviting Saudi students to apply for the Chevening Scholarship, sponsored by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Peter Grout, the former Deputy Director of the 
Council in the Kingdom, was keen to stress that “These scholarships […] are intended 
for graduate professionals of outstanding ability. They will give the opportunity for 
further study or training in any subject at British universities or other accredited 
training institutions and in an area of importance to relations between Britain and 
Saudi Arabia.”644 
 
The British Council Trust Pays Report 645 
In addition to its core remit, the British Council also contributes to research and 
studies about the opinions of foreigners to British society, Higher Education, and 
cultural relations, published for the public on the Web sites. It is the opinion of the 
author of this research role could be one of the most important tasks performed by the 
Council in order to clarify concepts and data related to their work and structure 
activities to achieve their goals.  
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One of these studies relates to Trust Pays, a survey “commissioned to measure 
the levels of trust towards the UK among […] young adults […] educated to at least 
secondary level, in 10 countries of strategic importance to the UK’s future.” 646 This 
report attempted to understand the role of international cultural relationships in 
building trust in the UK and how this influenced business and trade with the UK 
based on the principle that trust is a key aspect that underpins better economic growth 
and success. The research was divided into two stages; the first stage was carried out 
by YouGov in 2010, whereas Ipsos Mori undertook the second stage in 2011. 
Collectively, the research covered ten countries “which are important to the UK’s 
future prosperity, security and wider strategic interests.” The countries covered were 
“the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China; two European democracies – 
Spain and Poland; a significant player in South East Asia, Thailand; along with three 
predominantly Muslim countries of global significance Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and 
Turkey.” All of them were chosen as key trading partners of the UK as well as 
economic competitors of Britain.  
The participants were selected to take into account a number of factors, such 
as the traditional connections to the UK and issues of importance to the UK on 
economic, security and strategic levels. The Saudi online sample covered 520 young 
people aged 16/18-34 who were educated to at least secondary level, active online, 
and living in major urban areas. The reason for selecting this sample was justified on 
the following grounds: 
“these young people are not necessarily representative of their 
entire country populations but they do reflect their respective 
societies’ ’future influencers’ and ‘young people with 
potential.’ They are also the key group within their societies 
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who will drive long–term international and business 
engagement.” 
 
The study investigated “respondents’ willingness to engage with the UK in relation to 
business, tourism, education and arts.” The results were analysed by the level of trust 
expressed in people of the UK. The study mainly focused on benchmarking trust 
towards UK people in comparison with key contenders in the market; the US and 
Germany. The results highlighted the high trust in UK people compared with 
international competitors. 
Figure 31 shows the results of the Trust Pays study for the 10 countries 
analysed and compared the results to Germany and the US. The y-axis shows the level 
of trust, expressed as a percentage and overall the UK enjoyed a positive level of trust 
in most of the countries examined, certainly better than the US in all countries aside 
from Thailand, where there seemed to be little difference. 
 
 
Figure 22: The UK Compares well against International Competitors in the level of Trust 







The one exception to the positive level of trust was from Saudi Arabia, which among 
all the Muslim countries examined consistently gave negative levels of trust of around 
-10 per cent, although a later part of the study showed that British people were trusted 
more than the government. The study concluded that the UK enjoyed higher levels of 
trust from the other Muslim countries examined because of long-standing trade links 
and the links through the Commonwealth. The low levels of trust shown by the young 
people of Saudi Arabia were reinforced by other studies, where 
 “its conclusions [were] somewhat supported by [other] 
sources, such as the Arab Youth Survey 2013. […] This poll 
surveyed young people from 16 Arab countries, including 
Saudi Arabia, and found a favourable rating for the UK of only 
32%, lower than that of France (44%) and Germany (39%), and 
just above the US (30%).The Arab Youth survey cautiously 
attributes this to a decline in favourability toward ‘traditional 
regional powers’ such as the UK and US.”647 
 
Hence it may be concluded that although the British Council is making strenuous 
efforts to improve the standing of the UK in Saudi Arabia, among some young people, 
who are increasingly influenced by what they see in a rapidly-changing news cycle 
and on social media, the UK – which is often seen as “shoulder to shoulder” with the 
US since the 9/11 attacks – does not receive the level of trust that it would like. Such 
a result would not be enhanced by the unfriendly reporting of some newspapers and 
other parts of the British media, as we showed in chapter 6. 
However, British public opinion of Saudi Arabia appears to be similarly poor. 
In 2012, the Hard Choices Ahead report from Chatham house showed that only two 
per cent of 2,000 people surveyed picked Saudi Arabia as a country to which they 
                                                 
 






 and a Pew Research survey in the US found that the 
British public expressed 
“similarly negative views of Saudi Arabia […] with regard to 
their perception of the Saudi government's respect for human 
rights. When British participants were asked if they thought 
that the government of Saudi Arabia respects the personal 
freedoms of its people, 69% said no, and only 12% said 
yes.”649 
 
However, the low levels of trust found in the Trust Pays survey were more complex 
than a simple analysis suggest. Where young people from Saudi appeared to be in the 
lowest position among the 10 countries examined, when the researchers differentiated 
between “those who had been involved in some form of international activity with the 
UK and those who hadn’t” there was a clear 14 per cent difference in levels of trust, 
which that could suggest a lack of knowledge between the people of both countries 
was a more significant factor when looking at trust. Although there have been few 
diplomatic tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UK in the last 4 decades since 
1973, this might suggest that the actions of the two governments and their peoples’ 
level of trust are not always aligned.
650
 
Additionally, the study emphasised the relationship between trust and cultural 
relations. The aim was mainly to understand how trust affected individuals to 
potentially visit the UK as a tourist, or who might like to live in the UK and bring up a 
family, study in the UK, develop their own business links and contacts with UK 
citizens, and enjoy artistic, creative and cultural activities. Essentially, the research 
studied these issues taking into account the level of trust among people, family ties in 
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the UK, level of English language and cultural experience with the UK. Using 
statistical modelling, the survey calculated the ‘Odds Ratio’ and identified eight 
factors that would effect to what degree people would be “trusted” (Figure 32). The 
results echoed that of the 14 per cent difference in levels of trust found in Saudi 
Arabia and concluded that for the 10 countries, “somebody who has been involved in 
cultural relations activities with the UK is 23 per cent more likely to trust people from 
the UK than somebody who has not.”651 
 
Figure 23: Predictors of Trust in People from the UK. 
 
Furthermore, “a young person who is aware of the British Council – and for many that 
will be via participation in a British Council programme – is more likely to trust 
people from the UK than one who is not aware. And this uplift in trust comes in 
addition to the basic uplift through participation in any UK oriented cultural relations 
programme.”652 The results confirm the influential role that the British Council plays 
in increasing trust in the UK and its citizens. The Trust Pays study supported many 
British Council case studies and programme evaluations and concluded that;  








“cultural relations is an effective tool to increase trust between 
individuals internationally. It does so by helping young people 
learn English, build friendships and contacts with people from 
the UK and by giving them direct experience of contemporary 






Figure 33: Percentage net trust in people from the UK among people from 10 Countries 
 
When the Trust Pays study looked at the influence of the work of the British Council 
over non-British Council cultural activities in the 10 countries, there were consistently 
high levels of trust associated with the work of the British Council compared with 
non-British Council activities, or no experience of cultural relations at all (Figure 33). 
The results are very interesting, particularly in terms of the Saudi response where 
“Saudi nationals who have been involved in ‘cultural relations activities’ with the 
British Council have positive levels of ‘net trust’ in people from the UK, unlike those 
who have had no contact with the UK, who have overall negative net levels of 
trust.”654 As the report noted: 
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“Even in the lowest trust environment of the ten countries 
measured – Saudi Arabia – there is a difference […] between 
those who have and those who have not been involved in 
cultural relations with the UK. Indeed, involvement in cultural 
relations among Saudi Arabian participants was associated with 
a shift from a ‘net negative’ to a ‘net positive’ position of trust 
towards people from the UK.”655 
 
One of the positive outcomes for this report was that the work of the British Council 
was held in much greater esteem than the work of other UK organisations providing 
cultural activities in Saudi Arabia. As the results clearly show, even though some 
Saudis may have had cultural relations with British people and businesses, the support 
of the British Council provides the expertise to make such relations a more fulfilling 
experience and increase levels of trust. 
Building on the work of the Trust Pays report, the Culture Means Business 
report formed the second part of the analysis and looked at “the relationship between 
involvement in cultural activities, levels of trust and interest in business and trade 
with the UK.” Part of this report looked at the study opportunities in the UK, US, 
France and Germany and when asked to recommend countries to study, “the UK is 
the most commonly recommended of the four destinations in all countries other than 
Saudi Arabia, where it is on a par with the US.”656 The conclusion here is that for 
Saudis there is little difference to choose from between US universities and their UK 
counterparts and that students would sooner choose a UK or US university, where the 
common language is English, than study in Europe, again perhaps because of the 
language difficulties. In the Foreword to the Trust Pays report, Sir Roger Carr, the 
Chairman of Centrica and President of the CBI (The Confederation of British 
Industry), concluded that;  
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“[the] relationship between trust and an increased openness to 
the UK and its people holds true, not just in Europe and in the 
Commonwealth, but also in many of the countries where we do 
not have such a strong traditional relationship and which will 
be vital to the UK’s future. In […] places important to our 
security or strategic interests such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, 
this relationship between cultural relations and increased trust 
is strong.”657 
 
The significant difference between the positive levels of trust enjoyed by the UK for 
nine of the 10 countries examined in the report, and the negative levels of trust in the 
young people from Saudi Arabia is clearly a subject that concerns the British 
government, who commented:  
“Evidence of negative perceptions of the UK among young 
Saudis is deeply concerning, particularly in a state in which 
over 60% of the population is under 30 years old. It is difficult 
with so little evidence to draw conclusions as to the reason for 
the low level of trust in the UK.”658 
 
One reason for the lows levels of trust may well have been explored by the Trust Pays 
report and by the activities of the British Council, and that is knowledge and 
experience of working with the UK and its citizens. Clearly the report established that 
where there is no cultural exchange, and information about another nation or people is 
obtained purely by second-hand means; through the media, social media or negative 
comments from one’s peers, then that information may be prejudiced or inaccurate 
and lead to a negative impression or level of trust, The same holds true for UK 
citizens with a negative impression of Saudi Arabia. Yet when people have practical 
experience of working or studying with another country then their existing 
perceptions are challenged, and as the report shows levels of trust are greatly 
increased. 
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So it is important, I feel, that much more emphasis and effort is made by the 
British government and the British Council, and in turn by the Saudi government and 
the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau, to invest more in cultural exchange and cultural 
diplomacy. In the long term, such cultural exchange can only benefit the public 



















Although economics, trade and investment are always cited as positive examples of 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Britain, it is the contention of this final chapter 
that education and cultural exchange are also significant factors in promoting bilateral 
ties. As shown above, education could play an essential and pivotal role in creating 
bridges of contact and understanding between the British and Saudi people.  
In comments on International education, Martin Davidson, former CEO of 
the British Council, summarised the value of education exchange when he wrote: 
“[F]or the UK, international education is not merely an export 
industry. It enriches our society in many ways by deepening 
our awareness and understanding of other cultures, and 
likewise deepening others’ awareness and understanding of our 
own. The presence of international students helps to ensure that 
a greater diversity of programmes is available for home 
students; they provide a driver to maintain high quality course 
provision as UK universities compete in an increasingly 
competitive market to attract them; they enrich the diversity of 
campuses and communities and help to broaden the outlook 
and understanding of UK students as they prepare to join a 
global workplace.”659 
 
This concept is central to the work of organisations like the British Council and the 
Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau, and should be at the forefront of all cultural and 
diplomatic policy decisions. Students engaged in everyday life are immersed in 
British culture while they are in the UK, and on their return they not only take with 
them increased knowledge through education, but they also take an increased 
awareness of another culture. Hence, in the future, when they interact with members 
of that culture, they are fully aware not only of the needs of that culture, but of the 
differences of that culture to their own. This is one aspect that governments forget in 
their negotiations with other nations, and is especially true of a relationship such as 
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the Anglo-Saudi relationship, where on the one side we have a secular culture and on 
the other side the culture is steeped in Islamic culture and history; governments forget 
that not only are relationships built between nations at diplomatic levels but they are 
also built at personal levels.  
“While relations between the UK and Saudi Arabia have 
traditionally been conducted at the level of ruling elites, 
including the Royal Families, links are increasingly being 
forged between the broader societies as well. There are sizeable 
expatriate communities in each country: 34,000 Saudis were 
resident in the UK and 20,000 British nationals were resident in 
Saudi Arabia in 2012. Saudi Arabia is not a tourist destination 
for Britons, but over 70,000 British Muslims visit on 
pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina each year, and British 
Muslims make up the largest contingent from a Western state 
to the annual Hajj. The UK, particularly London, is considered 
a tourist destination, and over 100,000 visits were made from 
Saudi Arabia last year, making the UK the European country 
most visited by Saudis in most years.”660 
 
There are also other aspects of educational co-operation that have been made 
throughout the decades between Saudi Arabia and Britain, notably language-learning 
exchanges. Britain has hosted large numbers of Saudi students learning English, just 
as the British Council has done from its Saudi operations. Interestingly it has been 
British universities, rather than their Saudi counterparts, who have looked to meet the 
demand of those wanting to learn Arabic. It is argued in this chapter that Saudi Arabia 
could look to play a much more significant role in this educational pursuit in the 
future, by creating specialised Arabic teaching centres and institutes that at the same 
time introduce the Arab Islamic cultural heritage to Britain.
661
 Equally important is 
the need to expand opportunities for learning Arabic to the British and others in Saudi 
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Arabia, through the provision of scholarships for Britons inside Saudi for this 
purpose. What distinguishes this option from the former suggestion is that it requires 
total immersion in Arabic language study and in everyday Arab life, which has 
positive implications for larger and deeper understanding of Saudi and Arab culture in 
general. A concept perhaps, for future promoters of Anglo-Saudi cultural relations to 
aspire to achieve. 
As has been discussed quite extensively in this chapter, especially with 
reference to the Trust Pays report, is the fact that in Saudis who have had little 
cultural interaction with the British, and similarly in the British who have had little or 
no contact with their Saudi counterparts, there is little trust between the two nations. 
We have also seen in previous chapters how negative representation in the media, and 
the tendency for the British media, particularly the tabloid press, to sensationalise any 
story about Saudi Arabia as a mixture of barbarism and terrorism, can lead to a deep-
seated feeling of mistrust. So although “the UK was generally viewed quite positively 
by the Saudi leadership, [there was] a mixture of [...] ignorance and attraction among 
the wider Saudi population.”662  
“The British Council also contributes to people-to-people trust 
and understanding, promoting Britain through education, art, 
and social initiatives. With offices and teaching centres in 
Riyadh, Jeddah and Al-Khobar, it boasts a strong presence in 
Saudi Arabia and told us that it was ‘recognised as a trusted 
partner by both governments and by civil society.’ It provides 
English language teaching and training to 15,000 students, as 
well as working with the Saudi Ministry of Education, 
universities and private schools. The British Council claimed to 
be dominant in this area, telling us that ‘the scale of our work 
in English is unrivalled by US and other European cultural 
relations analogues in Saudi.’ The British Council also 
emphasised the arts as a means of connecting the Saudi and 
British societies, highlighting the success of their Out of 
Britain touring exhibition of contemporary British art and the 
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British Museum’s Hajj exhibition. Therefore, the 2012 British 
Council poll provides support for the British Council's claims 
to improve trust in people from the UK.”663 
 
We have shown that the Saudi government in particular, especially since the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 in the US and 7/7 in London, have been keen to promote scholarships 
abroad, and the UK economy and culture have benefitted from this. The scholarships 
have mainly been directed at the young, who are considered vital for the future 
development of Saudi Arabia, however, there are still high levels of mistrust between 
the citizens of the two nations. The work of the British Council in Saudi Arabia, and 
the Prime Minister’s Initiatives run under the last British Labour government went a 
long way to addressing these issues. In addition British Ambassadors have written 
columns in Saudi newspapers to “provide a sense of British views and values to the 
readership”664 and the British Embassy runs a Facebook page and twitter feed, with 
over 11,000 followers to report events and news. 
 “In an example of its outreach work, the Embassy has 
launched a photo competition open to the general public ‘to 
search for the best image which demonstrates the 
friendship between UK and Saudi Arabia’”.665 
Consideration of education and cultural exchange cannot be completely concluded 
without considering the work of the BBC Arabic language service. Part of the BBC 
World Service, the BBC Arabic service delivers news in Arabic for and about the 
Middle East. At the end of 2014, the BBC World Service reported record viewing 
figures for its Arabic Service across the Middle East with 31,500,000 weekly viewers, 
an increase of 13 per cent over the previous year, and online services were 50 per cent 









higher than the previous year
666
. In Saudi Arabia, BBC Arabic achieved its targets to 
have the highest ratings of any international television channel in the Arab world for 
key Trust indicators over Al Jazeera, Al Hurra and Al Arabiya.
667
 
Governments are becoming increasingly aware of the usefulness of cultural 
diplomacy and education exchange The Foreign Affairs Committee concluded with a 
recommendation towards Anglo-Saudi cultural relations:  
 “We recommend that the Government set out in response to 
this report any research it has conducted on the public 
perception of the UK in Saudi Arabia, and its views on the 




In response, the British government said that it was “concerned about any negative 
perception of the UK within Saudi Arabia,” but seemed to dispute the findings of the 
Trust Pays report, saying that, “there is little evidence available regarding Saudi 
perceptions of the UK or other countries [and] UK continues to be the second most 
popular destination for Saudi students overseas, after the United States.”669 However, 
the government did admit that Saudi Arabia is a “critical partner” for the UK and 
expressed an interest in reopening the Two Kingdoms Dialogue, which had stalled in 
2009 after the election of the British Coalition government in 2010. In terms of 
bilateral relations, the British government did acknowledge the work of the British 
Council, when it praised the Council’s “Connecting Classrooms” programme. 
However, much of the response was concerned with increasing business activities, 
citing the presence of Saudi Arabia in an “unstable region” as a reason for increased 
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business activities, and little attention was giving to helping students and education, 
for example reviewing the costs and tariffs associated with visas.
670
 
“Many in the Gulf, and especially in Saudi Arabia, believe that 
their society is often misrepresented in the West; this belief is 
not without foundation, and is expressed forcefully at all levels 
of society. By the same token, the European Commission has 
been concerned to find ways of expanding understanding of 
Europe, its institutions and society, among the younger 
generation of the Gulf, in part to underpin future relations.”671 
 
The emphasis on the promotion of business over education seems to be one factor that 
makes bilateral relations so complicated, particularly with relation to trust issues, as 
has been shown on many levels. One solution to this could be the expansion of 
student exchanges in both countries, and the inclusion of “European studies” in the 
curriculum of Saudi universities. As discussed previously, earlier attempts to create 
bilateral relations through education in Europe fell victim “to the overall collapse of 
the [1995 EU/GCC agreement].”672 
The availability of a host of British government scholarships such as the 
Chevening Scholarship is well known as a significant “pull factor” for Saudi students. 
Given this, the recent popularity of Saudi government scholarships could not just be 
viewed as a contributing factor for expanding international student enrolments
673
 but 
could also be a great opportunity for both countries to mutually enhance their image, 
close the cultural gap, and build bridges.  
This issue of cultural diplomacy, exchange, and relations, or as it was 
described by Nonneman as the “‘soft’ side of international relations,” has been left 
underdeveloped, with governments on both sides being more interested in the “hard” 
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aspects of the relationship such as “oil; trade and investment; security; regional 
politics; relations between the EU and the GCC; ‘and cultural understanding.’”674  
Although it is evident that more scholars and authors like Nonneman have 
started to recognise and use the term “cultural” in their articles and essays about 
relations with Saudi Arabia, there is still no clear view on the strategy of these 
countries in how they will deal “culturally” with Saudi Arabia. 
During an informal conversation with Daniel Kawczynski MP, in analysis of 
the relations between both countries he thinks that they are nothing like as fruitful as 
they should be. He gained this opinion from just the economic side, where he 
commented: 
“Bilateral trade with United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia is very 
small in comparison with other countries, I think we export 
only […] five or six billion pounds a year with Saudi Arabia. 
It’s over 12 billion pounds with the United Arab Emirates, so 
it’s double than it is with Saudi. There are over 130,000 British 
people living in the United Arab Emirates so I think because of 
the restrictions on visas and because of the lack of interest by 
many Saudi organisations in promoting opportunities within 
Saudi Arabia, British business people, and politicians, and 
others go to other parts of the Gulf rather than Saudi Arabia; 
like Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Oman. If you 
bear in mind the size of Saudi Arabia and the population, 
British/Saudi interaction is fractional compared to the 
interaction with other Gulf states.” 
 
Such an impression clearly affected his ability to conduct his own affairs as Chairman 
of the All-party Committee on Saudi Arabia, and he had been trying to provide a 
solution for a long time. Overall he felt it was, 
 
“very disappointing from my perspective because I’m the 
Chairman and I want to promote Anglo-Saudi relations, and I 
feel very strongly about the importance of Anglo-Saudi Arab 
relations both economically, strategically, and from a security 
                                                 
 





perspective. And yet the most important thing is for the people 
to get to know one another and learn about each other and have 
these cultural exchanges and economic exchanges. [But] it’s 
not happening between the United Kingdom and Saudi 
Arabia.” 
 
He continued:  
“So that’s very disappointing and there are very few British 
people living in Saudi Arabia and that’s a problem that Saudi 
needs to be more proactive in. For example, the other day [I 
went] to the Lancaster Hotel where there was a huge 
conference organised by the Emirates government. It was 
called “The Abu Dhabi Investment Forum” and there were 
people from all over the UAE that came specifically to engage 
with British companies to talk about the opportunities of 
bilateral trade. I’ve never come across anything like this by 
Saudi, I’ve never come across any and I’ve been the Chairman 
of the all-party group for Saudi for six or seven years. I’ve 
never come across the Saudi Investment Forum or Saudis 
coming here to talk about opportunities and so it’s very 
difficult.” 
 
Therefore, Daniel gave his opinion as to what Saudi should do to enhance the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and the British. He raised other very important 
points that should be considered: 
“People know very little about Saudi in this country and I will 
say […] the best thing they can do is to open up the Red Sea to 
tourism, because if people see something for themselves, the 
picture says more than thousands words. If you go to Saudi you 
see how beautiful the country is and how kind the people are 
and how warm they are. Saudi will sell itself to the British 
people. This why the relation with UAE is so strong, because 
the Emirates come here and the British go to the Emirates. The 
bond, the relationship and the friendship between the Emirates 
and the United Kingdom is profound. […] I understand the 
concerns the Saudi have, they have Makkah. Of course they 
will be restrictions, at the Vatican City you wouldn’t have 
people coming with beach towels on the steps of the Vatican, 
and I understand that the Saudi and custodians of the two holy 
mosques [want] to maintain some sort of semblance of 
propriety and of course they don’t want mass tourism like you 
will see in certain parts of Europe. But if they were to open up 




people come and visit Saudi on a cultural basis, that will do a 
huge amount.” 
 
Recognising the cultural differences, he commented: 
“I'm not asking them to set up ‘drink as much as you like’ bars 
and resorts with sunbathing, I could imagine what it could go 
down like in Saudi, but I'm saying if they really want to engage 
with Europeans, these restrictions on tourism are a huge 
impediment to that.” 
 
Daniel also raised the work of the Embassy and the cultural centres: 
 
“The Saudi Embassy is very good here, but I think they have to 
have a massive campaign to promote their country and the 
opportunities of engaging Saudis with the United Kingdom. 
E.g. have conferences, economic conferences where they bring 
their business people, like the Emiratis do. There should be an 
annual Saudi trade investment fair in London, once a year, 
where all businesses in Saudi Arabia can come to London and 
advertise what opportunities there are, because the more 
business engagement there is between the two countries the 
more likely there is to have better understanding.” 
 
“Now, we need to do things to promote the United Kingdom 
also, and I really wonder sometimes what the people of Saudi 
Arabia think of Britain. My only personal experience is 
walking in the park in Riyadh by myself. I was amazed at the 
number of children who are wearing Manchester United 
football shirts and English football shirts and they were very 
interested in English football, I should say. And they wanted to 
interact with me. I think these children and people wanted to 
share their food and picnic with me, people very, very 
welcoming and warm in Saudi Arabia. So I think the United 
Kingdom has to do more to understand about Saudi and Saudi 
opportunities, and no matter how difficult the visa restrictions 
are to try to find business out there. Saudi is a huge trade circle 
and there are opportunities for British companies to operate in 
Saudi. And yet because of the restrictions they tend to go the 
UAE as I said, to the other Gulf states, and as long that happens 
natural relations and understanding between the UK and Saudi 
will never be like the other Arab States, and that for me is very 
sad.” 
 
Daniel summarised one of the main problem between both countries, which in 




I am writing a book about Saudi Arabia to talk about about the 
positive aspects of Saudi society, because all you hear in this 
country are negative stories about Saudi Arabia. So what 
happens is the Press is very focused, in my view, […] on 
promoting negative stories about the Kingdom. So whether it’s 
to do with restrictions on women being able to drive, whether 
it’s issues to do with capital punishment, there are a lot of 
negative perceptions and these are propagated by newspapers 
and the media. So my book is an attempt to talk about the huge 
progress that Saudi is making in terms of modernising society. 
The development and growth of women’s rights and how the 
country is expanding and opening up opportunities for 
development. So it tries to portray a positive aspect of Saudi 
and to explain the importance of British engagement with 
Saudi Arabia.” 
 
When asked about his personal feelings about Saudi Arabia, Daniel commented: 
“People don’t understand why I’m very pro-Saudi and I get 
criticised here in Parliament for being very pro-Saudi, People’s 
perceptions are very negative. So I say to other MPs what’s the 
first thing that comes into your mind when I say ‘Saudi 
Arabia?’ Most of them […] accuse Saudi Arabia of all sorts of 
negative things because there is a lack of understanding about 
Saudi Arabia and the media deliberately try to portray Saudi 
Arabia as a highly restricted, undemocratic society. So my 
book is trying to counterbalance that really.” 
  
“The other thing you should know is that every time I take 
delegations of members of Parliament to Saudi Arabia, and last 
time I took 12 members of parliament, making it the largest 
ever British parliamentary delegation to Saudi Arabia, and 
every single one of those 12 parliamentarians who came with 
me, every single one of them, came away with a very positive 
view of Saudi Arabia. Because they visited Saudi Arabia, they 
met with women’s rights organisations. So they spoke to 
women directly, they talked to human rights NGOs, they spoke 
to ordinary men and women on the streets of Riyadh. So you 
know they had the opportunity of finding out what Saudi is 
really like rather than the propaganda.” 
 
He was very critical of the attitude of the British media in terms of the news that was 
being reported about Saudi Arabia: 
 “I would almost always go as far as to say [that it is] 
propaganda that is spewed out by the British media against 
Saudi Arabia. I mean is Saudi a perfect society? No, probably it 
isn’t, which society is? Do we have more or less in this 




about human rights and how they should behave but we have a 
saying in the Bible ‘let him without fault cast the first stone.’ 
So you know we are not perfect by any means as a society in 
this country and so I think we have to be more understanding 
about the different nature of other people’s societies.” 
 
 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Middle Eastern wars of the beginning of 
this century, the issue of Anglo-Saudi cultural relations has never been more uncertain 
since the days when such relations began in earnest during the 1970s. Both countries 
need to demonstrate yet again the balance between the need to reinvigorate bilateral 
relations and the need to take advantage of the available cultural tools and have the 
ability to create innovative cultural exchanges. Effort should also be made in 
establishing methods in order to achieve a measure of balancing cultural links, and 
correcting the image of both countries to build trust among the people and enhance 
other relations. 
 
At present, nearly every Saudi family has one or more of its children studying 
abroad, with the total number of such students approaching 200,000. Because of the 
close ties that are characteristic of Saudi families, those of them who have students 
studying abroad follow the news of the countries where their relatives are studying, 
including the weather forecast, as Abd al-Ilah Saati, a Saudi writer, mentions. This 
has a very positive effect as both the student and his or her family get to know a 
different culture. The author remember the time when a volcano erupted in Europe in 
2011 affecting air travel and British airports were closed for several days. People in 
Saudi Arabia were always talking about this with much apprehension and expectation, 
following the situation and its developments very closely. The same sort of interest 




families who had relatives in Britain took much interest and followed developments 
as though they were in Britain. Needless to say, interest in such matters was never 
previously at the same level.  
The Saudi attachés reporting to the Ministry of Higher Education at Saudi 
Embassies have been called ‘cultural’, while they undertake an important, but purely 
educational role. The researcher considers that there is urgent need that the Saudi 
Cultural Bureau at the Saudi Embassy in London opens branch offices in a number of 
the major British cities such as Manchester, Edinburgh and Cardiff, as the number of 
Saudi students in Britain continues to increase. So far, the administrative role of the 
Cultural Attachés in different countries has enabled them to supervise the students 
from the educational and formal points of view. They do not appear to have a clear 
cultural role that enables them to build cultural bridges that are seen and felt by the 
local population and the Saudi students and nationals. They need to be more proactive 
in communication with Saudi students. They can easily adopt a number of effective 
technological tools to ensure that the students are well aware of the different aspects 
of life in the country, its laws and regulations, their own safety and what precautions 
they need to take for their own security in the cities where they live. This can be done 
on an on-going basis through useful electronic applications.  
This role of spreading awareness is not an exclusive one to the Cultural Attaché. The 
Saudi Embassy is an important partner in this area. It must by fully active in 
establishing a clear cultural tie between Saudi students and the country they are in.  
 
Saudi Students’ Clubs, which are available in all British cities, should be more 
active and better supported. Most of these clubs do not actively interact with the 




present Saudi Arabia and remove barriers between Saudi and British people. The 
clubs are content to have their core membership and are happy to go ahead with their 
function, regardless of the limited number of people present. They thus fall short of 
interacting with all students. Moreover, they should endeavour to open channels 
between Saudi and other students in the British universities. Such channels help to 
achieve the objectives already mentioned and help to exchange views and expertise. 
This is certainly one of the main reasons for the establishment of these student clubs 
in Britain, as appears in the announcement of their establishment. Yet they do little in 
this regard.    
It seems clear that the role played by higher education, as well its various types and 
programmes, whether learning English; teaching Arabic; studying abroad; and student 
exchanges, in creating and promoting bridges of understanding, communication and 
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Britain are valuable.  It is also true that more 
opportunities, initiatives and projects could be made to contribute towards creating 
even more of these bridges and strengthen and consolidate existing ones.  
At the same time, when students are engaged with the detail of learning about 
everyday life in British culture, especially as many of them live with British host 
families during their learning period, it could be argued that this daily coexistence 
would create an ideal atmosphere for dialogue and discussion, thus providing a 
greater understanding of others and working to bring the views of different people 
together, strengthen ties and build bridges of understanding.  
The other aspect of education co-operation between Saudi and Britain over the years 
is language-learning exchange. It is important that Saudi Arabia, the GCC and the 
whole Arab states at this point should assume responsibility for the Arabic language 




could be burdening on the economy, Saudi Arabia and the GCC as they have a greater 
financial capacity than other Arab states, should provide a greater number of 
opportunities to learn about the Arabic language and Arab culture, both within their 
own countries and abroad.  
If Saudi Arabia had taken this initiative, no doubt such a project would have a large 
impact on strengthening relations and building bridges of understanding, not merely 
between Saudi Arabia and other countries, which have placed such projects in them, 
but also the GCC and the Arab states.  The Saudi government could take advantage of 
students who are sent to study abroad, and who are in large numbers, in Arabic 
language teaching according to their competence and efficiency, which would be 
mutually beneficial. In the meantime, the work would be from both sides, not just 
supported by one side, to improve cultural relations, which is represented here in this 
research by Britain. 
This initiative was supported by the “growing demand for learning Arabic in 
Britain”  as Alansari  said, as previously mentioned. Britain and Saudi Arabia could 
play an important role for the success of this initiative, especially if there was a co-
operation between Gulf states for this initiative.  As previously mentioned Saudi 
Arabia - with support from the GCC - can expand in providing opportunities to learn 
Arabic in Britain through the creation of specialised Arabic teaching centres and 
institutes, and introducing the Arab Islamic cultural heritage  into Britain.  
Equally important, if not the most important, is the need to expand opportunities for 
learning Arabic to the British and others in Saudi Arabia, and the GCC as well, 
through the provision of scholarships for Britons inside Saudi for this purpose. What 
distinguishes this option from the former suggestion is two things; the birth of young 




everyday Arabic life from a young age, which has positive implications in providing a 
larger and deeper understanding of Saudi and Arabic culture in general; and a real 
British presence in the GCC countries. 
 
Evaluation of this study, especially in these uncertain and turbulent days, is 
complicated, as their effects are hard to assess without examining some new 
phenomena which have only been touched lightly, such as the role of the information 
technology revolution, Saudi student clubs and the various Arab revolutions that are 
taking place during the writing of this thesis. 
However, it is hoped that this thesis might be a springboard to promote an in-
depth evaluation of Anglo-Saudi cultural diplomacy efforts on both sides. Without 
doubt, after studying many of the factors and events that have been raised, the 
conclusion is that bilateral cultural relations between Saudi Arabia and the UK are 
extremely complex, and it can only be suggested that after taking some of these 
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 Lt. (Frank Brown) mediates the pilot (Hugh Black) and co-pilot (Peter 








 Saudi Minister Commissioner in Britain (Hafiz Wahba) on a visit to the first 
batch of students at the Air Bases in Britain. 





















 Dhahran Riyadh Jeddah 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
London - 42,351 34,598 2,456 2,768 4,382 6,232 12,602 20,552 40,672 60,446 76,949 72,700 
Frankfurt 753 7,140 2,306 1,012 1,009 667 487 - - - 1,550 10,199 14,178 
Rome - 16,957 5,497 - - - 3,596 3,548 4,819 7,514 14,184 22,454 31,185 
Paris 58 6,660 10,718 - - - - - - - - 17,436 28,824 
 
 
Table 24: The Total Number of Passengers Arriving by Saudi Aircraft from European 




 Riyadh Jeddah Total 
London 47,009 36,689 83,698 
Frankfurt 13,059 3,949 17,008 
Rome 22,200 12,675 34,875 
Paris 14,902 15,987 30,889 
 
 





 UK US 
Total 6 8 
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 Passengers Travelling by Saudi Arabian Aircrafts from Domestic to Foreign Airports 1970–1979 
AD Table 8-28 p 309. Source: Saudi Arabian Airlines 
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 Source: Saudi Arabian Airlines 
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1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
 % 
UK/EU 
14.67% 15.18% 18.05% 13.81% 11.92% 10.72% 9.08% 8.00% 8.51% 
 
 
Table 27: Percentage of the UK Imports/Exports to Saudi Arabia as a total of the EU (1972-
80). 
 
 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
IMPORTS 
UK/EU 
23.99% 22.22% 18.22% 24.57% 16.74% 16.38% 16.26% 15.86% 15.05% 
EXPORTS 
UK/EU 




HRH Prince Khalid Al-Faisal presents HM Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom with a signed limited 
edition lithograph on the occasion of the British monarch’s visit to the Painting & Patronage exhibition held in 










The Rt Hon Baroness Margaret Thatcher, former British Prime Minister, receives from 
HRH Prince Khalid Al-Faisal a signed lithograph at a ceremony in 2000 attended by Sir 






HRH Prince Khalid Al-Faisal meets with some of the young students and their teachers who participated in several 
Painting & Patronage summer school programmes held in Abha, London and Riyadh. Further events were planned 
in Burnley, East London and Jeddah. Each summer school features classes in a wide range of disciplines including 







HRH The Prince of Wales and HRH Prince Khalid Al-Faisal held joint exhibitions oftheir paintings in London in 
2000 and Riyadh in 2001 and together launched a significant 
cultural and educational exchange programme between The Prince’s Foundation and the 
King Faisal Foundation. 
 
For a more detailed discussion of international student immigration statistics see the 
IPPR's publication Student migration in the UK (February 2011). 
Table 28: Visa Statistics by Country: Top Ten Countries/Territories 
 
 
Total exc. visitors Total inc. student visitors 
 
2010 2011 2010 2011 
China 44,724 52,484 51,673 59,914 
India 49,406 34,827 52,741 38,486 
Pakistan 26,490 35,660 26,794 36,100 
Saudi Arabia 14,560 10,086 18,374 16,322 
United States 14,985 14,476 15,339 14,640 
Nigeria 12,256 12,108 15,099 14,618 
Russia 3,221 3,754 11,377 13,790 
Turkey 4,366 3,118 10,824 11,402 
Malaysia 6,938 7,418 6,950 7,442 






Top non-EU sending countries 
 
 
Source: http://www.ukcisa.org.uk/Info-for-universities-colleges--schools/Policy-
research--statistics/Research--statistics/International-students-in-UK-HE/ 
 
 
 
